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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Joseph R. Cerami
The dominant trend within universities and think tanks is toward ever-narrowing specialization: a higher premium is placed on functioning deeply within a single field than broadly across
several. And yet without some awareness of the whole—without some sense of how means converge to accomplish or to frustrate ends—there can be no strategy. And without strategy there is
only drift.
Paul Kennedy and
John Lewis Gaddis
Yale University

Advice to strategists comes in many forms. Kennedy and Gaddis’s thoughts expressed
above are representative of most scholars, statesmen, and generals—strategy is a critical
subject for senior leaders. George Marshall expressed concerns, late in his distinguished
career, that as a statesman he had to learn a “whole new set of skills.” Theater strategists, like
Field Marshall Slim, have written that senior leaders must learn how to “think big.”
Important books on the subject stress an in depth knowledge of history, economics, politics,
geography, culture, and so on. For a concept that remains hard to define, the study of strategy
remains a complex subject of lifelong learning for scholars, statesmen, and soldiers alike.
For more than three decades the Army War College (AWC) Department of National
Security and Strategy has faced the challenge of educating future strategic leaders on the
subject of National Security, or Grand Strategy. Fitting at the top of an officer’s or
government official's career-long, professional development program, the challenge has been
to design a course on strategy that incorporates its many facets, in a short period of time, all
within the one-year, senior service college curriculum. To do this, a conceptual approach has
provided the framework to think about strategy formulation. The purpose of this volume is to
present the Army War College’s strategy formulation model to students and practitioners.
This book serves as a guide to one method for the formulation, analysis and study of
strategy—an approach which we have found to be useful in providing generations of
strategists with the conceptual tools to think systematically, strategically, critically,
creatively and big. Balancing what is described in the following chapters as ends, ways, and
means—remains at the core of the Army War College’s approach to national security and
military strategy and strategy formulation.
Each of the following chapters highlights a major concept used in our strategy formulation
model. All of the authors have been on the faculty at one of the nation’s armed forces, senior
service colleges. They have structured their essays to focus on concepts that have been
developed, debated, and tested for use in small group seminars, in an adult learning
environment. The majority of these chapters have been used effectively as required readings
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for the core strategy course. Several have been written especially for this book, to fill in some
of the gaps for explaining the strategy making process. The authors are drawn from several
academic fields, including international relations, government, public policy and, of course,
history. Several have also had high-level experience working as strategists at the White
House, in the Pentagon, and in joint and multinational, theater headquarters. The combined
effect is a book that is academic in its focus on concepts and theoretical approaches, yet
practical in the sense of being intended as a working guide for strategists. Each chapter also
serves as material to guide seminar discussion, to focus debate, and to define what we believe
are the key concepts in the study and formulation of strategy. While the strategic
environment is dynamic and complex, our experience has been that these concepts are a most
useful foundation for practitioners and scholars of national security strategy and defense
policy.

CHAPTER 2: A PRIMER IN STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT—
ROBERT H. DORFF.
In this chapter, Robert Dorff presents the core of the strategy formulation model, what we
call the “ends, ways, and means” of strategy. Grand strategy and national security strategy
are defined. Key concepts for the study of strategy are introduced, including brief discussions
of foundation concepts, such as, values, interests, threats, challenges, national security
strategy and risk assessments. The chapter ends with a comparison of current, alternative
approaches for U.S. national security strategy. The concepts and themes introduced in
Chapter 2 are developed in greater depth in the remainder of the book.

CHAPTER 3: ETHICAL ISSUES IN WAR: AN OVERVIEW—
MARTIN L. COOK.
Martin Cook’s essay provides background on the limits, constraints, and criteria that have
evolved regarding the use of violence by states and societies. Chapter 3 includes a review of
just war thinking and the general history of Western legal and ethical thought. Cook notes the
open questions regarding cultural diversity, especially in what many call the age of
globalization. How Western thought converges and diverges from other cultural and ethical
traditions, customs and laws should be an important area for seminar discussions and future
research. This Chapter includes the just war framework and criteria, and highlights the
importance of developing a strategist’s understanding of the moral structure of just decisions
in going to war, as well as just conduct in war.

CHAPTER 4: SOME BASIC CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES TO THE
STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS—ROBERT H. DORFF.
In Chapter 4, Robert Dorff introduces the essential concepts used by international
relations scholars to help understand, analyze and explain state behavior. His primary focus
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is on the nation-state and how perceptions of values and interests influence their behavior in
the international environment. The chapter’s main focus is on describing and expanding
Waltz’s three levels of analysis—the system, the state, and the individual. The reader also is
introduced to realist and idealist worldviews, and related concepts involving neorealism,
anarchy, the security dilemma, balance of power, Wilsonianism, and international
institutionalism. Other key foundation concepts the chapter addresses include, sovereignty,
nationalism, and inter and nongovernmental organizations. Dorff stresses the importance of
integrating the levels of analysis in strategic thinking. He also emphasizes the importance of
understanding the competing views and assumptions used when explaining nation state
behavior. The notion of how the concept of national interest serves to shape international
relations and security is introduced in Chapter 4, and expanded in much greater depth in
Chapters 5 and 6.

CHAPTER 5: THE PERSISTENCE OF CREDIBILITY: INTERESTS,
THREATS AND PLANNING FOR THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY
POWER—DAVID JABLONSKY.
David Jablonsky presents the first of two chapters on the concept of national interest.
Jablonsky’s realist perspective emphasizes the link between interests and credibility, which
he defines as a combination of both influence and will. This chapter introduces a framework
for analyzing national interests in terms of two dimensions—categories and intensity.
Categories of national interests include physical security, economic prosperity, values, and
world order. He subdivides the concept of intensity of national interests into vital, important
and peripheral. Jablonsky illustrates how using these two dimensions assists strategists in
analyzing the national interest and developing national priorities. Chapter 5 also reviews the
connections between national interest and the use of force. The Weinberger Doctrine is
presented and compared with the succeeding debates about gray area challenges, as well as
humanitarian values and interests. Jablonsky views the national interest as the key concept
for prioritizing national security policy and maintaining long term consistency and clarity.
Chapter 6 presents a different view.

CHAPTER 6: NATIONAL INTEREST: FROM ABSTRACTION TO
STRATEGY—MICHAEL G. ROSKIN.
In Chapter 6, Michael Roskin stresses the difficulty of turning national interest into a
working strategy. He writes of the strategist’s problems for using national interest to achieve
an undistorted clarity, or provide the ability to anticipate the 2d and 3d order effects of policy
options and decisions. Instead, Roskin sees national interest as a conceptual device most
useful for defining arguments limiting the number of crusades a nation should engage in.
Roskin reviews the concept in terms of the philosophies of Machiavelli and Clausewitz. He
then briefly traces the American interpretations, starting with George Washington and the
founding fathers, through Woodrow Wilson’s legal-idealistic approach. He then writes of the
shift in thinking among international relations experts in the 1930s, with the introduction of
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the Realist School, spearheaded by Hans Morgenthau. Roskin provides a taxonomy for
categorizing national interests in terms of importance, duration, specificity and
compatibility. For Roskin, the primary challenge for strategists is in finding where different
nations’ interests are in competition and where they are complementary. Roskin also points
out what he calls the warping effects on using national interest for strategy formulation. He
includes ideology, global systemic effects, public and elite convictions, mass media, and
bureaucratic policy inertia. These barriers, or constraints, are significant when attempting
innovative and radical approaches. Finally, Roskin concludes that the concept of national
interest is most useful for training analysts in asking good questions. Questions that are
necessary for strategists to focus on the use and limits of power, the true intensity of interests,
the will to use power, as well as the flexibility for maneuver and compromise. The comparison
of the Jablonsky and Roskin essays should provide ample room for seminar discussions about
the utility and problems of using the concept of national interest in strategy formulation.

CHAPTER 7: REGIONAL STUDIES AND GLOBAL STRATEGY—
R. CRAIG NATION.
Craig Nation writes of the importance of the New Regionalism in strategic studies. In
Chapter 7, Nation argues that the emergence of regional issues have redefined the security
environment of the 21st Century. This new configuration of global power requires strategists
who have a more sophisticated understanding of regional and national political, social, and
cultural processes. The challenge for strategists is to integrate regional perspectives, with a
sensitivity to regional and national dynamics; including geographic, social, cultural and
religious, as well as military dimensions. Nation describes the ways that regional affairs
condition the global security agenda and channel and constrain U.S. priorities that affect the
contours of world order. Four reasons he cites include regional sources of instability and
conflict; geopolitics; cultural dimensions of warfare; and regional alliances and associations.
Chapter 7 discusses Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis, and the writings on
geopolitics by Mackinder, Mahan, and Spykman. Regarding the military dimension of
strategy, Nation writes about the issues surrounding rogue and failed states, civil wars, and
complex and small-scale contingencies. Chapter 7 emphasizes the significance of the Army
War College’s core course on Regional Strategic Appraisals, and the importance of a New
Regionalism in balancing a global approach to international strategic studies.

CHAPTER 8: NATIONAL POWER—DAVID JABLONSKY.
Strategist’s understanding of the elements and instruments of national power are key to
strategy formulation. David Jablonsky’s chapter takes the reader back to Thomas Hobbes
and the Realist’s School of international relations—the primacy of self-help in an anarchic
international system. Key to Jablonsky’s treatment is an appreciation for the
multidimensional nature of the elements of power. In this chapter the author emphasizes the
dynamic, situational and relational aspects of power with respect to the interactions of state
and nonstate actors. Jablonsky discusses both the natural and social determinants of power.
Natural determinants include geography, resources and population. The social determinants
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include the states’ economic, political, military, psychosocial, and information systems. He
discusses emerging trends and their potential impact for U.S. defense and foreign policy
regarding the growing complexity of power relations among nation-states and international
actors. The author is careful to point out that strategy formulation remains more art than
science and he highlights the importance of qualitative factors in strategy formulation. These
include the importance of subjective perceptions of national power, purpose, and will.
Jablonsky also provides a framework for gain and risk assessments. Focusing on the elements
and instruments of national power provides a conceptual tool for linking means, ways and
ends—an essential link in the strategy formulation process. In sum, national power is the
concept that helps define the instruments used by a variety of government organizations to
achieve the national interest, as derived from national values. Jablonsky concludes by noting
how a deep understanding of the complexity of national power helps teach flexible thinking,
which he calls the sine qua non for strategists.

CHAPTER 9: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE INTERAGENCY
PROCESS: FORWARD INTO THE 21ST CENTURY—
GABRIEL MARCELLA.
Gabriel Marcella describes the complexity of governmental policymaking in Chapter 9.
Marcella defines the interagency process as the use of all of the nation’s instruments of power,
as coordinated by the national security staffs of a variety of government agencies, into a
coherent and effective national security policy. The challenge for strategists is to insure the
intellectual integration of the nation’s power to achieve a unity of effort within the U.S.
government. Marcella discusses the history of the U.S. government’s efforts at achieving
what is called purposeful adaptation, in the Post World War II era. He reviews the foundation
of the National Security Council (NSC), as legislated by the National Security Act of 1947.
The chapter describes the NSC policymaking structure of principals and deputies
committees, and interagency working groups. The chapter also examines the presidential
policy and decision directive processes. Included is a section comparing the various cultures
that stereotype the perceived differences in organizational and individual behaviors. Key for
strategists is developing an appreciation for the fact that no one agency resolves any issue in
today’s complex security environment. Marcella also examines the interagency process at the
operational level, including the roles and functions of the ambassadors, the embassy country
team, and the regional military commanders. For students of national security policymaking,
Marcella stresses the importance of the interagency process, as well as the growing
significance of multinational coalitions. The strategist’s skill sets for facing the challenges of
the 21st Century should include an appreciation of working effectively in international
diplomacy and negotiations, as well as within the domestic, interagency process of
governmental networks and bureaucracy.
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CHAPTER 10: THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: DOCUMENTING
STRATEGIC VISION—DON SNIDER AND JOHN A. NAGL.
Former NSC staffer, Don Snider, and co-author, John Nagl, provide an in-depth analysis
of the product that, since 1987, has been the official, presidential document for defining U.S.
national security strategy. The authors describe the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and the congressional requirement for a written national
security, or grand strategy. Snider and Nagl agree with previous authors on the utility of
grand strategy—to coherently integrate all the resources of national power for mid and long
term strategy to define and further U.S. national interests. In addition, they address the
political context of defense reform and the problems of executive and legislative branch
cooperation, especially in periods of gridlock and adversarial politics. Nevertheless, National
Security Strategies have been written and published and viewed as authoritative statements
of the nation’s grand strategy. The authors point out the documents five key purposes to
communicate the President’s strategic vision to Congress; to key constituents; to foreign and
domestic audiences; to solidify an intergovernmental consensus on foreign and defense policy;
and to contribute substance in the administration’s overall agenda. Chapter 10 briefly
reviews the major attributes and shifts in the NSS documents from 1987 to the current
version, spanning the Reagan, Bush and Clinton presidencies. Snider and Nagl note the
simple elegance of the three overriding goals for national security strategy during the Clinton
era—enhancing security, promoting prosperity and promoting democracy. Chapter 10 ends
with a brief discussion of the remaining debates regarding the utility of the NSS documents.
Remaining issues include the difficulties of developing grand strategy in light of divided
government, and the lack of an executive branch organization for conducting long range
planning in a substantive, systematic manner. They also note the tendency for national level
strategists to focus on crisis management and near term policy development and
implementation. Given the complexity of the interagency process as described in the previous
chapter, Snider and Nagl have presented strategists with significant challenges. These
include developing and maintaining an overarching strategy and strategic vision to provide
an azimuth and prevent the drift that concerns Kennedy and Gaddis. This is of course more
difficult when engaged in day to day operations that in effect serve to shape the current and
future security environments. The additional problem of developing an organizational
capacity for grand strategy and long-range planning remains to be solved.

CHAPTER 11: WHY IS STRATEGY DIFFICULT? —DAVID JABLONSKY.
In Chapter 11, Jablonsky explores the important question of why strategy remains the
most difficult of all. Here he develops the idea of strategy as an art, a creative activity. Several
key concepts are introduced. One is the policy continuum, as the relationship of policy,
strategy and tactics. Another is the modern era’s notion of grand strategy as a nation’s
balancing of ends-ways-means in the complex construct represented as including vertical
(strategic, operational and tactical) and horizontal (economic, psychological, political and
military) dimensions. In this section, Jablonsky further discusses Clausewitz’s prescription,
that war is a continuation of politics with the addition of other means. Clausewitz’s
remarkable trinity, which has evolved into an American Trinitarian approach (including the
6

army, the government and the people), is also introduced. Jablonsky’s historical review
includes the impact of the Industrial and French Revolutions, and how the transformations of
technology and politics forever changed the modern conception of national security and
military strategy. Chapter 11 provides essential background reading for current discussions
regarding the Revolution in Military Affairs, the influence of Information Age technology,
and ongoing efforts at military transformation and innovation.

CHAPTER 12: FORCE PLANNING AND U.S. DEFENSE POLICY—
JOHN F. TROXELL.
The examination of military strategy continues in Chapter 12. John F. Troxell focuses
more directly on the subjects of defense policy and strategy, and military force planning.
Force planning is defined as determining the force structure of the right size and composition
to achieve a nation’s security goals. Troxell prescribes key tasks for force planners in
recommending how much force structure, how much risk to accept, how to posture the force,
and how to defend their recommendations to the Congress and public. Chapter 12 includes an
in depth discussion of the two dominant force planning methods—threat-based and
capability-based concepts. Troxell reviews defense policy from the Truman through the
Clinton Administrations and recounts the complexities of reconciling force structure with the
defense policies and national security strategies of each period. Readers will find useful
summaries of defense policy in the Cold War era. Troxell also examines post-Cold War
defense policy and program reviews as well as the debates about the two major theater of war
force planning requirements. The chapter ends with an important model for dynamic force
planning that integrates both the threat and capability based approaches.

CHAPTER 13: TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF MILITARY
STRATEGY—ARTHUR F. LYKKE, JR.
Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., the father of the Army War College’s ends, ways, and means strategy
models, served on the AWC faculty for more than 20 years. It is no exaggeration to say that the
simple elegance of his model, as expressed in this brief essay, influenced generations of
strategic thinkers. The importance of the Lykke model became legendary among graduates in
senior positions in the U.S. armed forces, as well as with the AWC’s distinguished
International Fellows, many of whom went on to lead their nation’s military establishments.
In Chapter 13 we have reproduced the Lykke article that simply lays out the ends, ways,
means model of strategy. Lykke applies it to the subject of military strategy, while pointing
out the model’s utility for any and all kinds of strategies. The analysis of ends (or the
objectives), ways (or courses of action), and means (or resources) is a concept useful at the
strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. Important for strategists is Lykke’s emphasis
on the objective in strategy, and the distinction between political and military objectives.
Central to the U.S. tradition of civil-military relations is Lykke’s repetition of a familiar
Clausewitzian concept—that policy drives strategy and that the political objectives must
come first. The critical task then for military strategists is to understand the political
objective and derive the military objectives, courses of action, and resources that provide the
7

military instrument, in conjunction with the other instruments of national power, as the
means to achieve political ends. This simple construct is most complex when put into practice.
We believe that mastering ends, ways, and means remains at the heart of strategy. Lykke
encourages strategists to think long and hard about balancing ends, ways, and means as the
core concept for strategy formulation.

CHAPTER 14: STRATEGIC RISK—JAMES F. HOLCOMB, JR.
In Chapter 14, James Holcomb discusses a variety of aspects of the subject of strategic
risk. Holcomb provides a review of risk as covered by several important modern strategists,
including Liddell-Hart, Beaufre, Eccles, Wylie and Allison, as well as in chapters in this book
by Lykke and Jablonsky. He also links the topic to foundational concepts on uncertainty,
chance and genius, as found in Clausewitz’s writing. Chapter 14 reviews several frameworks
for risk assessment and management and includes a section from Neuchterlein’s approach to
assessing values and cost-risk factors in determining national interests. Included are
sections on the CIA’s suggested framework, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff readiness reporting
system. Holcomb concludes with a brief case study on risk assessment, as applied to an
analysis of the Kosovo bombing campaign. In the final analysis, risk assessment returns the
reader to the beginning of this book, and to the fundamental strategic calculations regarding
values, national interests, political and military objectives and, of course, ends, ways, and
means.

CHAPTER 15: STRATEGIC ART: THE NEW DISCIPLINE FOR 21st
CENTURY LEADERS—RICHARD A. CHILCOAT.
The final chapter provides a capstone for this guide and addresses the importance of
educating individual strategists. Chilcoat’s chapter is a call for strategic thinkers to develop
an approach to strategic art rivaling the mid-1980s development of operational art. By this
point the reader will be familiar with the framework used to define the strategic art—as the
skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means to promote and
defend the national interests. The chapter addresses individual professional development
and the importance of educating senior leaders for three interrelated roles—as strategic
leaders, practitioners and theorists. The complex challenges facing post Cold War strategists
are evaluated in light of the required skills, knowledge and abilities, as described in case
studies contrasting the conventional Persian Gulf War with unconventional peace operations
in Bosnia. Chilcoat concludes by pointing out three trends that face strategists in the new
global era. These are first, an understanding of adult learning; second, appreciating the
utilization of technology; and third, expanding conceptual horizons. Chilcoat also addresses
the importance of civil-military relations, as well as the difficulty of wargaming and
simulating the political-military environment of today’s shifting strategic landscape.
Chapter 15 provides important ideas and poses significant questions for those engaged in
security studies, and especially those engaged in the professional development of strategic
leaders at all levels of the armed forces.
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APPENDIX I: GUIDELINES FOR STRATEGY.
Appendix I is copied from the AWC’s core strategy course directive. In the appendix the
reader will find an outline of the strategy formulation model and working definitions.
Definitions are presented for ease of reference on the key concepts of national values, national
interests, strategic appraisals, national policy, national strategy, military strategy, and risk
assessment. Naturally, for an in-depth discussion of the concepts the reader is referred to the
appropriate chapters.

APPENDIX II: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY:
A BIBLIOGRAPHY—JANE GIBISH.
A bibliography for strategists is provided in Appendix II. Jane Gibish, of the Army War
College Library, compiled this bibliography. The list includes both classic and current works.
The editors of this volume want to express their sincere thanks to the AWC Library staff,
under the leadership of Mr. Bohdan Kohutiak. The AWC Library remains a cornerstone for
the research into the study of national security strategy at Carlisle Barracks.
The editors and authors acknowledge that this book is not a complete coverage of all of the
subject matter related to the study of strategy. In fact, the treatment of strategy formulation
found here is only one aspect of the AWC’s intensive, two-month, core strategy course. For
those involved in designing courses on grand strategy, the importance of including history
and case studies cannot be overstated. It is also not possible to develop an in-depth
appreciation for strategy without studying the material found in the other two AWC core
courses. These courses cover the equally complex subjects of Strategic Leadership and
Management, and Military Planning and Operations. Of course, our parochial view is that
strategy is most important and must come first. So, consider this volume a starting point, as
well as a reference book. The U.S. Army War College’s Guide to Strategy asks that the reader,
as student, engage in the strategic thought process. The simple intent of this book is to
contribute to your understanding of our approach to strategy formulation. If it helps you
think conceptually, analytically, critically and creatively about the important issues
surrounding national security, or grand strategy, then so much the better for the theory and
practice of strategy. The ultimate measure of success of this book is in its utility for civilian
and military strategists—those engaged in the challenge of working day-to-day policy issues,
while keeping one eye on the evolving strategic landscape, and the other on defending and
promoting the nation’s security values and interests for the mid and long term.
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CHAPTER 2
A PRIMER IN STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
Robert H. Dorff
THE STRATEGY FRAMEWORK.
One of the key elements in teaching strategy at the United States Army War College is the
strategy framework. Conceptually, we define strategy as the relationship among ends, ways,
and means. Ends are the objectives or goals sought. Means are the resources available to
pursue the objectives. And Ways or methods are how one organizes and applies the resources.
Each of these components suggests a related question. What do we want to pursue (ends)?
With what (means)? How (ways)? This very simple framework is useful in a variety of
applications. Consider a common example drawn from the world of sports. In a basketball
game, most teams begin a game with a straightforward objective of winning. We assume for
the sake of simplifying the argument that both teams are relatively evenly matched and that
1
both enter the game with the objective of winning. Obviously, both teams have resources that
consist first and foremost of the players on their respective rosters. Characteristics of those
players provide additional dimensions of the resources available in the play of the game (e.g.,
speed, height, quickness, etc.). Rules of the game provide not only the context within which
the game is played but also additional resources that the coaches can use. For example, the
shot clock is not just a rule governing how long a team can hold the ball before taking a shot; it
2
is also something a coach can use to increase one team’s advantage over the other. Most rules
affect the choices coaches have as to how they use their resources. Essentially, a team
achieves its objective of winning the game by outscoring the opponent. They can accomplish
this with a strategy that employs both offensive (how your team will score) and defensive (how
you prevent the other team from scoring) “ways” or “methods.” Successful “strategic” coaches
figure out ways to employ their means more effectively than their opposing coaches, thereby
achieving their objective more frequently. (Of course, successful coaches also recruit better
“means” than their opponents.) We can see that the choices a coach makes all relate back to
decisions about how to employ the means in pursuit of the objective. The coach who is a
strategic thinker is planning and the team is executing a strategy.

GRAND STRATEGY.
Countries employ strategies much as basketball teams do. However, the nature of the
game and the elements of strategy are considerably more complex than in the game of
basketball. And of course, the stakes of the game are considerably higher, thereby making the
risk of failure much greater (a country losing its sovereignty as opposed to a team losing a
game). Nonetheless, the basic framework remains the same. We want to consider what
objectives a country decides to pursue, with what resources, and how.
11

When we talk about the strategy a country employs in pursuit of its interests, we usually
use terms such as National Strategy, National Security Strategy, or Grand Strategy. We use
the latter term in this chapter to denote a country’s broadest approach to the pursuit of its
national objectives in the international system. At times it appears that all three terms are
essentially synonymous, and it is not really necessary to spend time trying to define them
3
here. The essential point is that a country adopts objectives based on its interests and values
and how they are affected, threatened, or challenged in the international system. The means
it possesses to pursue those objectives fall into three or four (depending on how one
conceptualizes them) broad categories of national power, which we call “instruments of
4
national power.” They are political/diplomatic, economic, military, and informational. How a
country marshals and applies those instruments of national power constitute the “ways” of its
5
grand strategy. One of our goals in this book is to provide a framework that the reader can
use in analyzing and assessing the ways in which the United States is protecting and
promoting its interests in the post-Cold War world. Such an analysis must begin with an
assessment of U.S. grand strategy.
The Cold War provides an excellent example of how the strategy framework can be used to
describe and subsequently analyze a country’s grand strategy. We examine it from the
perspective of the United States. The grand strategy of the United States during the Cold War
was containment, a name that derived from the core objective of that strategy which was to
contain communism, or prevent the further spread of Soviet communism and its influence.
The early stages of the Cold War saw the strategy develop along the lines suggested by George
Kennan in his now famous “long telegram” from Moscow. Kennan wrote: “The main element
of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but
6
firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies . . .” According to his
assessment, there was both an offensive and defensive component to the strategy. The
defensive objective was to hold back the political, economic and military influence and
physical presence of the USSR. The offensive objective, somewhat overlooked in conventional
analyses of United States Cold War policy, was the promotion of stable democracies and
market economies; healthy market democracies would deprive the Soviets of fertile ground in
which to sow the seeds of their revolutionary ideology.
Although a detailed analysis of containment is beyond the scope of what we want to
accomplish here, it is useful to illustrate how the United States implemented its strategy of
containment. The overall objective, of course, was to contain communism. The means
consisted of the economic, military, and political/diplomatic instruments of power. On the
economic side, the Marshall Plan provides the best example of how the United States used its
considerable economic power in support of the strategy. The Marshall Plan, by infusing large
amounts of United States capital into the devastated West European economies, would help
restore their economic vitality. This would then remove one of the potential sources of appeal
for communist ideology (the physical dislocations and psychological pressures people feel
when they have no apparent economic sources of survival). The Marshall Plan is therefore one
example of a “way” in which the United States applied the economic “means” in pursuit of its
overall strategic objective.
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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provides an excellent illustration of how
the United States employed the military instrument of national power as part of its overall
grand strategy. This military alliance was primarily a collective defense organization in
which the United States provided the vast muscle of its military might to insure the West
7
Europeans that the Soviet military could not threaten their physical security. Unable to
marshal much in the way of their own military power, most of which had been either
destroyed or exhausted in the war, the West Europeans were encouraged to rely on the
capabilities of the United States. This was especially true of the United States nuclear
umbrella, which was to take shape particularly in the 1950s as the Cold War unfolded. So
NATO serves as an example of a “way” in which the United States applied the military
“means” in pursuit of its overall strategic objective.
Finally, the United States used its considerable political/diplomatic power by initially
declaring and then implementing the Truman Doctrine. This doctrine stated that the United
States would support those countries seeking to resist communist movements. Obviously
economic and military resources backed up this doctrine. But the fact that the United States
was willing to make an open political declaration of its intentions to provide such assistance is
an example of the use of political/diplomatic “means” in support of the grand strategy of
containment. One can also argue that even then, long before the “Information Age” made the
use of information technology part of our national security lexicon, the United States
employed the informational dimension of power through Radio Free Europe, Voice of
America, and the like. So the Truman Doctrine serves as an example of a “way” in which the
United States applied the political/diplomatic and the informational “means” in pursuit of its
overall strategic objective.

U.S. GRAND STRATEGY TODAY.
With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States
has had to reassess its grand strategy. Whether a result of the success of the United States
8
grand strategy of containment or other factors, this profound transformation of the
international security environment has rendered much of the common strategic frame of
reference, so familiar for the past 50 years, less relevant today. The challenge lies in
identifying a new grand strategy that captures the critical characteristics of the new
international security environment and identifies appropriate ends, ways and means for
organizing and executing the search for security in the post-Cold War world.
Such periods of significant transformation and change in the strategic environment are
not new but they do occur infrequently. Historically change in the international security
system tends to unfold incrementally and in an evolutionary manner, rather than as a result
of wholesale transformation and revolution. Yet sweeping transformation does occur
periodically, and we often refer to the ensuing period in which the search for a new grand
strategy occurs as a “strategic pause.” What is often daunting in a period of strategic pause is
the fact that continuity and change coexist. We must examine a newly emerging system with
an eye toward identifying factors and forces that fall into four basic categories: 1) that which is
“old” but still relevant; 2) that which is “old” and no longer relevant; 3) that which is “new” and
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relevant; and 4) that which is “new” but not relevant. Adapting effectively to the new
circumstances while simultaneously balancing against the lingering circumstances from the
older system is the central challenge. If we jettison too quickly parts of the old framework, we
may find ourselves ill prepared to deal with some of the traditional challenges that have
endured from one period to the next. If we fail to identify and respond quickly enough to the
new characteristics, we will find that we have outdated and only marginally useful
instruments for dealing with the new challenges. So how do we proceed in this search for a
new grand strategy in a period of strategic pause?
First, we must know what characteristics and factors are generally important in building
a grand strategy. Then we turn to an analysis of the contemporary international security
environment in an attempt to identify as precisely as possible the relevant characteristics of
that environment. Figure 1 provides one methodology for conducting such a strategic
9
assessment.

National Values

National Interests

Strategic Appraisal

National Policy

National Strategy

Military Strategy

Risk Assessment
Figure 1. Strategy Formulation.
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The process begins with identifying core national values from which one can derive
national interests. Based on the identified interests, we can develop statements of national
objectives that are the ends of our grand strategy. Identifying the interests we wish to protect
is an essential ingredient of a strategic appraisal. That appraisal then continues with the
identification of threats and challenges to those interests. We want to know, as best we can,
who or what can threaten our interests in what ways. The threats and challenges may derive
from specific actors in the international system (states or non-state actors), or they may be
more generally based in developments and trends occurring within the system (such as
increasing economic globalization or weapons proliferation). Once the threats and challenges
to U.S. interests have been identified, we must examine current policy to see if we are
adequately addressing the protection and promotion of our interests. Realigning our strategy
with the protection and promotion of our interests, given the threats and challenges to them
in the contemporary security environment, is the essence of the search for a new grand
strategy. Of course, we must also identify and articulate the other component parts of that
strategy (such as a military strategy in support of the national security strategy), and conduct
a risk assessment. The latter is important because no country, including the United States,
has unlimited resources (means) with which to pursue its objectives (ends). This implies that
we must make tradeoffs in what we protect and promote and how. Such tradeoffs entail risk,
and we must make conscious decisions about how much risk in what areas we are willing to
bear.
Let us use this strategy framework to explore the ongoing United States search for
security in the contemporary international system. One of the most fundamental questions of
grand strategy is the general role that the country will play in international affairs. This
question has a long and serious history in the debate within American society. In its simplest
form it was a debate between isolationists and interventionists. The former argued that
United States interests were preeminently domestic and could be best protected by a refusal
to become engaged in international affairs. The interventionist school argued that United
States interests required an active international role for the country. In more recent years
this debate has played out in the realist-idealist schools of thought, with Wilsonian idealism
serving as an organizing framework for the advocates of intervention and realism serving the
10
same purpose for advocates of isolationism (or at least minimal activism).
The post-Cold War debate has witnessed the emergence of many proposals for the proper
grand strategic role for the United States, and our purpose here is not to review all of them.
Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross offer one very useful review of four general alternatives
11
that we use in this overview. They are: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative
security, and primacy. Neo-isolationism takes its cue from its isolationist precursors and
argues that the United States should adopt a minimally active, largely defensive role.
Selective engagement draws on the traditional realist concept of balancing power for its
definition of the proper United States role. Primacy is perhaps the extreme version of realism,
arguing for a highly active United States role designed to maintain American dominance of
the security environment. And cooperative security is the Wilsonian idealist legacy: Very
active United States role in support of cooperation and stability maintenance through close
and frequent participation with other actors in the international system.
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In the remainder of this chapter we examine the existing United States National Security
Strategy. We will review this document for what it has to say both about United States
national interests and the current strategy for addressing them. What we don’t address here
is the nature of the threats and challenges to those interests in the contemporary
international system, and hence the overall soundness of the strategy. Readers may wish to
conduct their own assessment employing the framework outlined here.

CURRENT U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY.
Beginning with congressional passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department
Reorganization Act of 1986, the President of the United States is required to produce an
12
annual statement of the National Security Strategy. Although there are problems with the
document, it nonetheless provides an excellent starting point for our analysis of current
United States strategy. The most recent document appeared in October 1998 and is entitled
“A National Security Strategy for a New Century.” Let us highlight the key elements of that
document as they pertain to our search for security in the 21st Century.
According to this and other official statements of United States policy, there are certain
“fundamental and enduring needs” which our national security strategy must ensure. They
are: “…protect the lives and safety of Americans, maintain the sovereignty of the United
States with its values, institutions and territory intact, and promote the prosperity and
13
well-being of the nation and its people.” Based on these enduring needs, the document
articulates a set of national interests for the United States in three categories: vital interests,
important national interests, and humanitarian and other interests. Among vital interests
the National Security Strategy identifies “the physical security of our territory and that of our
allies, the safety of our citizens, our economic well-being and the protection of our critical
infrastructures.” Important national interests are identified as those that “do not affect our
national survival, but [which] do affect our national well-being and the character of the world
in which we live.” The document provides no specific list but continues on to state: “Our efforts
to halt the flow of refugees from Haiti and restore democracy in that state, our participation in
NATO operations in Bosnia and our efforts to protect the global environment are relevant
14
examples.” Humanitarian and other interests require action because “our values demand it.
Examples include responding to natural and manmade disasters or violations of human
rights, supporting democratization and civil control of the military, assisting humanitarian
15
demining, and promoting sustainable development.”
Based on these categories of interests, the document proceeds to identify three core
national objectives for our national security strategy: enhancing our security, bolstering our
economic prosperity and promoting democracy abroad. The threats and challenges it
identifies to U.S. security are regional or state-centered threats, transnational threats, the
spread of dangerous technologies, foreign intelligence collection, and failed states. Bolstering
our economic prosperity and promoting democracy abroad are objectives that support our
security, and a variety of ways and means are identified as potential contributors to the
accomplishment of these objectives. The strategy identified by the Clinton Administration, as
16
stated in its broadest terms, is one of “engagement and enlargement.” Arguing for the
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“imperative of engagement” (the United States “must lead abroad if we are to be secure at
home”) it identifies the “enlargement” of the community of market democracies as the
strategic concept for achieving our objectives. The means? “Today’s complex security
environment demands that all our instruments of national power be effectively integrated to
17
achieve our security objectives.” Military instruments alone will not suffice; we must
employ the full range of the instruments, to include military, political, economic, and
informational.
The question of course remains whether this is indeed a sound and appropriate strategy.
Has the document correctly identified United States interests? Do the stated objectives
reflect the underlying interests? Does it address the likely challenges and threats to those
interests and objectives? Does it adequately articulate the concepts for pursuing those
objectives? Can we see the proper mix and amount of means for use in the ways proposed? In
other words, does this stated national security strategy offer a reasonable chance for finding
security in the 21st Century? It is here that the search begins in earnest. We provide no
answers but suggest that by using the basic framework and approach outlined in this essay,
readers can reach their own conclusions about the adequacy and appropriateness of current
and future U.S. National Security Strategy.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2
1. That this might not always be true is illustrated by the case of a hopelessly outclassed team up against a
powerhouse: the former may just want to “make a good showing.”
2. This is consistent with the game framework used in many analyses of political systems. For example, see
James Eisenstein, Mark Kessler, Bruce A. Williams, and Jacqueline Vaughn Switzer, The Play of Power: An
Introduction to American Government (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996) in which the authors consistently
argue that rules are also resources that players can employ in the pursuit of their objectives. The same argument
can be made about rules such as international law and regimes in the international system.
3. For example, the DoD Dictionary contains the following statement as its definition of National Security
Strategy: “The art and science of developing, applying and coordinating the instruments of national power
(diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.
Also called national strategy or grand strategy.”
4. See the chapter on “National Power” by David Jablonsky in this volume. Jablonsky focuses on “elements”
of national power, whereas the focus here is on instruments of national power and their use in the strategy
framework.
5. Ways are also “courses of action.” They represent the alternative approaches one can take in the pursuit of
the objectives.
6. George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” reprinted in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Spring
1987): pp. 852-868. Quote p. 868.
7. We say “primarily” a collective defense organization because there was always something of a collective
security dimension to NATO’s purpose, too. This is perhaps most aptly summed up in a statement attributed to
the first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay, that the purpose of NATO was to keep the Russians out, the
United States in, and the Germans down.

17

8. For a discussion of the role played by U.S. grand strategy in winning the Cold War, see John Lewis Gaddis,
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market democracies (enlargement). Although the title was changed primarily because of concerns that it seemed
to suggest a US-based neo-imperialistic approach to exporting democracy and capitalism, the fundamental
components of the strategy remain the same: an active US role internationally in pursuit of a growing
community of stable market democracies.
17. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, p. 1.
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CHAPTER 3
ETHICAL ISSUES IN WAR:
AN OVERVIEW
Martin L. Cook
INTRODUCTION.
Violent conflict among human beings is, unfortunately, one of the great constants in our
history as a species. As far back as we can see, the human species has engaged in war and
other forms of organized violence. But it is equally true that, as far back as human culture and
thought have left written records, humans have thought about morality and ethics. Although
cultures vary widely in how they interpret death and killing from a moral and religious
perspective, every human culture has recognized that taking human life is a morally grave
matter; every human culture has felt the need to justify taking of life in moral and religious
terms.
In the modern world, a large body of ethical and legal thought attempts to limit, constrain
and to establish criteria that sanction the use of violence in the name of the state and society.
Through the mechanisms of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the Charter of the United
Nations, military manuals such as the U.S. Army’s “Law of Land Warfare,” and similar
documents, modern governments and militaries attempt to distinguish “just war” and just
conduct in war from other types of killing of human beings. Morally conscientious military
personnel need to understand and frame their actions in moral terms so as to maintain moral
integrity in the midst of the actions and stress of combat. They do so in order to explain to
themselves and others how the killing of human beings they do is distinguishable from the
criminal act of murder.
Attempts to conduct warfare within moral limits have met with uneven success. Many
cultures and militaries fail to recognize these restraints, or do so in name only. The realities of
combat, even for the best trained and disciplined military forces, place severe strains on
respect for those limits and sometimes cause military leaders to grow impatient with them in
the midst of their need to “get the job done.” In the history of the U.S. Army, events like My Lai
in Vietnam show that even forces officially committed to just conduct in war are still capable
of atrocities in combat—and are slow to discipline such violations.
Despite these limitations, the idea of just war is one to which the well-led and disciplined
military forces of the world remain committed. The fact that the constraints of just war are
routinely overridden is no more a proof of their falsity and irrelevance than are similar points
about morality: we know the standard, and we also know human beings fall short of that
standard with depressing regularity. The fact of moral failure, rather than proving the falsity

19

of morality, points instead to the source of our disappointment in such failures: our abiding
knowledge of the morally right.
Because of the importance of just war thinking, the general history, key provisions, and
moral underpinnings of just war are things which every military person, and especially every
senior leader, must understand and be able to communicate to subordinates and the public. It
is important that senior leaders understand just war more deeply and see that the positive
laws of war emerge from a long moral tradition which rests on fundamental moral principles.
This essay will provide that history, background and moral context of ethics and war.

BACKGROUND OF JUST WAR THEORY.
Most cultures of antiquity attempted to place some restraints on war. All recognized that
there are some causes of war which are justifiable and others which are not. All recognized
that some persons are legitimate objects of attack in war and others are not. All recognized
that there were times, seasons, and religious festivals, etc. during which warfare would be
morally wrong or religiously inappropriate.
The roots of modern international law come from one specific strand of thought emerging
out of Antiquity: the Christian Roman Empire that took shape after the conversion to
Christianity of the Emperor Constantine in the year 312 AD. Although there were important
ideas of restraint in war in pre-Christian Greek and Roman thought and indeed in cultures all
over the world, it is the blend of Christian and Greco-Roman thought that set the context of
the development of full-blown just war thinking over a period of centuries.
Christianity before this time had been suspicious of entanglement in the affairs of the
Empire. For the first several centuries of the movement, Christians interpreted the teaching
of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount and other places quite literally, and saw themselves as
committed to pacifism (the refusal to use force or violence in all circumstances). Although
many appreciated the relative peace, prosperity and ease of travel the Empire’s military force
made possible, Christians felt prayer on behalf of the Emperor was the limit of their direct
support for it.
Much changed with Constantine. For many, war fought on behalf of a “Christian Empire”
was a very different thing than war on behalf of a pagan one. Further, during the century
following Constantine’s conversion, the Empire began to experience wave after wave of
invasion from the north, culminating in the fall of the city of Rome itself in 410 AD—a mere
hundred years after Constantine.
It was in that context that Christian thinkers, most notably St. Augustine, a doctor of the
church and bishop of Hippo in North Africa, first worked out the foundations of Christian just
war thought. History, Augustine argued, is morally ambiguous. Human beings hope for pure
justice and absolute righteousness. Augustine firmly believed that the faithful will
experience such purity only at the end of time when God’s kingdom comes. But until that
happens, we will experience only justice of a sort, righteousness of a sort.
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What passes for justice will require force and coercion, since there will always be people
who strive to take more than their share, to harm and steal from others. In that world, the
peacemakers who are blessed are those who use force appropriately and mournfully to keep
as much order and peace as possible under these conditions. The military officer is that
peacemaker when he or she accepts this sad necessity. Out of genuine care and concern with
the weak and helpless, the soldier shoulders the burden of fighting to maintain an order and
system of justice which, while far short of the deepest hopes of human beings, keeps the world
from sliding into complete anarchy and chaos. It is a sad necessity imposed upon the soldier by
an aggressor. It inevitably is tinged with guilt and mournfulness. The conscientious soldier
longs for a world where conflict is unnecessary, but sees that the order of well-ordered states
must be defended lest chaos rule.
For Augustine and the tradition that develops after him, Just War is an attempt to balance
two competing moral principles. It attempts to maintain the Christian concern with
non-violence and to honor the principle that taking human life is a grave moral evil. But it
attempts to balance that concern with the recognition that, the world being what it is,
important moral principles, and that protection of innocent human life requires the
willingness to use force and violence.
As it wends its way through history, the tradition of Just War thought grows and becomes
more precise and more elaborate. In that development, it faces new challenges and makes
new accommodations.
The Spanish in the New World, for example, were challenged to rethink the tradition as
they encountered and warred against indigenous populations. Are such wars, too, governed
by moral principles? Are all things permitted against such people? Or, it was seriously
debated, are they even people, as opposed to some new kind of animal? Through that
discussion came an expansion of the scope of Just War principles to populations that did not
share common cultures.
After the Protestant Reformation, as wars raged throughout Europe in the attempt to
restore religious unity to “Christendom,” some thinkers (most notably Hugo Grotius) argued
that Just War must be severed from a distinctively Christian religious foundation. Human
reason instead must provide a system for the restraint of war that will be valid despite
religious difference, valid etsi deus non daretur, even if God did not exist! In other words, for
Grotius and others, human reason is a commonality all people share, regardless of religious,
ethnic, and cultural differences. That rationality, rather than revealed religion or religious
authority, could suffice to ground moral thinking about war.
As a result of that “secularization” of Just War thinking in Europe, the foundation was laid
for the universal international law of the present international system. As a result, the
foundation was laid for that system in Natural Law (moral rules believed to be known by
reason alone, apart from particular religious ideas and institutions) and in the jus Gentium,
the “law of Peoples,” those customary practices which are widely shared across cultures. In
current international law these accepted practices are called “customary international law”
and set the standard of practices of “civilized nations.”
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Since virtually all modern states have committed themselves by treaty and by
membership in the United Nations to the principles of international law, in one sense there is
no question of their universal applicability around the globe. But the fact that the tradition
has roots in the West and in the Christian tradition does raise important multicultural
questions about it.
How does one deal with the important fact that Muslims have their own ways of framing
moral issues of war and conflict and even of the national state itself which track imperfectly at
best with the Just War framework? How does one factor into one’s thinking the idea of “Asian
Values” which differ in their interpretation of the rights of individuals and the meaning of the
society and state from this supposedly universal framework? What weight should the fact
that much of the world, while nominally nation-states on the model established by the Peace
of Westphalia in 1648 in Europe, are in reality better described as “tribes with flags”? How
does one deal with the fact that, in much of the world, membership in a particular ethnic
group within an internationally recognized border is more an indicator of one’s identity than
the name of the country on one’s passport?
All of these questions are subject of intense scholarly debate and practical importance. All
have very real-world applications when we think about the roots of conflict around the
modern world and attempt to think about those conflicts in the ways many of the participants
do. But for our purposes, we will need to set them aside in favor of making sure we understand
the Just War criteria as they frame United States military policy and the existing framework
of international law.
This limitation of focus is justified not only by the limitations of time, but also by legal
reality. Whatever one might want to say about the important cross-cultural issues posed
above, it remains true that the United States and its allies around the world are committed by
treaty, policy, and moral commitment to conduct military operations within the framework of
the existing Just War criteria. That fact alone makes it important that strategic leaders
possess a good working knowledge of those criteria and some facility in using them to reason
about war.
Ideally, however, strategic leaders will also have some grasp of the ongoing debate about
cultural diversity and the understanding of war in fundamentally differing cultural contexts
as well.

THE PURPOSES OF THE JUST WAR FRAMEWORK.
The framework of principles commonly called “Just War Criteria” provide an organized
schema for determining whether a particular conflict is morally justified. As one might
imagine, any such framework will inevitably fall short of providing moral certainty. When
applied to the real world in all its complexity, inevitably persons of intelligence and good will,
can, and do disagree whether those criteria are met in a given case.
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Furthermore, some governments and leaders lie. No matter how heinous their deeds, they
will strive to cast their actions in just war terms to provide at least the appearance of
justification for what they do. If hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue, it is testimony
to the moral weight of the just war principles that even the most extreme lies follow the shape
of just war principles. Just war language provides the shape of the lie even the greatest war
criminals must tell. Rare indeed is the aggressor or tyrant willing to declare forthrightly the
real causes and motives of their actions.
The twin realities of real-world complexity and the prevalence of lying about these matters
suggest the importance not only of knowing the just war criteria as a kind of list, but also of
skillful and careful reasoning using the just war framework as a strategic leader competency.
Only if a leader is capable of careful and judicious application of just war thinking can he or
she distinguish valid application of just war thinking from specious and self-serving attempts
to cloak unjust action in its terms.

THE JUST WAR FRAMEWORK.
Moral judgments about war fall into two discrete areas: the reasons for going to war in the
first place, and the way the war is conducted. The first is traditionally called jus ad bellum, or
justice of going to war, and the second jus in bello, or law during war. Two interesting features
of this two-part division are that different agents are primarily responsible for each, and that
they are to a large degree logically independent of each other.
Judgments about going to war are, in the American context, made by the National
Command Authority and the Congress. Except at the highest levels where military officers
advise those decision-makers, military leaders are not involved in those discussions and bear
no moral responsibility for the decisions that result. Still, military personnel and ordinary
citizens can and do judge the reasons given for entering into military conflict by those decision
makers and make their own determinations whether the reasons given make sense or not. A
morally interesting but difficult question arises concerning one’s obligations and
responsibilities when one is convinced that recourse to war is not justified in a particular case.
Just conduct in war concerns the rules of engagement, choice of weapons and targets,
treatment of civilian populations and prisoners of war and so forth. These concern the “nuts
and bolts” of how the war is actually conducted. Here the primary responsibility shifts from
the civilian policymakers to the military leadership at all levels. Of course political leaders
and ordinary citizens have an interest in and make judgments about how their troops conduct
themselves in war. Militaries conduct themselves in light of national values, and must be
seen as behaving in war in ways citizens at home can accept morally.
Modern war, usually fought in plain sight of CNN and other media, is for good and for ill,
especially subject to immediate scrutiny. Political leaders and ordinary citizens react to
virtually every event and require of their leaders explanations for why they do what they do
and conduct war as they do. This fact, too, indicates why strategic leaders must be adept in
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explaining clearly and honestly the conduct of their forces within the framework of the Just
War criteria.
I turn now to a discussion of the criteria of Just War in some detail. These are the “tests”
one uses to determine the justification of recourse to war in particular circumstances.
We begin with the criteria for judging a way jus ad bellum (in terms of going to war in the
first place). In detail lists of these criteria vary somewhat, but the following captures the
essential elements:
l

Just Cause

l

Legitimate Authority

l

Public Declaration

l

Just Intent

l

Proportionality

l

Last Resort

l

Reasonable Hope of Success

Recall that the moral impulse behind just war thinking is a strong sense of the moral evils
involved in taking human life. Consequently, the ad bellum tests of just war are meant to set a
high bar to a too-easy recourse to force and violence to resolve conflict. Each of the “tests” is
meant to impose a restraint on the decision to go to war.

JUST CAUSE.
Just Cause asks for a legitimate and morally weighty reason to go to war. Once, causes like
“offended honor” or religious difference were considered good reasons for war. As it has
developed, just war tradition and international law have restricted greatly the kinds of
reasons deemed acceptable for entering into military confrontation. The baseline standard in
modern just war thinking is aggression. States are justified in going to war to respond to
aggression received. Classically, this means borders have been crossed in force. Such direct
attacks on the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of an internationally recognized
state provide the clear case of just cause, recognized in just war and in international law (for
example, in the Charter of the United Nations).
Of course there are a number of justifications for war which do not fit this classic model.
Humanitarian interventions, preemptive strikes, assistance to a wronged party in an
internal military conflict in a state, just to name some examples, can in some circumstances
also justify use of military force, even though they do not fit the classic model of response to
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aggression. But the farther one departs from the baseline model of response to aggression, the
more difficult and confusing the arguments become.
As one moves into these justifications, the scope for states to lie and try to justify meddling
in each others affairs grows. For that reason, international law and ethics gives an especially
hard look at claims of just cause other than response to aggression already received. To do
otherwise risks opening too permissive a door for states to interfere with each other’s territory
and sovereignty.
Legitimate authority restricts the number of agents who may authorize use of force. In
the Middle Ages, for example, there was the very real problem that local lords and their
private armies would engage in warfare without consulting with, let alone receiving
authorization from, the national sovereign.
In the modern context, different countries will vary in their internal political structure
and assign legitimate authority for issues of war and peace of different functionaries and
groups. In the American context, there is the unresolved tension between the President as
Commander in Chief and the authority of Congress to declare war. The present War Powers
Act (viewed by all Presidents since it was enacted as unconstitutional, but not yet subjected to
judicial review) has still not clarified that issue. But while one can invent a scenario where
this lack of clarity would raise very real problems, in practice, so far the National Command
Authority and the Congress have found pragmatic solutions in every deployment of American
forces.
The public declaration requirement has both a moral purpose and (in the American
context) a legal one. The legal one refers to the issue we were just discussing: the role of
Congress in declaring war. As we all know, few twentieth-century military conflicts in
American history have been authorized by a formal Congressional declaration of war. While
this is an important and unresolved Constitutional issue for the United States, it is not the
moral point of the requirement.
The moral point is perhaps better captured as a requirement for delivery of an ultimatum
before initiation of hostilities. Recall that the moral concern of just war is to make recourse to
armed conflict as infrequent as possible. The requirement of a declaration or ultimatum gives
a potential adversary formal notice that the issue at hand is judged serious enough to warrant
the use of military force and that the nation is prepared to do so unless that issue is
successfully resolved peacefully immediately.
The just intent requirement serves to keep the war aims limited and within the context
of the just cause used to authorize the war. Every conflict is subject to “mission creep.” Once
hostilities commence, there is always the temptation to forget what cause warranted the use
of force and to press on to achieve other purposes—purposes that, had they been offered as
justifications for the use of force prior to the conflict, would have clearly been seen as
unjustifiable. The just intent requirement limits war aims by keeping the mind focused on the
purpose of the war. Although there are justified exceptions, the general rule is that the
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purpose of war is to restore the status quo ante bellum, the state of affairs that existed before
the violation that provided the war’s just cause.
Proportionality is a common sense requirement that the damage done in the war should
be worth it. That is to say, even if one has a just cause, it might be so costly in lives and
property damage that it is better to accept the loss rather than to pay highly
disproportionately to redress the issue. In practice, of course, this is a hard criterion to apply.
It is a commonplace notion that leaders and nations are notoriously inaccurate at predicting
the costs of conflict as things snowball out of control.
But here too, the moral point of just war criteria is to restrain war. And one important
implication of that requirement is the demand for a good faith and well-informed estimate of
the costs and feasibility of redressing grievances through the use of military force.
The requirement that war be the ultima ratio, the last resort, stems too from a
commitment to restrict the use of force to cases of sad necessity. No matter how just the cause,
and no matter how well the other criteria may be met, the last resort requirement
acknowledges that the actual commencement of armed conflict crosses a decisive line.
Diplomatic solutions to end conflicts, even if they are less than perfect, are preferred to
military ones in most, if not all cases. This is because the costs of armed conflict in terms of
money and lives are so high and because armed conflict, once begun, is inherently
unpredictable.
In practical reality, judging that this criterion has been met is particularly difficult.
Obviously, it cannot require that one has done every conceivable thing short of use of force:
there is always more one could think to do. It has to mean doing everything that seems
promising to a reasonable person. But reasonable people disagree about this. In the Gulf War,
for example, many (including Colin Powell) argued that more time for sanctions and
diplomacy would be preferable to initiation of armed conflict.
The last requirement ad bellum is reasonable hope of success. Because use of force
inevitably entails loss of human life, civilian and military, it is a morally grave decision to use
it. The reasonable hope criterion simply focuses thinking on the practical question: if you’re
going to do all that damage and cause death, are you likely to get what you want as a result? If
you’re not, if despite your best efforts it is unlikely that you’ll succeed in reversing the cause
that brings you to war, then you are causing death and destruction to no purpose.
An interesting question does arise whether heroic but futile resistance is ever justified.
Some have argued that the long-term welfare of a state or group may well require a memory of
resistance and noble struggle, even in the face of overwhelming odds. Since the alternative is
acquiescence to conquest and injustice, might it be justifiable for a group’s long-term
self-understanding to be able look back and say, “at least we didn’t die like sheep”?
This completes the overview of the jus ad bellum requirements of just war. Recall that the
categories and distinctions of the theory are not simple and clear. Neither individually nor

26

together do they provide an algorithm that can generate a clear-cut and obvious judgment
about a particular war in the minds of all fair-minded people.
On the other hand, it is important not to overemphasize the difficulty here. Although the
language of just war is used by virtually all states and leaders in the attempt to justify their
actions, not all uses are equally valid. Often it is not that difficult to identify uses that are
inaccurate, dishonest, or self-serving. While there certainly are a range of cases where
individuals of good will and intelligence will disagree in their judgments, there is also a good
range where the misuse is transparent.
Recall, for example, Iraq’s initial (and brief) attempt to justify its invasion of Kuwait on
grounds that there had been a revolution in the Kuwaiti government and the new legitimate
government of Kuwait had requested Iraq’s fraternal assistance in stabilizing the new
government. Had this story been true, of course, Iraq would have been acting in conformity
with international law and just war tradition by being in Kuwaiti. It is important to note that
Iraq did apparently feel obliged to tell a tale like this, since that itself is a perverse testimony
to the need of states to attempt to justify their actions in the court of world opinion in just war
terms. Of course the story was so obviously false that even Iraq stopped telling it in a matter of
hours (how many of you even recall that they told it?).
My point in citing this example is to forestall an easy relativism. It is simple intellectual
laziness to conclude that, because these judgments are hard and people disagree about them
in particular cases, that the principles have no moral force or, worse, that all uses of them are
mere window-dressing. In all moral matters, as Aristotle pointed out, it is a mark of an
educated person not to expect more precision than the matter at hand permits. And in
complex moral judgments of matters of international relations, one cannot expect more than
thoughtful, well-informed and good-faith judgments.

JUS IN BELLO.
I turn now to the jus in bello side of just war thinking. As I noted above, except at the
highest levels of the military command structure, officers do not make the decision to commit
forces to conflict. The moral weight of those judgments lies with the political leadership and
its military advisors. On the other hand, strategic military leaders, whether they are
technically responsible for decisions to go to war or not, will often be placed in the position of
justifying military action to the press and the people. Further, thoughtful officers will often
feel a need to justify a particular use of force in which they participate to themselves. For all
these reasons, therefore, facility with just war reasoning in both its dimensions (jus ad bellum
and jus in bello) is a strategic leader competency.
The practical conduct of war is, however, the primary responsibility of military officers.
They bear the responsibility for the training and discipline of military personnel. They issue
the orders that determine what is attacked, with what weapons and tactics. They set the tone
for how civilians are treated, how POWs are captured, confined and cared for. They determine
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how soldiers who violate order and the laws of war are disciplined and what examples they
allow to be set for acceptable conduct in their commands.
Because of this weight of responsibility, the officer at all levels must thoroughly
incorporate thought about the jus in bello side of just war into standard operating procedure.
It is an integral part of military planning at all levels, from the tactical issues of employing
small units to the highest levels of grand strategy. United States policy, national and
universal values, and political prudence combine to require officers at all levels to plan and
execute military operations with a clear understanding of just war requirements.
The major moral requirements of just war in bello boil down to two: discrimination and
proportionality. Together, they set limits in the conduct of war—limits on who can be
deliberately attacked and on how war can legitimately be conducted.
Although we use the term “discrimination” almost wholly negatively (as in racial
discrimination) the core meaning of the word is morally neutral. It refers to distinguishing
between groups or people or things on the basis of some characteristic that distinguishes one
group from another.
In the context of thought about war, the relevant characteristic upon which just war
requires us to discriminate is combatant status. In any conflict, there are individuals who
are combatants—actively engaged in prosecuting the war efforts—and there are
noncombatants. The central moral idea of just war is that only the first, the combatants, are
legitimate objects of deliberate attack. By virtue of their “choosing” to be combatants they
have made themselves objects of attack and have lost that immunity from deliberate attack
all human beings have in normal life, and which civilians retain even in wartime. I put
“choosing” in quotes, of course, because we all know soldiers become soldiers in lots of ways,
many of which are highly coerced. But they are at least voluntary in this sense: they didn’t run
away. They allow themselves to be in harm’s way as combatants.
Of course, in modern war, there are lots of borderline cases between combatant and
non-combatant. The definition of the war conventions is straightforward: combatants wear a
fixed distinct sign, visible at a distance and carry arms openly. But in guerilla war, to take the
extreme case, combatants go to great lengths to blend in to the civilian population. In such a
war, discrimination poses very real practical and moral problems.
But the presence of contractors on a battlefield, or combat in urban environments where
fighters (whether uniformed or not) are mixed in with civilian populations and property (to
point to only two examples) also make discrimination between combatants and
noncombatants challenging both morally and practically.
It is less critical to focus on the hard case than on the central moral point. War can only be
conducted justly insofar as a sustained and good faith commitment is made to discriminate
between combatants and noncombatants and to deliberately target only the combatants.
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Of course civilians die in war. And sometimes those deaths are the unavoidable byproduct
of even the most careful and conscientious planning and execution of military operations.
Intelligence may be mistaken and identify as a military target something that turns out in the
event to be occupied by civilians or dedicated only to civilian use. Weapons and guidance
systems may malfunction, placing weapons in places they were not intended to go.
Just war recognizes these realities. It has long used the “principle of double effect” to sort
through the morality of such events and justifies those which, no matter how terrible, do not
result from deliberate attacks on civilians. Such accidents in the context of an overall
discriminate campaign conducted with weapons that are not inherently indiscriminate are
acceptable as “collateral damage.”
What is not acceptable in just war thinking is the deliberate targeting of civilians, their
use as “human shields,” or use of indiscriminate warfare on populations. In practice this
means choosing weapons, tactics and plans which strive to the limit of the possible to protect
innocent civilian populations, even if they place soldiers at (acceptably) greater risk.
The other major requirement of jus in bello is proportionality. It, too, attempts to place
limits on war by the apparently common-sense requirement that attacks be proportionate to
the military value of the target. Judgments about these matters are highly contextual and
depend on many dimensions of practical military reality. But a massive bombardment of a
town, for example, would be disproportionate if the military object of the attack is a single
sniper.
It is true, of course, that all sides violated these rules in World War II, especially in the
uses of airpower. But the development of precision munitions and platforms for their delivery
have, since that conflict, allowed the U.S. military to return to more careful respect for the
laws of war, even in air war. Furthermore, it is a testimony to the moral need to do so that, at
least in part, drove that development—along with the obvious point that munitions that hit
what they’re aimed at with consistency and regularity are more militarily effective as well.

CONCLUSION.
The moral tradition of just war, and its partial embodiment in the laws of war at any
moment is part of on-going evolution. They represent a drive to make practical restraints on
war that honor the moral claim of individuals not to be unjustly attacked while at the same
time recognizing that use of military force in defense of individuals and values is sometimes a
necessity.
All military officers charged with the grave moral responsibility of commanding and
controlling military units and weapons must, if they are to conduct war morally, have a good
working knowledge of the just war tradition and of the moral principles it strives to enshrine.
Above all, strategic leaders who set large-scale military policy, control training and
organizational culture, and supervise the preparation of operational plans for national
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militaries need to understand and think in ways deeply conditioned by just war principles.
Because their responsibility is so great and because the weapons and personnel under their
control are capable of causing such destruction, they above all bear the responsibility to
insure that those forces observe the greatest possible moral responsibility in their actions.
As I indicated above, no amount of knowledge of the terms and concepts of just war will
make morally complex decisions miraculously clear. But clear understanding of the concepts
of just war theory and of the moral principles that underlie them can provide clarity of
thought and a way to sharpen one’s thinking about those choices.
If our military is to conduct itself in war in ways compatible with American national
values, and if individual soldiers and officers are to be able to see themselves and their
activities as morally acceptable, they must be able to understand the moral structure of just
conduct in war. Further, it is imperative that they integrate that understanding into the
routines of decisionmaking in military operations.
In the Gulf War, and in major operations since then, the language and concerns of just war
are integrated increasingly into planning and execution of military operations. Military
lawyers are fully integrated into modern targeting and operations planning cells of the U.S.
military. In light of those realities, facility in just war thinking is, indeed, a strategic leader
competency. This paper is only an introduction to the terms and grammar of that thought.
True facility in just war thinking will come from careful and critical application of its
categories to the complexities of real life and real military operations.
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CHAPTER 4
SOME BASIC CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES
TO THE STUDY
OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Robert H. Dorff
The study, analysis, and planning of strategy require a basic familiarity with some
essential concepts and approaches to the study of international relations. It is not so much the
terms and the jargon that are important; rather, it is the conceptual understanding that they
bring to the study that makes them useful. Using the precise terminology is less critical than
grasping the essential, underlying foundations of nation-state behavior so crucial to
explaining the interactions that interest us as strategic thinkers. This chapter introduces
some of the basic concepts and approaches in order to make them accessible for future
reference in our study of strategy.
Why do nation-states (and other significant actors in the international system) behave as
they do? How can we explain this behavior and use those explanations to anticipate likely
future behavior? What are the contemporary characteristics of the international system and
how do they affect the actors in that system? What are the ongoing trends (political, economic,
military, and technological) in the international system? How are those trends likely to affect
the interactions among those actors? What are the implications for U.S. national security
strategy?
These are the kinds of questions we need to ask as strategic analysts. In order to answer
them we must be familiar with some basic concepts and tools of analysis. We begin with a
discussion of the actors, their interests, and the ways in which those interests help determine
how an actor behaves. We then turn to one very common approach to the study of
international relations, the “levels of analysis.” Finally, we conclude with a brief discussion of
the two most common sets of assumptions about the behavior of nation-states in the
international system: realism and idealism.

THE ACTORS.
The Nation-State. The nation-state is the central actor in the international system. Not
everyone agrees with this premise. There is growing evidence that substate and
transnational actors and forces in the international system are increasing in importance, and
in many cases challenging the cohesiveness and effectiveness of national governments.
Nonetheless the nation-state appears unlikely to surrender its preeminent position in the
international system anytime soon. Consequently, this chapter will devote considerable
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attention to those tools that help us understand nation-state behavior in the international
system.
The concept of the nation-state provides a useful starting point. As the compound noun
implies, there are two essential components to the nation-state. The state is generally defined
as a group of human beings possessing territory and a government. The state represents the
physical and political aspects of a country. Sovereignty refers to the ability of a country to
exercise preeminent control over the people and the policies within its territorial boundaries.
To the extent that a state is sovereign, it is free to exercise its own control over its people
without undue interference from external forces such as other states. The nation represents
the human aspect of a country, or the concept of nationality. It suggests that the people living
within the state share a sense of distinctiveness as a people; this distinctiveness may be seen
in language, religion, ethnicity, or a more general and amorphous sense that “we are one
people.” The modern nation-state has its origins in the seventeenth century. The Treaty of
Westphalia, signed in 1648, brought a formal end to the Thirty Years War in Europe. That
bloody conflict is generally viewed as the catalyst for consolidating what we think of today as
the “countries” of Europe. Consequently, one frequently sees references to the “Westphalian”
system of states or nation-states. Although the nation-state was already forming before and
during the Thirty Years War, historical shorthand has provided us with a birth date for the
concept—1648. The powerful nation-states that emerged from that conflict could raise and
fund large militaries, and they soon spread worldwide as the means of organizing people
within a defined territory under a distinct government. In the early days of the nation-state,
the government was most often a monarchy headed by a king or queen.
The American and French Revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century added two new
dimensions to the modern state. The first was nationalism, as evidenced especially in the
Napoleonic Wars in which the masses of people were mobilized to fight for the country. No
longer were wars limited to a small group of elite warriors. Whole nations were mobilized and
fought against each other. The second dimension was popular sovereignty: the notion that
the people were no longer simply subjects to be ruled but the very source of the government’s
right to rule. Among other things, this led directly to an increase in public participation in
virtually all aspects of political affairs and to the emergence of a new form of government,
democracy. During the next two centuries democracy took hold and evolved in countries such
as the United States and Great Britain, while monarchies and authoritarianism continued to
dominate in many other countries. Wars of national unification further consolidated the
various nation-states, and great clashes among powerful states characterized both centuries,
culminating in the two great world wars fought in the first half of the twentieth century. By
the end of World War II the nation-state had been the central actor in international affairs for
roughly three centuries. But the twentieth century was to witness the emergence of other
actors.
Other Actors. Clearly, the nation-state is not the only actor in the contemporary
international system. International governmental organizations (IGOs), such as the United
Nations, are growing in number and importance. Regional organizations, such as the
European Union, are in some cases assuming functions traditionally performed by the
nation-state. Other functional organizations, especially in the areas of trade and economics,
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such as the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
play significant roles in contemporary international relations. Similarly, there has been an
explosion in non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private groups that play an important
role in a variety of aspects of international affairs; groups such as the International Red Cross
and Greenpeace come readily to mind. Some of the IGOs and NGOs are even visibly involved
in military operations, as we have seen in Haiti, Somalia, and of course Bosnia. And hardly a
day goes by that we don’t see, read, or hear about the actions of terrorists, transnational
organized criminal groups, or religious and ethnic groups. While all of these other actors can
be very important in international affairs, much of their impact still lies in how they affect the
behavior of nation-states. So it is this central actor—the nation-state—on which we focus our
attention.

INTERESTS.
The behavior of a nation-state is rooted in the pursuit, protection, and promotion of its
interests. So if one can identify accurately the interests of a state, one should be able to
understand much of its behavior vis-a-vis other states and actors in the international system.
Most analysts begin with this notion that nation-states have basic, fundamental interests
that underlie their behavior. They are most often referred to as national interests. Exactly
what those interests are and how they are determined is a matter of considerable controversy,
however. What we should recognize here is that all states have core or vital interests, and the
most readily seen and agreed upon are the basic survival interests of the nation-state—its
territory, its people, and its sovereignty. While forces outside their own boundaries affect all
countries—large and powerful, small and weak—a certain level of sovereignty is critical to
the notion of national interests. A country that is unable to exercise effective control over its
territory and its peoples, relatively free from the intrusion of other nation-states into its
internal affairs, is lacking in this critical element of sovereignty. Historically, states and their
peoples have been willing to risk much, including death and destruction, in order to protect
and promote their sovereign rights.
Despite the controversy and debate surrounding the identification of specific interests,
some agreement exists on what those interests are. Current U.S. policy, as formulated in the
most recent version of the national security strategy, identifies three broad interests and
three general categories of interests. The broad interests are: “…protect the lives and
personal safety of Americans, both at home and abroad; maintain the sovereignty, political
freedom and independence of the United States, with its values, institutions and territory
1
intact; and promote the well-being and prosperity of the nation and its people.” The three
broad categories are vital interests, important interests, and humanitarian and other
2
interests. While almost everyone agrees on the centrality of the survival interests,
considerable disagreement arises when one tries to be more specific about which economic or
value-based interests to pursue. Is access to oil a vital U.S. interest? Many analysts would say
yes because of the severe economic problems caused by the lack of such access. Others would
disagree, arguing that such access is important but not vital. Does the U.S. have an interest in
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promoting democracy and individual rights? If so, is it a vital, important, or simply an “other”
interest? Resolving such debates is part of the overall political process, and is central to any
explanation of the behavior of nation-states.

NATION-STATE BEHAVIOR.
The key questions a strategist asks about the behavior of nation-states in the
international system are really rather few. They are essentially generic and broad questions,
with other derived questions simply serving as variations. For example: Why do nation-states
go to war? Why does peace obtain? Why is there conflict? Why cooperation? Why does a state
choose to use military force? Why does it choose diplomacy instead? In the end, answers to
these and other questions are sought in the interplay between a nation’s interests and the
tools it has available to protect and promote them. To answer such questions we must look at
the different factors that affect the behavior of nation-states.

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS.
One of the most common frameworks for analyzing international relations suggests that
these factors can be organized according to three levels of analysis. Commonly associated
with the work of Waltz, the three levels are the international system, the nation-state, and
3
the individual. Over the years these levels have been discussed, refined, and expanded, but
in essence they remain the same. The purpose of the framework is to demonstrate that we can
explain the behavior of nation-states in the international system by looking at three different,
general sets of factors. As we will see, the first level explains nation-state behavior largely on
the basis of factors external to the country, while the other two levels emphasize internal
factors.
The System Level. The first level (international system) suggests that nation-states
behave the way they do because of certain fundamental characteristics of the system of which
they are all a part. The idea is simply that the system itself exerts a kind of force on the states
that compels them to behave and react in certain predictable ways. Theories such as the
balance of power are based on this kind of analysis; for example, that if a single nation-state
seeks to dominate the system (a hegemon), other states will join together to counter the power
of that single state (balancing). Who possesses how much and what kinds of power (political,
economic, military) at any given time are the critical variables. This leads to a basic focus on
the distribution of power in the international system as a key explanation for system and
hence nation-state behavior. The reasons for this are found in the characteristics of the
international system.
The characteristics of the system that are most important are relatively few. First, the
system is largely anarchic. In other words there is no collective decision-making body or
supreme authority to manage conflict among the competing states in the system. States
compete with each other and “manage” their conflicts through their own use of power. Second,
this means that the system basically relies on self-help by the individual states, so the states
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must be concerned about developing their power relative to other states in the system. The
more power one has, the more that state is able to achieve its goals and objectives; the less
power one has, the more that state may be subject to the whims of other states. These two
characteristics mean that each state has a basic goal of survival and must be the guardian of
its own security and independence. No other actor in the system will look out for the state, a
role performed for the individual by government in most domestic political systems. (So, for
example, if another individual wrongs you, you have a legal system to use in order to right
that wrong.)
To illustrate how the system level is used to explain nation-state behavior, such as the
causes of war, let us use the example of World War II. According to this approach, Hitler’s
Germany was a classic hegemonic actor. Its objective was to amass power (political, military,
and economic) in order to dominate the European and, perhaps, Asian continents, and
eventually the world. It saw in the weakness of other states (Great Britain, France, Russia,
and the United States) the opportunity to make its play for world domination. Yet the
“inevitability” of system influences would ultimately frustrate German aspirations. For as
Germany sought to dominate, other states in the system would eventually band together and
“balance power with power.” So the unlikely alliance (unlikely in the sense that they were not
natural allies) among those four against Germany, Italy and Japan is seen as a nearly
automatic occurrence that results from the necessity of balancing power. As Germany sought
to dominate, other states in the system naturally sought to balance it. Despite the roles
played by individuals such as Hitler, Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt (a point to which we
shall return in a moment), the decisions made by these countries were part of a broader
pattern of system-determined behavior. The titanic clash that was World War II was destined
to occur once Germany sought to dominate the system; natural system dynamics would see to
that.
The Nation-State Level. The second level of analysis is commonly referred to as the
nation-state level, although recently the term actor level has been used. The latter usage
reflects the fact that in contemporary international relations there is a growing number of
actors in the international system that are not nation-states, as we discussed earlier. While
we focus here primarily on the nation-state, we are reminded that non-state actors do play an
increasingly important role. This second level of analysis argues that because states are the
primary actors, it is the internal character of those states that matters most in determining
overall patterns of behavior. Because states are sovereign entities, they act relatively
independently; because they are part of the same system, the interaction of those
independent decisions is what leads to war or peace, conflict or cooperation. One of the most
common state-level approaches emphasizes the nature of the political system as a major
determinant of state behavior. So for example, we have the premise that democracies behave
differently than do authoritarian political regimes. This is precisely the notion that underlies
the “Theory of the Democratic Peace”, a central component of the current United States
national security strategy of engagement and enlargement. If democracies do not go to war
with other democracies (so runs the “democratic peace” argument), then it is only natural for
the United States to want to promote more democracies in the world as a way of increasing
peace and stability in the system. Other nation-state level explanations include cultural and
social factors.
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The second level can also be used to explain the causes of World War II. In this case what is
important is not the systemic influences of balance of power, but the specific character of the
major actors. The totalitarian regimes in Germany, Japan, and Italy were compelled to
undertake aggressive foreign policies in order to pacify the oppressed peoples living under
them. If the leaders didn’t create external enemies for the people to fight against, the people
would soon focus on how oppressive their regimes were and they would eventually revolt. The
democratic regimes of Great Britain and the United States were similarly compelled to
oppose the totalitarian regimes’ expansionist desires because that is what democracies
do—they fight against the evils of totalitarianism and for the good of freedom. So in this view,
World War II was fought to protect the freedom-loving democracies of the world, not simply to
balance power against the expansionist desires of a potential hegemon. An alliance with
Russia was a “necessary evil” to be endured in the short-term in order to achieve the defeat of
the immediate aggressor.
The Individual Level. Finally, the third level of analysis emphasizes the role played by
individual leaders. Recently this level has been referred to as the decision-making level,
which tends to point to factors more general than the idiosyncrasies of individuals, and to the
fact that decisions about war and peace, conflict and cooperation are made by individuals,
organizations, and institutions within a society. But the primary emphasis remains the same;
real people make decisions that determine the pattern of behavior among states in the
international system. This level of analysis is frequently seen in “Great Man” historical
explanations or in the philosophical analyses of human nature. The former emphasizes the
critical role played by certain individuals who happen to be in the right place at the right time
to exert fundamental influence on the unfolding events. The latter tends to hold, as did
Hobbes and others before him, that there is a basic, aggressive tendency in human nature,
and that tendency will emerge time and again no matter how much we wish to keep it
suppressed. War occurs because individuals are inherently aggressive, and therefore war (not
peace) is the natural state of affairs among groups of individuals interacting in the
international system as nation-states. This is the basic view of human nature held by most
analysts who consider themselves realists. Alternatively, and with the same focus on human
nature, one can assume that individuals are inherently peace loving and perfectible, and that
peace is therefore the natural state of affairs, and the abnormal departure from it is war and
conflict. This is the basic view of human nature held by most analysts who consider
themselves idealists. (We shall return to these two views in the final section of this chapter.)
This level also focuses our attention on the perceptions and misperceptions of key actors (how
they see the world, how they see the motivations and goals of other actors in the system, and
so on). It also stresses the types of decisions being made (different policies generate different
kinds of decisions) and the processes with which they are made (whether public opinion plays
a role, whether the process is open or closed, etc.). If you want to know why a nation-state
behaves as it does, you need to ask questions such as: Who are the most important decision
makers, what are their motivations and perceptions, and what are they trying to achieve?
What is the type of decision being made? What kind of process is required to reach a decision?
One analysis employing a third-level approach offers a fairly straightforward explanation
of the causes of World War II. Hitler, seen from this perspective as the embodiment of evil that
exists in human nature, decided to pursue world domination and dragged the German people

36

(afflicted by the same frailties of human nature that affect us all) into his scheme. Churchill
and Roosevelt, viewed as those altogether rare examples of good prevailing over evil, saw it as
their calling to rally their democratic and freedom-loving peoples to the cause of eradicating
evil from the system. According to this level of analysis, there was nothing inevitable about
the causes or the outcomes of the war. Had Hitler not come on the scene, no power vacuum
would have drawn Germany toward domination. Had Churchill and Roosevelt not been
leaders of their countries, no necessities of balancing power or opposing evil would have
ensured a set of foes that would in the end prevail over Hitler’s Germany. According to this
admittedly simplified third-level perspective, the fact that we had these particular
individuals on the scene at that particular point in time is what explains the causes and the
outcomes of that Second World War.
Elegant theories and models have been developed using these levels of analysis, most of
which have focused on the system and the nation-state levels (elegant theories of
idiosyncratic individual behavior are hard to come by, but psychological approaches come the
closest). Trying to discern the compelling forces that drive nations to behave in certain ways is
the goal. For the strategic analyst, however, elegant theories are less important than accurate
assessments of current conditions and predictions of likely future courses of action. As a
consequence, we typically employ all three levels in attempts to understand and explain
international politics. Explanations drawn largely from the first level (such as balance of
power) interact with variables drawn from the other two levels (such as the nature of the
regime and the profiles of current leaders) to produce a strategic assessment and derivative
policy recommendations. Ultimately the goal is to explain why nation-states might pursue
certain courses of action, and what should be done to counter those actions that are
detrimental to one’s own interests or to encourage those actions considered favorable. To do
that requires familiarity with all three levels and the factors drawn from each that can help
lead to a better strategic assessment. In most cases, that will require an understanding of
some general system factors, characteristics of the actors in the system, and attributes of
individual leaders.

REALISM AND IDEALISM.
No discussion of basic concepts and approaches would be complete without some
treatment of the two most prominent sets of competing assumptions about behavior in the
international system. Although adherents of these schools of thought often speak as though
their views are statements of fact, it is important to realize that they are actually
assumptions. They provide the underpinnings for explanations of nation-state behavior, but
for the most part they cannot be proven. What one assumes about nation-state behavior is of
course central for the explanations that derive from them. Therefore, we shall briefly outline
the core assumptions of the two approaches and compare and contrast them, particularly in
terms of where they lead us in our strategic analyses.
Realism. Realism, frequently identified with scholars such as Hans Morgenthau, Henry
Kissinger, and more recently Kenneth Waltz, considers anarchy the primary characteristic of
the international system; in other words, there is no central authority to settle disputes
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among the competing member states, as there is in domestic political systems. Given this lack
of central authority, states compete with one another within a loose system that includes
some rules, norms, and patterns of behavior, but which ultimately causes the individual
nation-state to look out for its own interests (the system of “self-help” described earlier). The
means for protecting, preserving, and promoting one’s interests (the ends) is power, hence
states will be preoccupied with their own power capabilities and how they relate to the
capabilities of other states. Not surprisingly, realists tend to view the world in terms of
competition and conflict, a recurring struggle for power and its management.
In trying to explain why power and struggles over it are the central feature of nation-state
behavior, proponents of realism fall into two general groups. One group, perhaps best
epitomized by Morgenthau, argues that human nature is the key explanation. In their view
human nature is fixed and unchangeable, and it is inherently focused on the quest for ever
more power. Consequently, conflict among people competing for power is inevitable. And
since states are simply aggregations of individual humans, and statesmen are the leaders of
those groups, nation-states will exhibit this same lust for power in their behavior with one
another. No matter what one does, this lust for power anchored in human nature will make
some conflict inevitable. The best we can hope for is to manage that conflict because it can
never be eradicated.
The second group of realists, today most clearly associated with the writings of Waltz,
finds the explanation for the centrality of power relations in the structure of the international
system. This view, called structural realism or neorealism, is essentially what we have
outlined in the first paragraph of this section and in our earlier discussion of the international
system level of analysis. The primary characteristic of the international system is anarchy;
the absence of a central authority to make and enforce rules, settle disputes, and generally
regulate and manage the conflict that is inevitable in a system of individual, sovereign
nation-states. All states possess some level of military power, and ultimately each state has
the option of threatening or actually using that power. To some extent, then, each state must
be concerned with the power capabilities of other states. To the realist this creates a system in
which all states to varying degrees will be distrustful of other states. The more one state
increases its power capabilities, the more insecure other states will feel. This leads directly to
the security dilemma: the actions undertaken by a state to increase its security (such as
expanding its military capabilities) will lead to counteractions taken by other states, leading
eventually to the paradoxical outcome that all states will in fact feel (or actually be) less
secure. The classic example of this dilemma is an arms race.
This second school of realist thought is by far the largest, and its proponents generally
reject any notion of human nature as an underlying explanation for the prominent role played
by power in international relations. Neorealists tend to locate most, if not all, of the
explanations for nation-state behavior in the structural characteristics of the international
system, not in the internal characteristics of nation-states or individuals. But regardless of
their positions on this issue, all realists come to the same conclusion about power in the
international system: the distribution of power is the most important variable explaining
nation-state behavior, and the best way of managing conflict in the system is by balancing
power with power. Various balance of power theories all assume that the only effective way
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to prevent war is to prepare for war; one must be willing to threaten and to use force in order to
reduce the likelihood that such force will in fact be used. Hence the common dictum in
international relations, “If you want peace, you must prepare for war.” Whether through
increasing individual state capabilities or multiplying those capabilities through a system of
changing alliances, states must be constantly on guard against a shift in the overall balance of
power that would tempt the momentarily strong to exploit their advantage over the weak. To
the realist, a country has “no enduring allies, only enduring interests,” and those interests
can only be protected through its own vigilance and preparedness.
Idealism. Idealists can trace their modern heritage to the tenets of Woodrow Wilson,
although like realism its origins go much further back in history. Often referred to as
Wilsonian liberalism, idealist thought frequently views human nature as a positive force. It is
precisely the power politics of nation-state behavior that is the problem, so the cure is to find a
way to reduce or eliminate altogether that particular form of interaction. To the idealist, there
is a natural harmony of interests among nation-states, based on the inherent desire of most
people to live in peace with one another. Only when the corrupting influences of great power
politics, ideology, nationalism, evil leaders, and so on intervene do we see international
politics degenerate into conflict and war. The task then is to prevent the rise and control of
such corrupting influences. How is this to be accomplished? First and foremost it can be
encouraged through the growth of democracy as a form of government that gives maximum
expression to the voice of the people. After all, if most people are inherently peace loving, then
governments that express the desires of the people will themselves be less warlike. A second
means to the desired end is the use of international institutions to create forums in which
nation-states can discuss their disagreements in ways that will reinforce the cooperative
rather than the competitive dimensions of their relationships with one another. So the
idealist finds great promise not only in institutions like the United Nations but also in the
further development of international treaties and covenants, as well as common practice, as
the bases for a system of international law. Such international institutions can be used to
change the way states calculate their interests, hence they can encourage cooperation over
conflict. At one extreme, some idealists believe that the creation of a world government is the
answer; all we have to do is create the international equivalent of domestic government to
regulate and manage the behavior of the actors in the system.
Idealism is too often, and generally inaccurately, portrayed as a “fuzzy-headed liberal
notion” of peace and cooperation, in part because there are some idealists who do espouse
what sound very much like “utopian” aspirations. Yet the contemporary counterpoint to
realism is most accurately referred to as “liberal institutionalism”, which emphasizes the role
played by states’ interests (the liberalism of the 19th century that comprised the core
argument for conservative economic theory like that of Adam Smith) and international
institutions. The more states can be shown that their interests are effectively pursued within
international institutions, and that all states can benefit from such interaction, the more they
can be induced to behave cooperatively rather than competitively. Much of the post-World
War II international trade and economics regimes (Bretton Woods, GATT, and so on) are
based precisely on this “idealist” approach.
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Yet both schools of thought have some shortcomings when we look carefully at the
assumptions and their implications. For example, while realists place great emphasis on the
fundamental influence of national interests on nation-state behavior, not all realists can
agree on what those interests are. For example, Morgenthau was an early and outspoken
critic of United States involvement in Vietnam, arguing that there was no vital national
interest being threatened. At virtually the same time no less prominent a realist than Henry
Kissinger was arguing that it was precisely United States vital interests that were
threatened by the possible communist takeover of Southeast Asia. How did realism help
decide who was correct? And in a later attempt to justify the covert United States role in the
overthrow of the leftist Allende regime in Chile, Kissinger is alleged to have said that Chile
“was a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica,” which to many observers (including many
realists) sounded like a politician bending over backwards to produce a realist-sounding
defense for a rather silly policy decision. On the idealist side, we can return to our earlier
historical examples. The hope that the voice of the people would establish more reason and
peace in international relations seems a bit wishful when we consider that it was precisely the
vengeance sought by the publics in France and Great Britain that helped produce the fatally
flawed Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The punishment meted out to Germany in that peace
agreement almost certainly paved the way for the eventual rise of Hitler and the subsequent
explosion of the continent in World War II. And the same publics, so weary and fearful of war
based on their experiences in World War I, helped produce the climate of appeasement in the
1930s that rendered any meaningful “balance of power” approach impossible to implement.
Because it is virtually impossible to prove the accuracy of the underlying and competing
assumptions in these two approaches, the arguments between realists and idealists will
certainly continue. This will be especially the case in times of tremendous and profound
change in the international system such as we are now experiencing in the most recent period
of transition following the end of the Cold War. What we need to recognize, however, is the
nature of the assumptions we are making and the implications they have for our analysis of
nation-state behavior. In general, the differences between the realist and idealist schools of
thought show up in the relative weight they give to the levels of analysis discussed earlier,
and to the significance of the roles played by non-state actors, especially international
institutions, in the regulation and management of inter-state conflict. Not surprisingly, most
realists give primary emphasis to the system-level of analysis. In fact, some realists continue
to discount completely the influence of all domestic factors, such as the nature of the regime or
the individuals who occupy leadership positions. To them, nation-states are rational, unitary
actors who make decisions based on their interests and pursue them consistently over time
regardless of who leads them. To many idealists this is a great weakness of realist thought,
because they see the interests of nation-states growing out of a much more amorphous
domestic competition among differing views about just what those interests are, let alone how
best to pursue them. To the realist, the nation-state is all that really matters, and attempts to
create supranational institutions (such as the United Nations) to help manage state behavior
are doomed to fail. To the liberal institutionalist, it is precisely such institutions that can
bring more orderly and less conflictual patterns of behavior to the international system.
Theorists will continue to debate which level (or levels) is most important, so the basic
dialogue between realism and liberalism will go on. But for the strategic analyst concerned
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with current policy, the focus must be on the interactions across levels. While changes in the
international system will create situations and circumstances to which nation-states can
respond, how they perceive those changes and what they do in response, will be in part shaped
by domestic characteristics and conditions, including individual leadership. This ability to
integrate the levels of analysis and to understand the assumptions underlying different views
of what is important in international political behavior is essential to strategic thinking and
analysis.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PERSISTENCE OF CREDIBILITY:
INTERESTS, THREATS AND PLANNING
FOR THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER
David Jablonsky
In Ibsen’s Hedda Gabler, when one protagonist comments “But, good heavens, we know
nothing of the future,” another replies: “No, but there is a thing or two to be said about it all
the same.” This is equally true today, even in a period of transition marked not only by
change, but by the ubiquity and rapidity of change. The reason is that continuity invariably
accompanies change, in many cases providing historical guidelines which, if used carefully,
can provide a basis for saying “a thing or two” about the future. The purpose of this chapter is
to demonstrate that such historical threads do indeed provide a basis for analysis of one of the
most important issues facing the United States in the post-Cold War era: the use of military
power in national security policy. Key to that analysis is the continuity implicit in the concept
of national credibility, defined as a combination of a nation’s capability to influence other
international actors and the perceived willingness to use that capability. It is a concept that
links the past, present and future in the complex interaction of national interests and the
threats to those interests.

THE COLD WAR LEGACY OF INTERESTS AND CREDIBILITY.
“A small knowledge of human nature will convince us,” George Washington once stated,
1
“that with far the greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle.” At the U.S.
Army War College, national interests are presented as desired conditions—the enduring end
states by which nations rationally prioritize their efforts. The core interests are divided into
four categories: physical security, economic prosperity, promotion of values, and world order.
2
They are further refined in terms of their intensity: vital, important and peripheral.
Physical security refers to the protection against attack on the territory and people of a
nation state in order to ensure survival with fundamental values and political systems intact.
This category dominated U.S. focus for most of the Cold War, with containment of the Soviet
Union on the Eurasian landmass as the justification for the buildup of forces and institutions
that came to make up the national security state. In terms of prosperity during that same
period, the United States was economically supreme in the world as demonstrated in such
institutions as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and in the global
dominance of the dollar for much of that time. For Americans, foreign policy must also reflect
the values for which they believe their country stands. The promotion of these values in the
Cold War was captured in the crusade of anti-Communism, which in turn was enhanced by its
linkage to the geostrategic goal of containment. “I believe,” President Truman declared in the
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March 1947 doctrine named for him, “that it must be the policy of the United States to support
free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation...to work out their own destinies in their
3
own way.”
It was in pursuit of the last category of world order that U.S. leaders discovered how the
concept of credibility during the Cold War could blur the distinction between intensity of
national interests. From a rational viewpoint, vital interests during that long twilight conflict
should have been focused exclusively on the bipolar, superpower core as opposed to the global
“periphery” of that core. But, as John Lewis Gaddis pointed out, the distant sound of dominoes
4
falling could be just as loud as sabres rattling next door. This type of connectivity was closely
tied to the psychological aspects of credibility with potential aggressors—summed up in
Pericles’ classic argument against giving in to foreign demands: “If you give in, you will
immediately be confronted with some greater demand, since they will think that you only
5
gave way on this point through fear.” Thus, there was the 1950 invasion of South Korea, the
survival of which had been defined as outside vital U.S. interests but which, because of the
nature of the North Korean attack, quickly joined that degree of intensity. “If we let Korea
down,” Truman briefed Congress after the attack,
the Soviets will keep right on going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another . . . . If we were
to let Asia go, the Near East would collapse [and there is] no telling what would happen in Eu6
rope.

In addition, as George Kennan discovered at the beginning of the Cold War, the problems
with credibility were not just confined to actual or potential enemies. There were also the
psychological problems of open pluralistic societies in trying to differentiate between vital
and other interests. In this context, defeats on the periphery could have demoralizing effects
on the public and elites in areas where core or intrinsic interests were involved. Moreover,
there was also the problem of cumulative effects. In 1947, for example, Kennan was concerned
that Soviet victories might cause a bandwagon effect in West Europe, not because of any
ideological affinity, but from purely pragmatic motives to join the movement of the future.
And in the fall of 1961, this phenomenon was evident in President Kennedy’s justification for
his increasing commitment to South Vietnam. “There are limits to the number of defeats I can
defend in one twelve-month period,” he explained. “I’ve had the Bay of Pigs and pulling out of
7
Laos, and I can’t accept a third.”
By that time, the domino principle was fully enshrined in the indiscriminate perimeter
approach to containment with its assumption of undifferentiated interests and unlimited
means. The expectations of domino dynamics in this approach caused interests to become a
function of the threat and as a consequence credibility to become an interest in itself. In such
circumstances, prioritization was impossible. “I don’t know where the non-essential areas
8
are,” President Kennedy acknowledged in an off-the-record press briefing. Equally
important, the approach left the United States in a strategically reactive mode, since the
potential adversary could create a crisis at a time and place of its choosing which the U.S.,
focused on universal credibility, could ignore only at its perceived peril. “Unlike those sociable
games it takes two to play,” Thomas Schelling once noted, “with chicken it takes two not to
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play. If you are publicly invited to play chicken and say you would rather not, you have just
9
played.”

REACTION.
The most important concerns with domino dynamics and the use of military force found
expression in a 1984 speech by the Secretary of Defense outlining six criteria for commitment
of U.S. troops abroad that were clearly focused on the problem of credibility. Under this
so-called “Weinberger Doctrine,” force would be used as a last resort and with the clear
intention of winning—but only when the vital interests of the United States and its allies
were threatened. There must also be clearly defined political and military objectives
combined with the knowledge of how the U.S. forces could accomplish those objectives. “War
may be different today than in Clausewitz’s time, but the need for a well-defined objective and
a consistent strategy is still essential.” Moreover, the relationship between political and
military objectives and the size and composition of the forces committed must be continually
reassessed and adjusted if necessary with, as a constant “beacon light,” the basic question: “Is
this conflict in our national interest?” Finally, there was the requirement for the reasonable
assurance of support by the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.
We cannot fight a battle . . . at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in the case of
10
Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win, but just to be there.

But the issue of credibility would not prove so simple. A few months later, Secretary of
State Shultz defined the dilemma in a reply to the Weinberger Doctrine that was muted at the
time by the Cold War. In a complex world, Shultz pointed out, there were also “gray-area
challenges” in regional and local conflicts that were often far removed from major war but
nonetheless, absent responses by the United States, would have important adverse
cumulative effects on American credibility. We live as is commonly said, on a shrinking planet
and in a world of increasing interdependence. We have an important stake in the health of the
world economy and in the overall condition of global security; the freedom and safety of our
fellow human beings will always impinge upon our moral consciousness. Not all these
challenges threaten vital interests, but at the same time an accumulation of successful
challenges can add up to a major adverse change in the geo-political balance. . . . American
military power should be resorted to only if the stakes justify it, if other means are not
available, and then only in a manner appropriate to the objective. But we cannot opt out of
every contest. If we do, the world’s future will be determined by others—most likely by those
who are the most brutal, the most unscrupulous and the most hostile to our deeply held
11
principles. This theme was renewed after the end of the Cold War. As he left office, President
Bush pointed out in a major speech that the use of military power must be considered without
“rigid criteria” on a case-by-case basis. “The relative importance of an interest is not a guide,”
he concluded. “Military force . . . might be the best way to protect an interest that qualified as
12
important, but less than vital.”
President Bush was no doubt influenced by the outcome of Desert Storm, which only fed
the post-Cold War euphoria concerning the management of power, and led to impossibly high
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expectations in the realm of lesser multilateral operations on the periphery ranging from
peacekeeping to peace enforcement. The result early in the Clinton Administration was a
policy that came to be called “assertive multilateralism,” the major rationale of which was to
maintain U.S. global involvement at a much-reduced cost. The principal vehicle was to be a
reinvigorated United Nations that not only would provide legitimacy to interventions on the
periphery, but would mount such operations with its own resources. All this, it was expected,
would constrain unwanted unilateralism by other nations while easing the burden for the
13
U.S.
The reality was somewhat different. To begin with, there was the realization that
traditional UN peacekeepers had never been able to create the conditions for their own
success and that to establish institutional capabilities in the UN for such endeavors would be
an enormous undertaking. At the same time, U.S. forces were increasingly involved in
Somalia where humanitarianism was evolving into peace enforcement and nation building.
The loss of American soldiers in Mogadishu in October 1993 renewed an intense debate by the
public and Congress. The outcome in May 1994 was Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25,
a set of preconditions for U.S. participation in Security Council votes on peace operations as
well as for the actual involvement in such operations—all distinctly reminiscent, with its
“stringent conditionality,” of the Weinberger Doctrine. Most of the considerations in the PDD,
one analyst observed, “taken individually, appear reasonable...under most circumstances.
Taken collectively, however, against the backdrop of the experiences with the use of force in
the post-Cold War world and the current priorities of the Administration and Congress, these
14
factors appear so constraining as to be prohibitive of action.”

WARFIGHTING VS. MOOTW.
The question of selectivity is particularly important for a U.S. military stuck squarely on
the horns of a dilemma between, on the one side, peace operations and other nontraditional
missions—all collectively labeled Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)—and on
the other, preparation for threats to vital national interests. For some critics, there is no
dilemma. Many non- or less-traditional MOOTW missions, Carl Builder points out, are
actually more traditional than those normally associated with military forces and likely to
become even more common in the future. Army engineers, for example, worked on roads
throughout much of America’s history and built the Panama Canal. And the military has
remained the ultimate safety net whether it involved efforts at the 1871 Chicago fire or those
concerned with earthquake, flood and other humanitarian relief in the 1990s; or whether it
involved the suppression of riots and revolt ranging from Shay’s 1786 Rebellion to the 1992
Los Angeles riots. For Builder, however, the case for nontraditional roles ultimately rests on a
view of the future in which states lose their legal monopoly of armed forces and the current
15
distinctions between war and crime break down. At that time, contends Robert Kaplan, the
leading exponent of this apocalyptic view, “the classificatory grid of nation-states is going to
be replaced by a jagged-glass pattern of city states, shanty-states, nebulous and anarchic
regionalisms. . . .” It will be a “bifurcated world” with part of the globe inhabited by the
well-fed recipient of all that technology can offer, and the other, much larger part, peopled by
Hobbes’s First Man, living out his “poor, nasty, brutish, and short” life. In such a world,
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Kaplan sees re-primitivized man in warrior societies operating in an environment marked by
planetary overcrowding and unprecedented resource scarcity in which state supported,
technologically-enhanced military will have no effect.
The intense savagery of the fighting in such diverse cultural settings as Liberia, Bosnia, the Caucasus,
and Sri Lanka—to say nothing of what obtains in American inner cities—indicates something very
troubling that those of us inside the stretch limo, concerned with issues like middle-class entitlements
and the future of interactive cable television, lack the stomach to contemplate. It is this: a large number of people on this planet, to whom the comfort and stability of a middle-class life is utterly unknown,
16
find war and a barracks existence a step up rather than a step down.

In this environment, other critics contend, the U.S. military has hunkered down,
protecting hierarchical structures, and like German officers a half-century before,
attempting to reestablish a basis for military professionalism incorporated in the view that
war remains the special province of the warrior who can thus rightly claim a distinctive status
in society. The revolution in military affairs in such a milieu is nothing more than a
reactionary attempt to ignore nuclear and unconventional warfare as well as other factors
that shape warfare, while conveying, in A.J. Bacevich’s description, a “techno-chic” image of
military institutions “in the midst of continuous transformation, redesigning, restructuring
and reorganizing in a hell-bent rush to embrace the future.” In this light, scenarios of major
regional contingencies are simply attempts to revive an unlikely model of limited war more
suited to 18th century politics than an era of changing warfare. “If forces designed and
equipped in compliance with the dictates of the future are ill-suited for dealing with civil
wars, ethnic conflicts, failed states, and terror,” Bacevich concludes, “then they are of limited
17
utility in the world as it exists.”
All this, particularly that concerned with the more likely low intensity aspects of future
conflict, is reminiscent of those arguments during the Cold War that caused Robert Komer to
define the “likelihood fallacy” as posturing to deal primarily with the most likely
contingencies on the conflict spectrum to the detriment of the less likely but most critical
ones. The ultimate result is that by ignoring the most critical contingencies, they become in
18
fact the most likely. Such considerations have direct credibility implications for trade-offs
concerning forces designed to protect vital national interests in major regional contingencies.
For example, the U.S. Army, primarily configured for these contingencies, has a shortage of
mobile light divisions that could be used in urban, jungle or mountain operations. The
temptation in such circumstances is to ignore Ambassador Komer’s warning. “Given the
increased importance of peacemaking, peacekeeping operations and the likelihood of other
contingencies to which airborne and air assault forces would be best suited,” one analyst
concludes, “. . . it seems that the priority being given to heavy units—the very forces for which
19
Air Forces can most nearly substitute on the margin—may be overdone.
For other critics like Paul Bracken, the controversy itself is irrelevant, since the choices
are irrelevant. On the one hand, there is warfighting against “B” competitors, “mid-level
developing states with modernized conventional forces (much like Iraq in 1990), with the
possibility of Model T nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) forces.” On the other, there is
what is essentially MOOTW against “C” competitors, “militarily ineffectual nations with
complex or complicated security problems: ethnic civil war (Yugoslavia), insurgency (Peru),
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terrorism (Egypt), civil disorder (Somalia), or infiltration (narcotic flows).” Bracken’s advice
is to avoid the messy “C” states and deal with the “terra incognita” of potential “A” nations,
“peer competitors, or major regional competitors with which the United States may have to
deal.” In the future, “B” countries may graduate to this level by a combination of training,
doctrine, and the availability worldwide of advanced military technologies, to include
weapons of mass destruction. In any event, an emergent “A” state may not have a direct
adverse effect on U.S. interests, but like Germany after 1870, might so upset a regional
20
balance as to affect those interests.

THE SECURITY DILEMMA.
There is today, of course, a historically remarkable absence of great power competition.
Nevertheless, international politics not only abhors a vacuum, but the diffusion of power as
well. And although predictions of even more such diffusion are currently fashionable,
situations involving either impending or actual power maldistribution always return. “There
may not be a precisely predictable superpower force (state or coalition) in the U.S. future of
21
today,” Colin Gray reminds us, “but all of history says that such a force will reappear.”
It is comforting to think that with the communication-information revolution, it is
improbable that an “A” level peer superthreat could grow and suddenly emerge. But even one
of the sharpest critics of the current U.S. global role admits the possibility of “the appearance
of a ‘careful’ challenger able to cloak its ambitions and ward off external balancing against
22
it. . . .” Moreover, as described in chaos theory, there can be a rapid growth and emergence of
nonlinear threats—that is, some change in fundamental conditions that may have later
consequences radically disproportionate in their adverse effect. Trend analysis has great
difficulty in dealing with such nonlinear possibilities. All in all, as Richard Betts has pointed
out in terms that apply to any future peer threat for the United States, major discontinuities
in international politics are seldom predicted. Who would not have been derided and
dismissed in 1988 for predicting that within a mere 3 years Eastern Europe would be
liberated, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union deposed, and the Union itself on the ash
heap of history? Yet it is hard to believe that the probability of equally revolutionary negative
developments, of economic crisis and ideological disillusionment with democracy, of
scapegoating and instability leading to miscalculation, escalation, and war several years
23
from now is lower than the probability of the current peace seemed several years ago.
The security dilemma in such an environment is not that U.S. defense precautions will
cause other nations to perceive them as hostile and thus counterbalance; but rather that
absent a standing military force sufficient to deal credibly with such surprises, democratic
politics will respond with too little, too late to burgeoning security dangers. Historically in
such a situation, as Britain’s interwar “Ten Year Rule” illustrates, there is a tendency to wish
away the gap between perceived risks and political action even as those risks grow. “It should
be assumed for framing revised estimates,” the “Rule” stipulated, “that the British Empire
will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years, and that no Expeditionary
24
Force is required to this purpose. . . .” And although there were compelling international and
domestic reasons for the “Rule” when it was adopted in 1919, the automatic annual renewal
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through 1932 of the assumption that there would be no major war for ten years, left the
British ripe for appeasement of the emerging peer threat in Nazi Germany for the remaining
25
years of the interwar period. In this, as W. H. Auden captured in 1939, Britain was not
alone.
In the nightmare of the dark
All the dogs of Europe bark,
And the living nations wait,
Each sequestered in its hate;
Intellectual disgrace
Stares from every human face,
And the seas of pity lie
Locked and frozen in each eye.

CREDIBILITY AND CONNECTIVITY.
The exaggerated domino linkage in the Cold War blurred the distinction between the
intensity of national interests. Nevertheless, connectivity can be an important tool in making
such a differentiation. Vital interests from this perspective are those end states in the world
that would require very few dominoes to fall in order to affect core national interests.
Important interests would require more dominoes; and peripheral interests are those which
no matter how many dominoes fall, will not affect core interests. All this would still not
mitigate the danger of connectivity becoming a function of the threat. If a government begins
with a threat assessment before a conceptualization of interest intensity, it may react to a
threat with major commitments and resources devoid of any rational linkage to that
intensity. In a similar manner, rational cost-benefit analysis should not be allowed to affect
the intensity of interest. Although U.S. administrations sensibly make just such cost-benefit
calculations, Robert Blackwill points out that these should be analytically independent from
judgements about how important to the United States a particular national security interest
is. We may choose to defend a peripheral U.S. interest because it is not costly to do so; the
interest nevertheless is still peripheral. Or we may choose not to defend vigorously an
important—hopefully not vital—U.S. national security interest because we decide it is too
expensive in a variety of ways to do so; the interest nevertheless is still important, and we may
26
well pay dearly for our unreadiness to engage.
Prioritization, then, is the ultimate rationale for the use of national interests—the sine
qua non for any clarity and long-term consistency in a nation’s security policy. To move
interest after interest upward into the vital or important degrees of intensity is simply to
avoid choice, an unrealistic policy given declining means and the myriad domestic problems
facing the nation. This all presupposes, of course, fairly rational environments and processes.
But, as an example, nations can miscalculate the relationships between near-term cost and
long-term benefits. Thus, there was Neville Chamberlain’s perception of the Munich crisis: “If
27
we have to fight it must be on larger issues than that.” And, in addition to domestic
considerations, there was more than a touch of the credibility argument in the Clinton
administration’s rationalization for the deployment of U.S. forces to Haiti—all somewhat
reminiscent of arguments why Britain had to suppress the Irish rebellion in World War I
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despite the adverse effect on the war effort: “If you tell your empire in India, Egypt and all over
the world that you have not got the men, the money, the pluck, the inclination, and the
backing to restore order in a country within twenty miles of your own shore, you may as well
28
begin to abandon the attempt to make British rule prevail throughout the empire at all.”
In theory, the credibility factor should be drastically mitigated in the post-Cold War world.
It is, after all, a world in which high indivisibility in political and economic relations among
the advanced states is matched, using any rational standard, by low indivisibility in terms of
security issues and conflicts on the periphery. Consequently, as cascading dominoes on the
periphery have become increasingly less plausible, attention has turned to humanitarian
concerns. Even here, however, end states in a pure value-based sense have proven much
harder to achieve without the geopolitical tandem of the Cold War. The result in the current
transition period is that intervention on the periphery is often debated in terms of what
degree of intensity should be allotted to humanitarian concerns as a national interest. For
example, institutions like Amnesty International generally perceive one connective step
between abuses of human rights anywhere in the world and vital U.S. interests, because
American values are at stake. While it is easy to dismiss such universal escalation as
undermining the rational concept of connectivity and the ability to distinguish interest
intensity, there are, as even Edmund Burke could conclude, “obligations written in the
29
heart.” Humanitarian abuses, for instance, connect more directly with the higher intensity
of U.S. interests to the extent the violations become public knowledge, the more they affect
large groups of humans over longer periods of time, and the more they disproportionately
strike at the most helpless, particularly children.
All that notwithstanding, the road of solitary universalist promotion of values leads
everywhere and thus nowhere. The basic fact remains that peace in the post-Cold War era is
simply not indivisible, which means that occasional failures to preserve stability in regions of
secondary geopolitical importance are tolerable. “There will be some safety in indifference,”
Josef Joffe concludes in this regard, “and not every crisis needs to be approached as if it were a
30
wholly owned subsidiary of American diplomacy.” Promoting regional security because of
humanitarian concerns will rarely work and only then if the ways for achieving that security
are cost-effective and can be sustained economically and politically on a long-term basis. That
acceptability, as Douglas MacDonald points out, is key.
If cost-effectiveness criteria are not observed in making moral choices, moral outrage will soon
dissolve into disillusionment, creating pressure to cut and run, which might leave matters worse
than if there had been no intervention. Fighting bloody, inconclusive wars for humanitarian
purposes will serve only to undercut support for America’s long-range role as a leading force for
31
world order.

CONCLUSION.
Ultimately, the indiscriminate use of the U.S. military for social welfare is self-defeating.
Such use normally places troops in situations where there are no demonstrable vital, much
less important national interests. The fact is that conflict on the periphery just as it is at the
core is controlled by its political objective, and that as Carl von Clausewitz long ago observed,
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“the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also
32
in duration.” And as acknowledged by U.S. policy in the Balkans, in the absence of a
convincing value for military intervention on the periphery, the cost in terms of casualties will
always appear to be prohibitive. In such circumstances, the American public is unlikely to
suffer U.S. losses for long. The consequent withdrawal of the forces in turn undercuts
American credibility abroad, encouraging would-be aggressors. All this eventually
undermines public support even in those situations where vital national interests are at
stake: the post-Cold War version of the Komer “likelihood fallacy.”
At the same time, the Bosnias of the world in various forms are proliferating in the current
transition period, and all cannot be ignored. Selective, achievable missions for the military
will be necessary occasionally to counter the cumulative credibility loss that can occur if the
United States declines consistently to respond to the “gray area challenges” described by
Secretary Shultz. That credibility also plays a role in the preservation of national values.
Without it, the most likely alternative is an American public suffused with flickering pictures
of suffering populations, increasingly reacting to international horrors with the apathy it
currently reserves for the daily news reports of the panoply of murder and mayhem on the
streets of U.S. cities. In addition, the skills learned and practiced on non-traditional missions
by no means constitute a loss in terms of traditional warfighting leadership and training.
Finally, selective non-traditional missions at home and abroad can provide a relevancy to the
American public for the U.S. military that may be lacking, as it often is, before the ultimate
emergence of a clear and present A-level danger.
It is, of course, the possibility of such future peer threats to vital American national
interests that must be the primary concern of U.S. military planners even as pressures mount
for nontraditional missions. It is in this context that warfighting capabilities for major
regional contingencies remain critical as the U.S. military continues to plan for uncertainty in
the best tradition of Admiral Horatio Nelson. “But in case signals can neither be seen or
perfectly understood,” the admiral instructed off Cadiz in October 1805, “no captain can do
33
very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.” The problem today, is that even
the enemy ships are not yet clearly visible, leaving U.S. planners to deal, in the absence of
tangible evidence, with what Colin Gray calls the fundamental rule in world politics: “bad
34
times return.” Historical experience also suggests that by the time a distant threat emerges
as a clear and present danger to the United States, it will be too late, as it was in 1941 when
the Imperial Japanese Navy had to announce that danger from the air. At the same time, the
ongoing unprecedented technological revolution is creating an increasingly more
instantaneously dangerous world. In such an environment, capabilities-based planning
focused on major regional contingencies can form a credible force foundation for threat-based,
requirements planning and implementation when major threats emerge in the future. On the
other hand, a premature return in the present to such threat-based, requirements planning,
coupled with a preoccupation concerning emerging trends in non-traditional missions for the
U.S. military, can lead to a new version of the Ten Year Rule, in which even the existence of
Nelson’s enemy ships is assumed away for the future as universal U.S. credibility becomes an
interest in itself.
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CHAPTER 6
NATIONAL INTEREST:
FROM ABSTRACTION TO STRATEGY
Michael G. Roskin
We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual,
and those interests it is our duty to follow.
Lord Palmerston, 1848

The student new to international relations is often at first intoxicated by the concept of
“national interest.” It seems crisp, clear, objective: what’s good for the nation as a whole in
international affairs. (What’s good for the nation as a whole in domestic affairs is the public
interest.) National interest lies at the very heart of the military and diplomatic professions
and leads to the formulation of a national strategy and the calculation of the power necessary
to support that strategy.
Upon reflection, however, one comes to realize how hard it is to turn concepts of national
interest into working strategy. It requires one to perceive the world with undistorted clarity
and even to anticipate the second- and third-order effects of policies. Few are so gifted.
Instead of bringing clarity and cohesion, many quarrel over what the national interest is in
any given situation. This essay will argue that the concept of national interest still has utility,
not as an objective fact but as a philosophical argument in favor of limiting the number of
crusades a country may be inclined to undertake.

PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND.
“National interest” traces its roots at least back to the pessimistic realism of Machiavelli
1
in the fifteenth century. As such, it represents a repudiation of earlier Western sources in
Hellenic idealism, Judeo-Christian biblical morality, and the teachings of medieval
churchmen such as Thomas Aquinas. You may have splendid moral goals, argued
Machiavelli, but without sufficient power and the willingness to use it, you will accomplish
nothing. Machiavelli’s overriding aim: Italian unification and liberation from foreign
occupiers. Nothing could be more moral than the interest of the Italian state; accordingly,
seemingly immoral ends could be employed for its attainment. Power rather than morality is
the crux of this school.
At least one element of the medieval churchmen survives in national-interest thinking.
Humans have souls, and these are judged in an afterlife, they argued. Accordingly, humans
can be held to exacting standards of behavior with curbs on beastly impulses. States, being
artificial creations, have no souls; they have life only in this world. If the state is crushed or
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destroyed, it has no heavenly afterlife. Accordingly, states may take harsh measures to
protect themselves and ensure their survival. States are amoral and can do things individual
humans cannot do. It is in this context that churchmen such as Thomas Aquinas proposed
2
theories of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
Clausewitz also contributes to the national-interest approach. All state behavior is
motivated by its need to survive and prosper. To safeguard its interests the state must
rationally decide to go to war; there should be no other reason for going to war. Unlimited war,
3
however, is foolish, for it serves no national interest. By this time, concepts of raison d’etat or
Staatsraison were long and firmly embedded in European thinking.
The Founding Fathers practiced a cautious realism in preserving and expanding the
thirteen original states, indicating they understood the concept of national interest.
Washington’s farewell address showed a shrewd appreciation of national interest: “Europe
has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must
be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our
4
concerns.”
During the 19th century the United States pursued its national interests by means of cash
and force in ridding its continent of non-hemispheric powers. Less and less, however, it called
its actions “national interest,” and by the twentieth century national interest in the United
States took a back seat to ethical and normative approaches to international relations. If
considered, it was given short shrift as distasteful German Realpolitik as practiced by
Bismarck. As was typical of American political science in its first decades, Woodrow Wilson
despised as amoral or even immoral approaches that used power, national interest, and
5
recourse to violence as normal components of international relations. America had a higher
calling than that. Wilson’s father was a minister, and Wilson trained as a lawyer; he was thus
steeped in what George F. Kennan called the “legalistic-moralistic approach” prevalent in
6
America.

REALISM COMES TO AMERICA.
With the flight of scholars from Europe in the 1930s, however, American universities
became exposed to what were called “realist” approaches that used national interest as their
primary building block. The man who more than any other acquainted Americans with the
idea of national interest was the German émigré Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980; no relation to
FDR’s treasury secretary). He was the truly powerful mind of Realism, as he called his
approach. Bringing the wisdom of Machiavelli and Clausewitz with him, Morgenthau told
Americans that they must arm and oppose first the Axis and then the Soviet Union, not out of
any abstract love of liberty and justice, but because their most profound national interests
7
were threatened. “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power,” he wrote.
Morgenthau’s writings immediately sparked controversy and to this day are not
uniformly accepted. They go against the grain of the Wilsonian idealism that was and still is
8
taught as international relations on some college campuses. American scholars resisted
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what they perceived as Germanic amorality. Many American academics and decisionmakers
still prefer “world order” approaches that posit peaceful, cooperative behavior as the
international norm. Denunciations of Morgenthau circulated much as “anti-machiavells” had
circulated to refute the wicked Florentine. McGeorge Bundy of Harvard, for example, during
the late 1950s taught an international relations course devoted entirely to denouncing
Morgenthau.
Actually, Morgenthau, a friend and collaborator of theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, was
deeply moral. His theory was, at bottom, a normative one, a philosophical argument for how
states ought to behave. He argued that if states pursue only their rational self-interests,
without defining them too grandly, they will collide with other states only minimally. In most
cases, their collisions will be compromisable; that is the function of diplomacy. It is when
states refuse to limit themselves to protection of their rational self-interests that they become
dangerous. They define their interests too broadly, leading to a policy of expansionism or
imperialism, which in turn must be countered by the states whose interests are infringed
upon, and this can lead to war. When states make national interest the guide of their policy,
they are being as moral as they can be. We can’t know what is good for the whole world or for
country X; we can only know what is good for us.

INTEREST DEFINED AS POWER.
Morgenthau supposed he had an objective standard by which to judge foreign policies:
9
were they pursuing the national interest defined in terms of power? That is, was the
statesman making decisions that would preserve and improve the state’s power, or was he
squandering power in such a way that would ultimately weaken the state? The statesman
asks, “Will this step improve or weaken my power?” The foreign policy of any state—no matter
what its “values”—can thus be judged rationally and empirically. It matters little whether the
national values are Christianity, Communism, Islam, or vegetarianism. Only one question
matters: is the statesman acting to preserve the state and its power? If so, his policy is
rational.
A policy of “improving” the state’s power is not to be confused with territorial expansion,
which is the hallmark of dangerous and disruptive imperialist powers, against whom the
prudent statesman is always on guard.
With power as a yardstick Morgenthau had no trouble defining the national interest at
any given time and under any circumstance. He was uncannily prescient. He also had no
difficulty in reading the minds of statesmen both dead and alive. “Using national interest
defined as power, we look over the statesman’s shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we
10
read and anticipate his very thoughts.” Did Morgenthau have this ability because he
applied some formula of national interest or because he was tremendously intelligent? Lesser
minds have tried to define certain policies as national interest and have thereby committed
egregious errors. Overseas expansion, for example, might appear to enhance state power by
the influx of new riches. But it may also drain state power by spreading it too thin and
engaging too many enemies. A giant empire may actually ruin the state; the Spanish
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Habsburgs put themselves out of business. Hitler flung away German power and ruined the
state.
There are times when the statesman must move decisively to engage his armed forces in
the threat or practice of war. When the borders or existence of the state are threatened by an
expansionist or imperialist neighboring state, one must arm and form alliances, and it is best
to do so earlier rather than later. Accordingly, one of the great tasks of the statesman is to
scan the horizon for expansionist or imperialist threats. Any state engaged in expanding its
power is pursuing a “policy of imperialism,” wrote Morgenthau. A state merely intent on
preserving itself and conserving its power is pursuing a “policy of the status quo.” The
statesman is able to tell one from the other despite the imperialist’s claim to be for the status
quo. When you see a Hitler on the march, arm yourself and form alliances. Do not wait for him
to flagrantly violate some point of international law, such as the invasion of Poland, for that
might be too late. Britain and France, more intent on the details of international law, failed to
understand the imperialist thrust behind German moves in the late 1930s.
Potentially the most dangerous policy is one of declaring certain interests to be vital but
then not backing up your words with military power. This is a policy of bluff and tends to end
badly, in one of two ways: either your adversary sees that you are bluffing and continues his
conquests, or you belatedly attempt to back up your words, in which case you may have to go to
war to convince him that you were not bluffing. One horrifying example is the U.S. policy of
angry words at Japan in the 1930s over its conquest of China, words unsupported by military
power or any inclination to use it. Tokyo simply could not believe that China was a vital U.S.
interest; the Americans were bluffing. Was not poker, the game of bluff, the Americans’
favorite card game?
Something similar occurred in Bosnia: many strong words from the United States and the
West Europeans, unsupported by military power or the intent to use it. Quite reasonably, the
Serbs concluded we were bluffing. They changed their minds only when U.S.-backed Croatian
and Bosnian forces rolled back their conquests in 1995. Always back your interests with
adequate power. If you don’t have the power, don’t declare something distant to be your
interest. Thou shalt not bluff.

VITAL AND SECONDARY INTERESTS.
11

Morgenthau saw two levels of national interest, the vital and the secondary. To preserve
the first, which concerns the very life of the state, there can be no compromise or hesitation
about going to war. Vital national interests are relatively easy to define: security as a free and
independent nation and protection of institutions, people, and fundamental values. Vital
interests may at times extend overseas should you detect an expansionist state that is distant
now but amassing power and conquests that later will affect you. Imperialist powers that
threaten your interests are best dealt with early and always with adequate power.
Secondary interests, those over which one may seek to compromise, are harder to define.
Typically, they are somewhat removed from your borders and represent no threat to your
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sovereignty. Potentially, however, they can grow in the minds of statesmen until they seem to
be vital. If an interest is secondary, mutually advantageous deals can be negotiated, provided
the other party is not engaged in a policy of expansionism. If he is engaged in expansionism,
compromises on secondary interests will not calm matters and may even be read as
appeasement.
12

Additionally, Realists distinguish between temporary and permanent interests, specific
13
14
and general interests, and, between countries, complementary and conflicting interests.
Defense of human rights in a distant land, for example, might be permanent, general, and
secondary; that is, you have a long-term commitment to human rights but without any
quarrel with a specific country, certainly not one that would damage your overall relations or
weaken your power. Morgenthau would think it absurd for us to move into a hostile
relationship with China over human rights; little good and much harm can come from it. A
hostile China, for example, offers the United States no help in dealing with an aggressive,
nuclear-armed North Korea. Which is more important, human rights in China or restraining
a warlike country which threatens U.S. allies? More often than not, political leaders must
choose between competing interests.
Two countries, even allies, seldom have identical national interests. The best one can hope
for is that their interests will be complementary. The United States and Albania, for instance,
may have a common interest in opposing Serbian suppression of Kosovar Albanians, but the
U.S. interest is a general, temporary, and secondary one concerning human rights and
regional stability. The Albanian interest is a specific, permanent, and possibly vital one of
forming a Greater Albania. Our interests may run parallel for a time, but we must never
mistake Albanian interests for U.S. interests.

Types of National Interest
Examples
Vital
No Soviet missiles in Cuba
Importance
Secondary
An open world oil supply
Support for Iraq in opposing
Temporary
Iran
Duration
Permanent
No hostile powers in Western
Hemisphere
No Japanese trade barriers
Specific
Specificity
Universal respect for human
General
rights
Complementary Russian cooperation in Kosovo
Compatibility
Conflicting
Russian support for Serbs

Figure 1. The Realists’ Taxonomy of National Interests.
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It is sometimes hard to anticipate how other countries will define their national interest.
They see things through different eyes. Hungary in the 1990s was very cooperative with the
West and eager to join NATO. In 1994, however, when the United States and France proposed
air strikes to curb Serbian artillery atrocities in Bosnia, Hungary stopped the U.S. use of its
territory for AWACS flights. An American looking at this refusal is puzzled: “But don’t they
want to be on our team?” A Hungarian looking at the refusal says, “We’ll have to live with the
Serbs for centuries; that border is a vital, permanent interest for us. Some 400,000 ethnic
Hungarians live under Serbian control in Voivodina as virtual hostages. The Americans offer
no guarantees of protection, but they expect us to join them in an act of war. Sorry, not a good
deal.” (The AWACS flights were quickly restored as the crisis passed.)
The diplomat’s work is in finding and developing complementary interests so that two or
more countries can work together. (Better diplomatic spadework would have signaled in
advance the difference between Hungarian and U.S. interests in 1994.) Often countries have
some interests that are complementary and others that are conflicting, as when NATO
members cooperated to block the Soviet threat but clashed over who would lead the alliance.
The French-U.S. relationship can be described in this way. Where interests totally conflict, of
course, there can be no cooperation. Here it is the diplomat’s duty to say so and find ways to
minimize the damage. Do not despair in this situation, as national interests can shift, and
today’s adversary may be tomorrow’s ally.
Much national-interest thought has a geographical component; that is, a country,
waterway, or resource may have a special importance for your national interest. Britain, for
example, had a permanent, specific, and often vital interest in the Netherlands. Who
controlled the Low Countries had the best invasion route to England. (For the blue-water
types: the northerly winds that sweep between England and the Continent allow a sailing
vessel to take a beam reach, the fastest point of sail, west from Holland to England. Here the
winds, in facilitating rapid invasion, helped define England’s national interest.) Whether the
threat was Habsburg emperors, French kings, or German dictators, Britain felt it had to
engage to secure this invasion springboard.
Morgenthau found much folly in U.S. policy during the Cold War, some of it on
geographical grounds. He thought it irrational that the United States could tolerate a Soviet
puppet state, Cuba, near our continent while we engaged in Vietnam on the other side of the
globe. Cuba was a vital interest; Vietnam was not. Morgenthau spoke against the Vietnam
War as an irrational crusade that did nothing but drain American power in an unimportant
15
part of the world. At this same time, many claimed Vietnam was a vital U.S. interest. How
can you tell at that moment who’s right?
Morgenthau’s favorite contemporary statesman was Charles de Gaulle of France, whom
he called extraordinarily intelligent. De Gaulle indeed was able to pursue French national
interests without undue sentimentality. When he realized that French colonies, especially
Algeria, were a net drain on French power, he cut them free despite the howls of French
imperialists. A richer, stronger France emerged from decolonization. De Gaulle also reasoned
that no state willingly entrusts its security to foreigners, so he built a French nuclear force
and kicked the Americans out of France. (In confining U.S. forces to the narrow width of
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Germany, he also pushed them into an implied doctrine of early first use, thus assuring
France precisely the U.S. nuclear guarantee that it sought.)

VARIATIONS ON MORGENTHAU.
Gradually, Morgenthau’s powerful arguments caught on. Operating independently of
Morgenthau, the diplomatist-historian George F. Kennan came to essentially identical
16
conclusions from his studies of U.S. and Soviet foreign policies. Protestant theologian
Reinhold Niebuhr insisted that Christians must look at the this-worldly effect of aggression
and be prepared to counter it; pacifism is a form of Christian heresy, for it requires the
17
Christian to stand impotent in the face of evil.
Perhaps the greatest damage done to Realism was by those who embraced it but
misunderstood and misused it. By the 1960s, Realism was part of mainstream thinking, just
in time to be used to support President Johnson’s escalation of the Vietnam War. Vietnam
hawks used Morgenthau’s reasoning to justify the war: an expansionist power was
swallowing one country after another and would not be stopped until defeated by force of
arms. A communist victory in Southeast Asia would destabilize the U.S. defense, economic,
and political presence in all of Asia. Stop them there or stop them later. Here the great
weakness of national-interest thinking came out with a vengeance: precisely how can you tell
when a genuinely vital national interest is at stake?
National-interest thinking also has been misused by idealistic interventionists who wish
to expand U.S. interests so that they include some kind of “world interest.” They would like to
use U.S. power to right wrongs the world over. A “crusade” may be thus defined as the use of
one’s power in causes unrelated to the national interest. In our day, for example, one hears
many prominent people, in and out of government, claim that slaughter of civilians in a
distant war is a vital U.S. interest, for if allowed to spread such behavior will eventually
threaten U.S. interests. They often use Nazi Germany and Munich as analogies. In defining
national interest so broadly, however, they turn it into altruism: “By helping the victims of
aggression, we make the world a safer, more stable place, and that redounds to our benefit,”
they argue. An altruist has been called someone who defines his self-interest so broadly that it
includes everybody’s interest. On such a basis, Morgenthau would argue, the United States
could be engaged permanently in a half dozen wars around the globe, a frittering away of U.S.
power that could come to no good end.
True national-interest thinking is rather tightly limited to one’s own nation. It is a
constant temptation to expand your thinking beyond your nation’s interest to include many
nations’ interests or the world’s interest, and under certain circumstances you may wish to do
this, but please do not call it “the national interest.” If you do, you may soon be “fighting for
peace” in many spots around the globe. The great utility of national-interest thinking is to tap
the statesman on the shoulder and ask, “Is this proposed effort for the good of your country or
to carry out an idealistic abstraction?”
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Feasibility is linked to national interest; power is the connecting link. An infeasible
strategy—where your power is insufficient to carry out your designs—is inherently a bad
strategy. If the type of power is wrong for the setting (e.g., heavy tanks to counter Vietnamese
or Afghan guerrillas; air power to stop a civil war), you are undertaking an infeasible strategy.
Further, remember that objectively any country’s expansion of its power is a policy of
imperialism. If you are expanding your power—even for the noblest of causes, to save the
world or to save country X—other nations, even friendly ones, still see it as imperialism. Once
we have sufficient power to stabilize conflicts, prevent aggression, and stop nuclear
proliferation, we will have accumulated so much power that we are de facto king of the world.
For some curious reason, other nations resent this; they can’t understand that our power will
be used only for good. This is the story of U.S. power both during the Cold War (e.g., French
resentment) and after it (e.g., Russian resentment).
One can make as many gradations and subdivisions in the national interest as one wishes.
Donald Nuechterlein, for example, saw four levels rather than Morgenthau’s two: survival,
18
vital, major, and peripheral. Examined more closely, though, survival interest concerns
only destruction in nuclear war (a subset of vital), and peripheral interests are too minor to
concern us. Thus we are back to Morgenthau’s two: vital and secondary. You could devise a
10-point or 20-point scale of national interests if you wished, but its precision is spurious as it
will soon reduce itself to the dichotomy of interests worth going to war for and interests upon
which one may compromise. As William of Ockam put it, do not needlessly multiply entities.

WARPING EFFECTS ON THE NATIONAL INTEREST.
At any given time, the national interest may be difficult to define due to the warping
effects of ideology, the global system, public and elite convictions, the mass media, and policy
inertia.
Ideology. An ideology is a plan to improve society, or at least a claim to be able to do so.
Ideology closely parallels religion, except the former aims to improve things in this world
rather than in the next. People caught up in an ideology often exhibit religious-like fervor and
disregard of empirical reality. The opposite of ideology is pragmatism. Morgenthau and other
realist thinkers generally scoff at ideology and claim it is essentially a trick to justify
dictatorship. The dictator himself generally takes ideology with a big grain of salt while
pursuing a policy of national interests. Did Lenin withdraw Russia from World War I because
it was a dirty imperialists’ war or to save Russia from further dismemberment at the hands of
the advancing Germans? In the 1936-39 Spanish Civil War, Stalin ordered the Comintern
volunteers in Spain to adopt an extremely moderate, non-revolutionary line. Stalin was
trying to convince Britain and France to join him in the struggle against Hitler. Without such
an alliance, Soviet vital national interests were threatened. Communist ideology or Spanish
democracy had nothing to do with it; the security of Soviet territory was all Stalin cared about.
Ideology can be changed at the drop of a hat. Stalin stopped excoriating Nazi Germany in
1939 because he couldn’t get any cooperation out of Britain and France to secure his western
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borders; he turned to Hitler to get a deal for the same end. By the same token, Winston
Churchill, a fire-breathing Conservative, explained why Britain was now in alliance with the
Soviet Union: “If Hitler invaded hell, I would find a few good words to say about the devil in
the House of Commons.” Ideological differences or affinities do not matter, only safeguarding
one’s country matters. Later in the war, the redoubtable Brigadier Maclean reported back
from Yugoslavia that Tito’s Partisans were communists and would communize Yugoslavia
after the war. Churchill took the news without surprise and asked Maclean, “Do you intend to
make Yugoslavia your permanent residence after the war?” Maclean allowed as he did not.
“Good,” nodded Churchill, “neither do I.” The ideology of postwar Yugoslavia was not
uppermost in his mind, indicated Churchill; the survival of Britain in the war was.
But what of the true believer, the revolutionary who still acts on his ideology? Such people
are extremely difficult to deal with because they ignore their own national interests and are
thus unpredictable. Typically, their passion does not last long as they become acquainted
with the burdens of governing and preserving their country. Lenin started switching from
ideology to pragmatism almost immediately upon seizing power, for now he had Russia to
take care of. Ideologues who are unable to switch may destroy their entire region, including
their own country, as Hitler did. Notice how after the death of Khomeini, Iranian policy has
gradually become more pragmatic. Ideology and national interest are at odds; a country
caught up in ideology is typically unable to pursue a policy of national interest, which requires
a calm, uncluttered view of reality.
Global System. The global configuration of power may also warp national-interest
thinking. Late in the nineteenth century, with the globe largely carved up by European
imperial powers, many countries felt compelled to grab the leftover pieces to prove
themselves major powers. A kind of contagion or copycat effect warped the national interest,
leading to the U.S. seizure of the Philippines from Spain. Teddy Roosevelt engineered the
move but some years later regretted it when he noticed that the Philippines had become a
U.S. vulnerability in the Pacific, one that had to be defended at great cost from the Japanese.
It is easy to declare something to be your national interest but hard to back out afterward.
A world divided by many powers is quite different from one divided by just two
19
superpowers. Probably the biggest distortions come in the latter case, that of Cold War
bipolarity, a zero-sum game that tended to make everything important. Limited definitions of
the national interest fall by the wayside, and the superpowers plunge ever deeper into
obscure corners of the world as if one more client state proved they were winning. Laos,
Ethiopia, Afghanistan, everything becomes the national interest. Only Antarctica remained
outside the superpower competition. Like the Sherwin-Williams paint symbol, national
interests “cover the Earth” and thus lose their utility. You must be able to discriminate and
rank national interests lest you spread your power too thin and in areas of little importance.
In a bipolar situation, the hegemonic superpower of each camp is forced, in order to hold its
alliance together, to take on the national interests of each client state. One of the causes of the
1948 Tito-Stalin split, for example, was Tito’s insistence that Trieste belonged to Yugoslavia.
Trieste may have been a Yugoslav national interest, but it was not a Soviet national interest,
and Stalin was reluctant to provoke the British and Americans over it. The United States was
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reluctant to come to French aid in the first Indochina war; it was not a U.S. national interest.
To draw France into the common defense of Europe in the early 1950s, however, it was
necessary to support French imperialism on the other side of the globe. U.S. involvement in
Indochina started as a bribe to get French cooperation in Europe. The care and feeding of the
alliance became a dominant national interest, one that blotted out a careful review of military
engagement in a distant swamp.
The clients, of course, feel little obligation to make the national interests of the hegemon
their own. France did not come to the aid of the United States in Indochina; de Gaulle, in fact,
told the Americans they were quite foolish. Aside from the Soviets, no members of the Warsaw
Pact had any interest in Afghanistan. The bipolar world thus produces a tail-wags-dog effect
in pushing the hegemon to defend the clients with no reciprocity implied. As such, bipolar
systems come under great stress and have finite lifespans. This bothers a Realist not at all, for
no alliance lasts forever; alliances change as the national interests of their members change.
An alliance is not an end in itself; it is merely one device that, for a certain time, may support
the national interest.
The collapse of the bipolar world of the Cold War now permits an un-warping or
normalizing of national interests. Laos, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan now receive precisely the
attention they merit. We are no longer so solicitous of our European friends, whose national
interests may diverge from and even conflict with ours. We are not desperate to hold together
NATO and may now tell the Europeans to feel free to do whatever they wish; we may or may
not back them up, depending on our national interests involved. Notice how the end of the
Cold War brought some very tough talk and inflexible positions in trade negotiations. There
was no longer much reason for the United States to be especially nice to the West Europeans
and East Asians on trade; it seemed to be high time for Washington to look out for U.S.
economic interests.
Public and Elite Convictions. While not as explicit as ideologies, the culture, values, and
convictions of a country also can warp definitions of the national interest. Every country has
national values, but the statesman who acts on them without reference to the national
interest risks damaging the nation. The long American missionary experience in China
convinced many Americans that China was our responsibility to uplift and defend, a
conviction that contributed to war with Japan. The cultural and ethnic affinities of many
Americans lead them to automatically support their country of origin and to define its
national interests as America’s. The Israeli and Greek lobbies are quite influential, even
though Israeli and Greek interests sometimes diverge from U.S. interests. The Greek lobby,
for example, made Washington hesitate for years before officially recognizing Macedonia.
A lack of interest also can be warping. If left to itself, some analysts believe, U.S. mass
opinion tends toward isolationism; that is, it sees no important national interests anywhere.
Americans are especially indifferent to Latin America, which is seen as having no influence
on the United States except as a source of drugs and illegal immigrants. Americans
mistakenly but deeply believe there are few U.S. national interests there.
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Elites—the top or most influential people—pay far more attention to foreign affairs than
the public at large; therefore they are instrumental in defining national interests. The
anglophilia of the WASP elite of the Northeast inclined America to enter two world wars to
defend Britain. This inclination was not shared by the Midwest, where elites were more Irish
and German in origin; hence the purported “isolationism” of the Midwest.
Economic elites may define U.S. holdings abroad as the national interest. United Fruit
saw Arbenz’s reforms in Guatemala as a threat to their bananas and hence to the United
States. ITT saw Allende’s takeover of the ITT-owned Chilean telephone network as a threat to
U.S. interests. Some critics wonder if the U.S. war against Iraq was a defense of national
interests or of oil-industry interests.
Educational elites may awaken or keep alive issues that do not interest the public at large.
By inculcating a “world order” view of global politics, educators may convince students that
distant problems are vital U.S. interests. As young officials these students may carry
idealistic views with them into government agencies and news organizations. Some young
State Department officials resigned when they could not get their way in defining Bosnia as a
U.S. interest.
Mass Media. Especially important in awakening the broader public to questions of
national interest are the mass media. Unfortunately, they do so on a capricious basis little
grounded in calm calculation. One noted columnist made the Kurds his pet national interest.
Addicted to good visuals and action footage, television goes where the action is and brings
back images of maimed or starving children—“If it bleeds it leads.” Implicit in the images is
the message that atrocities so terrible automatically become a U.S. interest. But the media
can be highly selective, giving extensive coverage to horrors in Bosnia but ignoring similar
horrors in Peru, Sri Lanka, or Angola. South America would have to sink before U.S.
television would cover it. To have the media set the national interest is to let show biz take
over the guidance of the nation.
Policy Inertia. Once a policy is set, it takes on a life of its own and may continue
20
indefinitely. It is the nature of bureaucracy to keep marching in the direction initially set,
which may include definitions of the national interest. The situation may change over time,
but not the bureaucracy. Dean Rusk testified that South Vietnam had become a vital U.S.
interest because we had sunk so much foreign aid into it. Henry Kissinger later said that even
if Vietnam had not initially been a U.S. interest, the commitment of American blood and
treasure had put U.S. credibility on the line and thus turned Vietnam into a vital interest. On
this basis, you can create national interests anywhere in the world where previously you had
none.

THE UTILITY OF NATIONAL INTEREST.
If the definition of the national interest can be warped in so many ways, what good is the
concept? It’s only as good as your ability to perceive reality accurately, a gift granted to few.
For the rest of us, to get an accurate fix on the national interest it would be necessary to travel
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into the future in a time machine to see how things worked out under a given policy. The real
national interest is sometimes knowable only many years after the fact. Second- and
third-order effects of a policy are often wildly unpredictable.
In the mid-1960s, Vietnam seemed to most Americans to be a national interest; a decade
later few thought it had been a national interest. The victorious communists in Vietnam,
having impoverished their country, now seek to enter the capitalistic world market economy.
Funny how things work out.
As noted above, the real problem is when reputedly intelligent, well-informed analysts
come down on opposing sides in defining the national interest. Whom can the statesman
trust? “National interest” is often used on a polemical basis, with each side claiming to have
the true picture.
The utility of national interest is not in any formula that can untangle complex issues.
Beware of anyone trying to sell you a formula or pat answer; there are none. National interest
is useful in training the decisionmaker to ask a series of questions, such as: How are current
developments affecting my nation’s power? Are hostile forces able to harm my vital interests?
Do I have enough power to protect my vital interests? Which of my interests are secondary?
How much of my power am I willing to use to defend them? What kind of deals can I get in
compromises over secondary interests? The net effect of these questions is to restrain
impetuous types from embarking on crusades defined, again, as overseas military actions
little related to national interest.
It is Morgenthau’s argument that the world would be a much better place if all statesmen
would consistently ask such questions, for that would induce a sense of limits and caution into
their strategies that might otherwise be lacking. For those who simply will not keep their
national interests defined tightly and close to home but instead are intent on expanding their
power (imperialism), Morgenthau’s approach is also useful. The statesman is constantly
scanning the horizon to detect the growth of hostile power centers, and if they seem likely to
impinge on his national interests he formulates strategies to safeguard his interests, each
step grounded in adequate power.
The national-interest approach is terribly old-fashioned, and some thinkers argue it has
been or must be superseded by “world interest” or “world order” approaches, which go beyond
the inherent selfishness of national interest. Empirically, however, one would still find
national interest a better predictor of state strategy than world order. In a crisis, when it
comes to putting their troops in harm’s way, statesmen ask themselves, “What is my nation’s
interest in all this?” It’s still not a bad question.
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CHAPTER 7
REGIONAL STUDIES AND GLOBAL STRATEGY
R. Craig Nation
THE NEW REGIONALISM.
The 20th Century has been a period of global conflict. The First and Second World Wars
were implacable struggles waged on the world stage, and they were followed by the Cold War,
a militarized contest between superpower rivals described by Colin Gray as “a virtual World
1
War III.” Not surprisingly, interstate rivalry propelled by Fritz Fischer’s Griff nach der
Weltmacht (Strike for World Power) gave rise to theoretical perspectives concerning the
2
dynamic of international relations dominated by globalist perspectives. From the founding
of the first university department devoted to the formal study of International Relations at
the University of Aberystwyth (Wales) in 1919 to the present, globalist and universalizing
theoretical models have been at the core of the profession.
Such models have also dominated the practice of American foreign and security policy.
The venerable traditions of American isolationism and exceptionalism, integral to the
founding of the republic, and through most of the 19th century the inspiration for a cautious
and discrete U.S. world role, were gradually pushed aside against the background of the
Great War by the liberal tradition of benign engagement under the aegis of international law,
international organization, and collective security. Though Woodrow Wilson’s project for a
U.S. led League of Nations was frustrated by congressional reversion to isolationist
sentiment, in the larger picture there would be no return from “over there.” America was a
dominant world power from at least 1916 (when the U.S. became a creditor for the major
European powers), and the range of its interests no longer permitted the luxury of an
exclusively national or even hemispheric policy focus.
Already on the eve of the Second World War, in his seminal work The Twenty Years’
Crisis, E. H. Carr argued that a relative neglect of the role of power and coercion in
3
international affairs had paved the way for the rise of fascism. Carr’s “realist” perspective,
given greater theoretical substance in the U.S. by transplanted Europeans such as Hans
Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, and Stanley Hoffman, who viewed themselves as tutors for
potent but naive American elites, became the dominant conceptual framework for postwar
4
U.S. policy. The classical realism of postwar theorists was never a vulgar philosophy of might
makes right, though it is sometimes interpreted in that spirit. Its most prominent
promulgators, often European Jews like Morgenthau who had fled the holocaust and were
lucidly aware of what unchecked power set to evil ends could affect, were preoccupied with
ethical concerns and the need to constrain the inherent violence of anarchic interstate
5
competition. But the realist tradition made no bones about the need to place power, the
global balance of power, and the inevitability of strategic rivalry between competing
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sovereignties at the center of an unrepentently globalist worldview. George Kennan’s
containment doctrine, the backbone of U.S. security policy through most of the cold war
decades, was little more than an astute application of realist premises to the management of
6
U.S.-Soviet relations.
Regional conflict was a significant part of cold war competition, but it too was usually
interpreted in a global perspective, as a projection of superpower rivalry into peripheral
regions on the shoulders of proxy forces. Architects of U.S. cold war strategy like Henry
Kissinger could publicly opine about the marginality of third world regions, and assert a great
power orientation that perceived the essence of foreign policy as an elegant game of balance
7
between power centers in Washington, London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Beijing. Nuclear
competition between the superpowers, and the theory of strategic deterrence that was crafted
to direct it, encouraged ever more abstract modeling of interstate rivalry. These trends
culminated in the 1980s with the emergence of “neo” versions of traditional theoretical
paradigms that consciously sought to void international theory of its historicist and
humanistic foundations. Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realist argument used austere logic in
8
interpreting interstate competition as an abstract calculus of power. The related schools of
game and rational choice theory sought to use mathematical modeling to reproduce the
dynamics of foreign policy decision-making. Neo-liberal institutionalist models built
alternatives to realism upon the universalizing trends of interdependence and globalization,
9
often founded upon a simplistic Benthamite utilitarianism. By the end of the Cold War, much
of the rationale for U.S. foreign and security policy rested upon assumptions integral to these
approaches—the centrality of great power rivalry, the balance of power as the axis of
interstate competition, the changing nature of power in an age of globalization where
economic strength and various soft power options have accrued in importance, and the need
for a competitive strategy to maintain and extend U.S. advantage.
Part of the reigning confusion surrounding the nature of post-Cold War world order
derives from the fact that it is no longer defined by an all-consuming rivalry between peer
competitors. With a Gross Domestic Product of $7.7 trillion in 1998, levels of defense spending
superior to any imaginable combination of rivals, a clear-cut technological advantage, and a
strong and stable domestic order, the U.S. stands head and shoulders above any real or
potential rival. The current distribution of world power is objectively hegemonic, and
American leadership is less a goal than a fact. In the absence, now and for the foreseeable
future, of an authentic peer competitor capable of posing a serious challenge to U.S.
dominance, balancing strategies such as that promulgated by Russia’s Evgenii Primakov,
seeking to regenerate a “multipolar” world order in which America will be limited to the
10
status of first among equals, must remain essentially rhetorical. Maintaining U.S. status
and using the advantages of preeminence to good ends have become primary responsibilities
11
for U.S. security planners. These are tasks that demand different kinds of perceptions and
priorities than those which motivated policy during the Cold War.
Most of the documents drawn up to chart directions for security policy into the new
century assert similar conclusions concerning the kinds of threats that the U.S. will be
required to respond to. In contrast with the focused strategic environment of the postwar
years, these threats will be dispersed rather than concentrated, unpredictable and often
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unexpected, and significantly derived from regional and state-centered contingencies. The
officially mandated A National Security Strategy for a New Century asserts that
“globalization ... means that more and more we as a nation are affected by events beyond our
borders,” and cites as a first strategic priority the effort “to foster regional efforts led by the
community of democratic nations to promote peace and prosperity in key regions of the
12
world.” The current edition of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) also places regional
dangers first in its list of challenges, noting “the threat of coercion and large-scale,
cross-border aggression against U.S. allies and friends in key regions by hostile states with
significant military power,” the possible rise of “more than one aspiring regional power” with
“the desire and means to challenge U.S. interests militarily,” and “failed or failing states” that
“may create instability, internal conflict, and humanitarian crises, in some cases within
13
regions where the United States has vital or important interests.” The Report of the
National Defense Panel, drawn up to provide an alternative perspective to that of the QDR,
asserts that among the types of military and security-related missions that the U.S. will be
called upon to perform in the time frame 2010-2020, “maintaining regional stability is
probably foremost among them” and calls regional engagement “an essential component of
14
U.S. national security.” The preface to the Hart-Rudman Report, intended to make
recommendations for recasting national security policy in a new century, likewise highlights
regional threats, including “an increase in the rise of suppressed nationalisms, ethnic or
religious violence, humanitarian disasters, major catalytic regional crises, and the spread of
15
dangerous weapons.”
These conclusions rest upon shared assumptions about the emerging 21st Century world
order, the changing contours of global security, and the evolving U.S. world role. The new
configuration of global power, which combines U.S. preeminence with considerable regional
fragmentation and turbulence, ensures that major world regions will be an ever more
important target for U.S. engagement—as sources of critical strategic resources, as platforms
for geostrategic leverage, as integral parts of an increasingly interdependent global economy,
and as testing grounds for great power will and determination to impose rules of the game.
Preeminence does not imply total control. Influence in key world regions will be a significant
apple of discord between the hegemonic leader, great power rivals, and influential local
powers. Regions and sub-regions will remain the primary forums for armed conflict and
instability, with a variety of small wars, rather than major theater engagements, posing the
most imminent demands upon a U.S. military committed to engagement and shaping
strategies. Aspiring regional hegemons, sometimes tempted by hopes of gaining access to
weapons of mass destruction, will continue to promote disorder and pose direct threats to
important U.S. interests. To navigate effectively under these circumstances, U.S. strategists
will have to base international engagement upon a sophisticated understanding of major
world regions, viewed not only in regard to their place within an overarching structure of
world power, but as entities in their own right, including the underlying social, political, and
cultural processes that make the national and regional context unique.
For all of these reasons, regional studies will remain a necessary foundation for an
integrated curriculum in national security policy and planning. If the 20th Century has been
the century of global conflagration, the 21st Century seems well placed to become the century
of regional disaggregation. New directions in international relations theory, cast around
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concepts such as turbulence and chaos theory, have been honed to highlight these trends.
For U.S. policy makers, the challenge will be to integrate regional perspectives, and
sensitivities to national and regional dynamics, into a realistic and balanced approach to the
pursuit of global security; not to question the relevance of regional perspectives (which should
be self-evident), but to better understand the ways in which they need to be joined to a
comprehensive strategy for the pursuit of national interest.

WHAT IS A REGION?
Regions may be defined and distinguished according to an approximate combination of
geographic, social, cultural, and political variables. It will always be difficult, however, to
create clear lines of separation. As an analytical category in international relations, the
“region” is fated to remain contingent and contentious. Geographical contiguity is clearly a
prerequisite for tightly defined regional identity, and without some geographical limitation
the concept loses all coherence, but drawing uncontested boundaries is usually an impossible
17
task. The concept of “eastern Europe” once had a fairly high degree of integrity, but since
1989 it has virtually disappeared from the political lexicon. The phrase “Middle East,” which
was originally the product of colonialist and Eurocentric world views, continues to be used to
describe an extremely diverse area stretching from the Maghreb into distant Central Asia.
Meanwhile, the designation of an eastern Mediterranean Levant has fallen out of fashion.
The Balkans have been regarded as a distinctive European sub-region for well over a century,
18
but almost any Balkan state with elsewhere to turn rejects the designation unambiguously.
“All regions,” writes Andrew Hurrell with some justification, “are socially constructed and
19
hence politically contested.”
One of the more influential recent attempts to delineate regions according to cultural
criteria has been Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis. Huntington identifies
nine world civilizational zones based significantly, though not entirely, upon confessional
20
affiliation. The argument that geostrategy will be increasingly dominated by civilizational
conflict waged along the “faultlines” dividing these zones has been widely used to explain the
apparent upsurge in ethnic conflict of the past decade. Huntington’s argument, however, is
neither entirely novel nor altogether convincing. Geopolitical analysis has long used the idea
of the “shatterbelt,” defined as a politically fragmented and ethnically divided zone that
21
serves as a field of competition between continental and maritime powers. Great
civilizations cannot be precisely bounded spatially, and they are rarely either entirely
homogenous or mutually exclusive. Huntington’s attempt to designate geographically
bounded civilizational zones, and to use these zones as the foundation for a theory of
geostrategy, rests on suspect premises.
Barry Buzan has developed the concept of the “regional security complex” in an effort “to
offset the tendency of power theorists to underplay the importance of the regional level in
22
international security affairs.” He offers the assertion that in security terms, “ ‘region’
means that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of
states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each
23
other.” The existence of a “subsystem” of security relations presumes high levels of
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interdependence, multiple interactions, and shared sensitivities and vulnerabilities. Any
attempt to identify such complexes empirically, however, poses obvious problems. Regional
security complexes are rarely if ever defined exclusively by geographical proximity, they are
often dominated by external powers, and they are sometimes held hostage by
national-cultural variables or systemic dynamics. The United States is the focus of
functioning security complexes in both Europe and Asia. Turkey and Israel lie within
different security complexes according to most of Buzan’s criteria, but they have recently
developed a close bilateral relationship that impacts significantly upon their relations with
contiguous states. Transnational threats such as terrorism, international crime, drug
trafficking, illegal migration, or environmental disintegration also overlap regions and create
dynamics of association that prevent security complexes from becoming significantly
self-contained.
The U.S. makes an approximate distinction between geographic regions in the Unified
Command Plan that lies at the basis of its war-fighting strategy, by fixing the contours of
unified command areas assigned to combatant commanders-in-chief (CINCs). The present
division designates a European Command combining western and central Europe with
Africa, a Central Command approximately contiguous with an extended Middle East, a
Pacific Command covering most of eastern and southern Asia and Oceania, a Southern
Command including much of Latin America and the Caribbean, and a Joint Forces Command
based in the United States. This approach originally evolved from the division of
responsibilities adapted by the U.S. to fight the Second World War, and was formalized by the
National Security Act of 1947. Over the years the geographic division of responsibility has
been adapted repeatedly, on the basis of changes in the international security structure,
technological advances, and strategic calculation, but also bureaucratic infighting over areas
of responsibility and access to resources. Geographic CINCs have recently been required to
draw up an annual Theater Engagement Plan defining regional shaping priorities, but the
CINC is primarily a war-fighter, and the division of responsibility which the current unified
command plan structure embodies is geared to position the U.S. to prevail in armed
confrontations. Current U.S. national security strategy, which mandates readiness to fight
two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, concentrates the attention of the CINCs on the
areas where such conflicts are presumed to be most likely—in the Middle East/Southwest
Asian and Western Pacific/Northeast Asian theaters. Three major nations of critical
importance to U.S. security—Canada, Mexico, and the Russian Federation—are not attached
to geographic CINCdoms. The distinction between CINCdoms is not altogether arbitrary, but
it is geared to the performance of the functional tasks of warriors, does not rest upon careful
conceptual distinctions, and is partially incomplete.
David Lake and Patrick Morgan define region minimally, as “a set of countries linked by
geography and one or more common trends, such as level of development, culture or political
24
institutions.” Their definition has the advantages of simplicity and flexibility. It is, however,
too broad to be really useful, and also potentially misleading. The nation-state is an
inadequate building bloc for regional complexes. Any viable definition of the post-Soviet
Central Asian region would have to include China’s Xinjiang province, whose population is
composed of 60 percent Turkic Muslims. Russia’s far eastern provinces are an integral part of
the Asia-Pacific region, while the core of historic Russia is an extension, both geographically
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and culturally, of a greater Europe. Ukraine’s population is divided politically along the line
of the Dnieper River, with the western provinces affiliating with an enlarged central Europe
and the eastern provinces oriented toward the Russian Federation and Eurasia. Northern
Mexico and southern California have become intimately associated as a result of high levels of
25
economic interaction and cross-border movement of peoples. The European Union has even
sought to institutionalize transnational communities, by creating multi-state districts
26
designated as “Euro-regions.” The commonalities used to distinguish regions cannot be
terminated artificially at national boundaries, and “one or more common trends” is too weak a
foundation for association to give regional designations analytical substance.
In its regional studies curriculum, the U.S. Army War College designates six major world
regions on the basis of broad geographical criteria—Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Russia
and Eurasia, the Asia-Pacific region, and the Americas. These are designations of
convenience intended primarily for pedagogical purposes. Our working definition of what
constitutes a region is of necessity broad and multidimensional. Geographical propinquity; a
sense of identity and self-awareness based upon shared experience, ascribed traits, or
language; a degree of autonomy within the international state system; relatively high levels
of transactions; economic interdependencies; and political and cultural affinity may all be
cited as relevant criteria. It is presumed that there will be gray areas and significant overlap
between regions however they are defined. The Turkish Republic, for example, is
simultaneously part of a greater Europe, an extended Middle East, and post-Soviet Eurasia.
No single set of associations is essential, and in the best of cases fixing the contours of major
world regions and sub-regions will remain a problematic exercise.

WORLD REGIONS AND WORLD ORDER.
However regions are defined and differentiated, the impact of local, national, and regional
dynamics upon world politics is substantial and destined to grow larger. For the foreseeable
future, effective strategy will require sensitivity to the various ways in which regional affairs
condition the global security agenda, channel and constrain U.S. priorities, and affect the
contours of a changing world order.
1. Regional Instability and Regional Conflict. Regional instability poses diverse kinds of
challenges to U.S. interests. Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in 1990 placed a critical mass of
Middle Eastern oil reserves in the hands of an ambitious and hostile regional power, thus
posing a clear threat to vital interests. Such dramatic scenarios will not occur very often, but
the potential consequences are so great as to demand high degrees of readiness. “Rogue
states,” which aspire to regional hegemony and whose leaders are often defiant of
international norms, are now acknowledged as a distinct threat in their own right. The most
persistent challenge of recent years, however, has been the chronic instability born of flawed
regional orders marked by severe underdevelopment, unequal development, frustrated
nationalism, ethnic rivalry, and the “failed state” phenomenon where weak polities lose the
capacity to carry out the basic tasks of governance.
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In the post-Cold War decade, the U.S. armed forces have been called upon to participate in
an unprecedented number of complex contingency operations ranging from simple
non-combatant evacuations to extensive, protracted, and dangerous peace enforcement and
peacekeeping duties. The logic of U.S. engagement is usually impeccable. Unchecked regional
or civil conflicts risk escalation with broadening consequences; threaten the credibility of the
U.S., its allies, and major international instances as guarantors of world order; and confront
decision makers with horrendous and morally intolerable humanitarian abuses. But the U.S.
should not feel obligated, nor can it afford, to take on the role of global policeman. Protracted
and open-ended peacekeeping deployments risk to undermine combat readiness by
disrupting training routines, erode the morale of the volunteer force, and pose the constant
possibility of deeper and higher-risk engagement. Shaping regional complexes to head off
resorts to coercive conflict behavior, and responding to regional challenges, if possible
preemptively and under the aegis of international organizations or multinational coalitions,
have as a result become pillars of U.S. security policy.
The challenges of civil war and low-intensity regional conflict will not go away or diminish.
In a larger historical perspective it seems clear that the total wars of the 20th Century have
been exceptional events rather than typical ones. Prior to our century, technological
limitations made the concept of “world” war unthinkable—warfare, of necessity, was waged
within physically constrained theaters on the regional level. Ironically, the technological
possibilities unveiled with the creation of massive nuclear arsenals during the Cold War have
once again made the outbreak of hegemonic warfare between great power rivals highly
unlikely, as well an eminently undesirable. The increasing lethality (and expense) of modern
conventional armaments only further raises the threshold of total war. While the Kantian
thesis that great power warfare has become obsolete may or may not be credible, it rests upon
27
substantial foundations. If for no other reasons than those imposed by the evolving
technology of violence, wars and armed confrontations are today once again being contested
almost exclusively as low and medium intensity conflicts on the local and regional level. “In
the foreseeable future,” write Lake and Morgan, “violent conflict will mostly arise out of
regional concerns and will be viewed by political actors through a regional, rather than global,
28
lens.”
In some ways, cold war bipolarity worked to constrain regional conflict. Neither
superpower could afford to tolerate an uncontrolled escalation of regional rivalry that risked
to draw it into a direct confrontation, and regional allies were consistently pressured to limit
29
their aspirations and bend to the will of their great power sponsors. It is difficult to imagine
that the anarchic disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation would have been allowed to
proceed unchecked in 1991 had the fragile European balance of terror of the cold war system
still been at risk. The extent of such constraint may nonetheless be exaggerated. Many of the
regional conflicts of the cold war era—in southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, the
Middle East, or southern Asia—have perpetuated themselves into the post-Cold War period
without missing a step. Cumulatively, post-World War II regional conflicts have occasioned
the deaths of over 25 million individuals, and the incidence and intensity of such conflicts
continues to increase.

75

A composite portrait of post-Cold War regional conflict calls attention to the difficulties
involved in programming effective responses. The large majority of contemporary “limited”
wars are civil wars or wars of secession, waged with the ferocity that is typical of such
contests. Combat operations often include the significant engagement of poorly controlled
and disciplined irregular forces. The bulk of casualties are imposed upon innocent civilians,
sometimes including genocidal massacre and forced population transfers (ethnic cleansing).
While often obscure in terms of their origins, such conflicts are usually highly visible. The
modern mass media, commercially driven and chronically in search of sensation, brings
regional chaos “into the living room” and generates popular pressure to respond that political
leaders often find difficult to ignore. Limited and often frustrated or only partly successful
intervention by the international community in the role of would-be peacemaker is another
shared trait that gives many contemporary regional conflicts a fairly uniform contour. Wayne
Burt notes correctly that, in comparison with the structured context of cold war bipolarity, the
“post-Cold War world is a much ‘messier’ world where limited conflict will be fought for
limited and often shifting objectives, and with strategies that are difficult to formulate, costs
30
that are uncertain, and entrance and exit points that are not obvious.”
As undisputed world leader, and the only major power with significant global power
projection capacity, the U.S. is often compelled to react to such conflicts whether or not it has
truly vital interests at stake. America’s ability to manage and shape the conflict process is
nonetheless severely limited. A decade of struggling with regional conflict in post-communist
Yugoslavia, including intensive diplomatic efforts, punitive air strikes, large and open-ended
peacekeeping deployments, and a full-scale war over Kosovo, has led to what may at best be
described as a mixed result. Peace enforcement and peacekeeping responsibilities have been
carried out with impressive efficiency, but the much more problematic, and politically
charged task of post-conflict peace building has proven to be something close to a mission
31
impossible.
The U.S. has made the maintenance of regional stability a strong pillar of its security
strategy, but the forces of disintegration at work within many world regions are daunting.
Effective responses will first of all require some selectivity in choosing targets for
intervention. When we do elect to become involved, our efforts should be based upon a much
greater awareness of regional realities than has been manifested in the recent past. We will
also need to make better use of friends and allies. Regional instability is often best addressed
by local actors, who usually have the largest vested interest in blocking escalation, and in
some cases regionally based conflict management initiatives can become a significant
stimulus to broader patterns of regional cooperation. Engaging allies and relevant
multilateral forums in managing regional conflict, as the U.S. has sought to do with the
African Crisis Response Initiative, should be a high national priority.
2. Geopolitics. Many currently fashionable approaches to international relations assume
the decline of territoriality as a motive for state behavior. The dominant trend in world
politics is persistently, albeit vaguely, described as globalization, implying a rapid increase in
interactions fueled by revolutions in communications and information management, the
emergence of a truly global market and world economy, the primacy of economic competition
as a mode of interstate rivalry, and an unprecedented space-time compression that places
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unique demands upon decision-makers. The globalization scenario is built on overarching
generalizations about world order and it rests upon universalizing premises that leave little
space for sticky concern with the intricacies of regional affairs. There are alternatives to
theoretical perspectives cast on so high a level of abstraction, however, that bring regional
issues into the forefront of international discourse. Most important among them is the
tradition of geopolitics.
The core challenge of geopolitical analysis is to link the systematic study of spatial and
geographical relations with the dynamic of interstate politics. As a formal discipline,
geopolitics dates from the late nineteenth century work of the Leipzig professor Friedrich
Ratzel. His 1897 study Politische Geographie (Political Geography) presents states as
organisms with a quasi-biological character, rooted in their native soil, embedded in a
distinctive spatial context or Lebensraum (living space), and condemned to either grow and
33
expand or wither away. In the works of various contemporaries and successors, including
Alfred Thayer Mahan, Rudolf Kjellén, Halford Mackinder, Alfred de Severing, Klaus
Haushofer, and Nicholas John Spykman, these insights have been pushed in a number of
directions. The strong influence of geopolitical categories, especially as transmitted through
the work of Haushofer, upon Adolf Hitler’s strategic program during the 1930s has brought
enduring discredit upon the discipline, widely but unfairly regarded as a vulgar amalgam of
social Darwinism and military expansionism. In fact, in its manifold and not always
consistent manifestations, geopolitical analysis presents a range of alternative strategic
perceptions whose common ground is a sense of the permanent and enduring relevance of
34
spatial, cultural, and environmental factors in world politics. These are also the factors that
stand at the foundation of regional studies.
Geopolitics is rooted in the study of geography, broadly but relevantly defined by Saul
Cohen as “spatial patterns and relations that reflect dynamic physical and human
35
processes.” Geography is a rich and complex construct that provides a context for weighing
the impact of a number of significant but often neglected variables. These include ethnicity,
nationalism, and the politics of identity; access to natural and strategic resources;
geostrategy and the role of lines of communication and strategic choke points; relations
between human communities and their natural environment; and the strategic implications
of increasing environmental stress. It encompasses demographic issues such as population
growth, cycles of migration and changing patterns of population distribution, and
“decision-making milieus” including Huntingtonian civilizational zones, political systems
and political cultures, as well as the spatial distribution of power within the world system.
Geopolitical analysis is best known in the West as refracted by Halford Mackinder’s
heartland concept, which defines control of the Eurasian land mass as the key to world power.
Mackinder distinguished between a World-Island encompassing the joined continents of
Europe, Asia, and Africa, the Eurasian Heartland approximately equivalent to Russia and
Central Asia, and the Rimlands (including east-central Europe) along the Eurasian
periphery. “Who rules East Europe,” he wrote in a famous passage, “controls the Heartland.
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island. Who rules the World-Island
36
commands the World.” Mackinder was not a fascist militarist, but a moderate professor and
civil servant, whose thinking lay at the foundation of British strategy through much of the
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twentieth century. By calling attention to the spatial dimensions of grand strategy, his work
points out the extent to which geostrategic concepts have been and continue to be at the heart
of modern statecraft.
A striking contemporary illustration of the continuing impact of geopolitical perspectives
is provided by the heartland power par excellence, the Russian Federation, where
disillusionment with the gilded promises of globalization and integration with the U.S.-led
37
world economy have led to a rapid and broadly influential revival of geopolitical theory. The
new Russian geopolitics has been dismissed in the West as a manifestation of radical
38
extremism, a sort of Russian fascism born of the post-communist malaise. In fact, core
geopolitical perceptions (the need to maintain the integrity of the Russian Federation, the call
to reassert a strong sphere of influence in the territories of the former Soviet Union, the
cultural distinctiveness of the Russian Idea and its historical role as a force for integration in
the expanses of Eurasia, the need for alliances to balance and contest American hegemony)
have moved into the mainstream of Russian strategic thought and share nearly consensual
support.
Haushofer has written that “geopolitics is the science of the conditioning of political
processes by the earth,” and that “the essence of regions as comprehended from the
39
geopolitical point of view provides the framework for geopolitics.” This is a plaidoyer for the
concrete and substantial, for a theory of world politics built from the ground up. Effective
geopolitical reasoning leads us back to the earth, to the distinctive political communities
nested upon it, to the patterns of association that develop between them, and to the conflicts
that emerge from their interactions. It is not the only school of thought that prioritizes the
relevance of geography and regional studies, but it provides a particularly good example of
the relevance of the textured study of peoples and places as a foundation for effective strategy.
3. The Cultural Dimension of Warfare. The maxim “know thy enemy” is often counted as
the acme of strategic wisdom. It is unfortunately a maxim that has not always been highly
respected in the U.S. military and security communities. War has organizational and
technological dimensions which make it a rigorous, practical, and precise enterprise, but
wars are also waged between calculating rivals in a domain of uncertainty, and by distinctive
political communities in ways that reflect deeply rooted, culturally conditioned preferences.
During the Cold War the U.S. made an intense effort to understand the societal and
cultural dynamics shaping the perceptions of its Soviet rival, arguably to good effect. In
general, however, in depth knowledge of national and regional cultural dynamics has not
been a strong point for U.S. strategy, which has tended to rest upon the sturdy pillars of
40
relative invulnerability and the capacity to mobilize overwhelming force. In the volatile and
uncertain security environment of the years to come, however, the assumption of
technological and material advantage may not be a safe one, nor will these advantages always
suffice to ensure superiority in every possible contingency. The People’s Republic of China
represents a potential long-term rival with considerable assets and great self-confidence,
41
derived in part from a highly distinctive and ancient culture. Russia’s current time of
troubles has temporarily brought her low, but eventually the inherent strengths that made
the USSR so formidable a rival during the cold war decades will reassert themselves. The U.S.
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will need to know “what makes them tick” if it wants to manage its relations with potential
peer competitors successfully. Effective intervention in complex contingencies will likewise
demand sophisticated knowledge of real or potential rivals. Strategy is not uniquely the
product of culture, and culture itself is not a lucid or unambiguous construct. But all strategy
unfolds in a cultural context, and cannot be fully or properly understood outside it.
Colin Gray defines strategic culture as “the socially constructed and transmitted
assumptions, habits of mind, traditions, and preferred methods of operation ... that are more
42
or less specific to a particular geographically based security community.” The foundations of
strategic culture are the fundaments of culture itself; shared experience, language, common
governance, and values. The cultural orientation that derives from these commonalities, it
can be argued, affects the ways in which polities conduct diplomacy, define and pursue
interests, and wage war. In his controversial History of Warfare, John Keegan suggests that
throughout history war has always been an essentially cultural phenomenon, an atavism
derived from patterns of group identification and interaction rather than the purposeful
activity implied in Clausewitz’s famous dictum that “war is the continuation of politics by
43
other means.” Victor Hanson argues that the ancient Greek preference for physical
confrontation and quick decision has created a “Western way of war,” dominated by a search
44
for decisive battle and strategies of annihilation, that remains alive to this day. Such
conclusions are extreme, but they are useful in underlining the fact that wars are conceived,
plotted, and waged by socially conditioned human agents.
As a dominant global power the U.S. will be called upon to wage war in a variety of contexts
in the years to come. A better understanding of the strategic cultures of real or potential
adversaries will place another weapon in its arsenal and strengthen prospects for success. In
Bernard Brodie’s classic formulation, “good strategy presumes good anthropology and
sociology. Some of the greatest military blunders of all time have resulted from juvenile
45
evaluations in this department.” Knowing the enemy goes well beyond order of battle, to the
sources of strategic preference and military operational codes that are grounded in the social
46
and cultural context of distinctive nations and regions.
4. Espaces de Sens: Regional Alliance and Association. The Cold War was a phase of
intense global competition manifested in ideological polarization, arms racing, and
militarized regional rivalry. It nonetheless offered a structure of purposeful endeavor for its
leading protagonists, as well as for critics who sought alternatives to what they perceived as
the dead-end of belligerent bipolarity. The USSR justified its international policy on the basis
of a distinctively Soviet variant of Marxism-Leninism. The U.S. consciously developed its cold
war strategy as a defense of the values of freedom and democracy. Various non-aligned
alternatives called for a plague upon both houses, and sought to develop a third way
independent of either power bloc. Regardless of where one stood, world politics took on the
contours of a moral tale infused with meaning.
The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a certain euphoria, captured by Francis
Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis, according to which the demise of the communist
challenge meant “the end of history as such: that is, the end point in mankind’s ideological
evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human
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government.” Fukuyama’s sweepingly optimistic argument promised an era of global
harmony in which interstate strategic rivalry would give way to cooperation under the
impetus of democratization, development, and consumerism, promoted by a benign American
hegemony. In place of a contest of values, Fukuyama’s Hegelian vision looked forward to the
unchallenged primacy of the culture of the West.
Needless to say, nothing of the kind has transpired. The post-Cold War period has been
marked by regional turbulence, torturous and sometimes unsuccessful post-communist
transitions, violent ethnic conflict, and continued, if sometimes muted, great power rivalry.
Western values are contested rather than embraced, and the absence of a compelling sense of
overall direction, of a larger domestic or international project, of a source of signification and
meaning, has arguably become a problem in its own right. Uncertainty about direction has
also contributed to strategic confusion. The suspicion or rejection of large civilizational
projects that has become so prominent a part of contemporary post-structuralist and social
constructivist approaches to international theory, often accompanied by a quasi-indifference
to any kind of strategic analysis whatsoever, reflects the state of affairs with admirable
48
clarity.
The United Nations, symbol of an earlier generation’s aspirations for a more peaceful
world order, has languished during the post-Cold War decade. In contrast, projects for
regional association have flourished. Realist theory portrays the formation of alliances and
regional blocs as an “outside-in” phenomenon, occurring as a response to real or perceived
external challenges, whether via “balancing” efforts to correct a maldistribution of power, or
“bandwagoning” whereby weak polities seek to dilute threats through association with a
49
hegemonic leader. Neo-mercantilist approaches follow an identical logic in explaining
regional association as a logical response to enhanced international economic competition.
But regional association may also be understood as a function of “inside-out” dynamics driven
by social and cultural trends. Zaki Laïdi has argued that, in the face of the universalizing
tendencies of globalization, meaningful civilizational projects can only be constructed on a
regional basis, as espaces de sens (spaces of meaning) bound together by a complex of
50
historical, social, cultural, political, and economic associations. These are contrasting
arguments, but they are not mutually exclusive. Both “outside-in” and “inside-out”
approaches to regional association need to be combined in an effort to come to terms with a
51
phenomenon that is well on the way to transforming world politics root and branch.
The “new regionalism” is manifested both by the revitalization of traditional regional
organizations and the creation of new forms of regional association. Large regional or
sub-regional blocs with a history of institutionalization, such as the European Union (EU),
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),
often have a strong security orientation, though today their focus is more often placed upon
52
internal conflict management than external threats. The proliferation of regional projects
for economic integration, including some of the organizations listed above as well as others
such as the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation Forum (APEC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the
Arab Magreb Union (AMU), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Southern Cone
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Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Andean Pact, the Central America Common Market
(CACM), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), has an obvious economic logic, but also a strong cultural
foundation; within these broadly drawn and sometimes overlapping zones of association one
may observe a powerful revival of regional and sub-regional awareness and identity. In other
cases, functionalist logic prevails. Regional associations are sometimes appropriate forums
for approaching large global problems such as environmental disintegration, occasioned on
the systemic level but not always effectively addressed on that level.
Regional alliances and associations play a critical role in U.S. strategy. The most
important by far is the Atlantic Alliance, uniquely successful as a formal security association
over many decades, but an organization whose raison d’être has been called into question in
the new circumstances of the post-Cold War. NATO was originally built up and maintained as
an organization for collective defense against a clear and present external threat. The
collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact have made this aspect of its
identity considerably less important, if not altogether irrelevant, but the Alliance has
adapted by restructuring itself as a “new NATO” including commitments to enlargement, out
of area peace operations, and gradual movement toward a broader collective security
orientation. Former Secretary General Javier Solana describes the process extravagantly, as
a “root and branch transformation” aimed to create “a new Alliance, far removed in purpose
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and structure from its Cold War ancestor,” inspired by the premise of “cooperative security.”
This “new” NATO is arguably more important than ever in the broader context of U.S.
security policy, as a platform for power projection, as a forum for managing relations with key
allies, as an instrument for reaching out to the emerging democracies of central and eastern
Europe, as the foundation for a new European security order, and as a context for engaging
the Russian Federation in a cooperative security effort.
The Atlantic Alliance is also a regional pact, whose stability has always been presumed to
rest in part upon close historical and cultural associations between the U.S. and its European
partners. Unfortunately, the new NATO will not have the luxury of assuming that a close
cultural affinity will continue to link both sides of the Atlantic indefinitely. Changing
demographic balances in the U.S. are reducing the proportion of citizens with European roots
and heritage. Enlargement has made NATO itself a politically and culturally more diverse
organization, where decision by consensus will be harder to achieve. Most of all, the project for
European unification is moving slowly but steadily toward the goal of a more autonomous
European subject possessed of the capacity to pursue an independent foreign and security
policy. Managing regional conflict in the Balkans has placed strains upon Alliance
mechanisms, and the Kosovo conflict in particular generated considerable tension between
the U.S. and its European allies. NATO rests upon secure foundations, but friction in
trans-Atlantic relations persists and it is likely to grow stronger as the European project
continues to unfold and efforts to bolster a European defense identity progress. Alliance
management, based upon a careful appreciation of changing European realities and
awareness of the cultural specificities of key European partners, will be an ever more
important strategic task.
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Other forms of regional association represent potential dangers. At least since the Iranian
revolution of 1979, concern for an emerging “Islamic threat” has been prominent in U.S. policy
circles. Somewhat less prominent, unfortunately, has been an informed understanding of
54
what Islam is and is not, as a religion, as a philosophy of governance, and a way of life. The
possible solidification of a Russian-Chinese strategic axis, which would rest in large measure
upon mutual alienation from the West, has the potential significantly to effect global power
balances, and the European Union clearly aspires to challenge the U.S. economically.
Contesting, co-opting and counter-acting these kinds of patterns will remain an important
priority for U.S. planners.
There is an unmistakable momentum pushing in the direction of stronger local and
regional identities, and more robust regional association. For some analysts, the trend is part
and parcel of a “retreat from the state” occasioned by changes in the locus of power in the
global political economy, whose logical endpoint will be a “new medievalism” in which
alternative forms of political association, with a more pronounced regional character, will
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eventually come to prevail. Whether or not such forecasts are correct, shifting patterns of
association and the heightened visibility of a variety of regional forums are clear
manifestations of the increased relevance of regional perspectives in global security affairs.

CONCLUSIONS.
The foundations of regional studies have changed remarkably little over time.
Substantive understanding of major world regions demands a thorough mastery of the
relevant specialized literature, careful and persistent monitoring of events and trends,
appropriate language skills, and a period of sustained residence allowing for immersion in
regional realities, accompanied by periodic visits to keep perceptions up-to-date. Regionalists
need refined skills that demand a considerable investment of time and resources to create and
maintain. If the argument presented in this essay is correct, however, and regional dynamics
will in fact become an increasingly important part of the international security agenda in the
years to come, the investment will be well worth making.
Although the confines of major world regions and sub-regions are difficult to fix with a
great deal of consistency and rigor, the relevance of local, national, and regional perspectives
in international political analysis is more or less uncontested. For U.S. strategists in the
post-Cold War period the importance of such perspectives is particularly great. In the absence
of a peer competitor, significant challenges to U.S. interests are most likely to emerge from
various kinds of regional instability, including threatened access to critical strategic
resources, the emergence of “rogue” states with revisionist agendas, and persistent low and
medium intensity conflict. In an increasingly integrated world system, geographic, cultural,
and environmental factors that are importantly or uniquely manifested in the regional
context will play an increasingly important role in shaping national priorities and
international realities. Strategic culture is a vital context for war-fighting, as relevant to
contests with peer competitors as it is to clashes with less imposing adversaries in regional
contingencies. Shifting patterns of regional association, often motivated by a heightened
sense of regional identity and a search for meaning and relative security in the face of the
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impersonal and sometimes dehumanizing forces of globalization, is an important worldwide
trend. None of these dynamics can be properly incorporated into U.S. security strategy
without a solid understanding of regional decision-making milieus and cultural proclivities.
To assert the importance of regional approaches in a balanced strategic studies
curriculum is not to deny the relevance of alternative perspectives. Universalizing theory is
essential and unavoidable. The formal and technical specializations necessary to make sense
of political and military affairs are ineluctable. And there is the ever-present danger of
regionalists falling into a narrow preoccupation with local problems and personalities, while
missing the larger, structural forces at work in the background. In context, however, and
approached with appropriate modesty, regional perspectives have an essential place in
strategy formulation.
The U.S. Army War College builds a regional studies component into its core curriculum,
structured around the six major world regions mentioned above and focused on the effort to
define and understand U.S. interests at stake on the regional level. Students are exposed to
an in-depth study of a particular region, and to an overview of all six world regions, as a
foundation for the school’s capstone exercise, which tests their ability to manage a series of
overlapping regional crises in an integrated political-military framework. Students are
expected to become familiar with the general historical, cultural, political, military, and
economic characteristics of the six major world regions; to evaluate U.S. national and security
interests in these regions and to identify the kinds of challenges that are most likely to
emerge; and to develop a regional strategic assessment that identifies alternative courses of
action that can lead toward the achievement of U.S. national security objectives. The skills
and expertise garnered during this bloc of instruction should make a vital contribution to the
cultivation of future strategic leaders.
Regional strategic analysis is also of particular relevance to Army leaders. Though we live
in the age of jointness, the Army remains the service branch primarily charged with placing
boots on the ground in regional contingencies. Its operational environment is the land, where
people live and societies are rooted, and it must at a minimum come to terms with the
geographical realities of the places where it is constrained to operate, and the cultural
characteristics of the peoples it is charged to fight or to protect. The emphasis placed upon
regional studies in the U.S. Army War College strategy curriculum is unique among our
senior service schools. Experience, as well as common sense, shows that it is an emphasis
well-placed.
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CHAPTER 8
NATIONAL POWER
David Jablonsky
I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that
ceaseth only in death.
Thomas Hobbes1

Thomas Hobbes personifies the realist approach to international relations in a world of
anarchy and self-help, in which individual man and men aggregated into states seek to
maintain or to increase power. In the modern era, this approach is reflected quintessentially
by Hans Morgenthau, who presents national power not only as an end in the Hobbesian sense
2
that “power is always the immediate aim,” but as a means to that end. The study of strategy
also deals with power primarily from the national security perspective, an acknowledgment
that the nation-state is still the most important actor in the international arena.
Most scholars focus on power as a means, the strength or capacity that provides the
3
“ability to influence the behavior of other actors in accordance with one’s own objectives.” At
the national level, this influence is based on relations between nation-state A and another
actor (B), with A seeking to influence B to act in A’s interest by doing x, by continuing to do x,
or by not doing x. Some governments or statesmen may seek influence for its own sake. But for
most, influence, like money, is instrumental, to be used primarily for achieving or defending
other goals, which could include prestige, territory, raw material, or alliances. To achieve
these ends, state A can use various techniques of influencing, ranging from persuasion or the
4
offering of rewards to threats or the actual use of force.
From this standpoint, the use of a nation’s power in national security strategy is a simple
relational exercise. But in dealing with the concept of national power, as Clausewitz
5
remarked of war, “everything . . . is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” To begin
with, there are subtle characteristics of power that render its use in the national strategic
formulation process more art than science. Moreover, relationships among the elements of
national power as well as the context in which they are to be used to further a nation’s
interests are seldom clear-cut propositions. All this means that in the end, national power
defies any attempts at rigorous, scientific assessment. The purpose of this chapter is to
demonstrate why this is so and, more important, why, all the complexity notwithstanding,
the concept of national power remains a key building block for understanding and developing
national security strategy.
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THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL POWER.
National power is contextual in that it can be evaluated only in terms of all the power
elements and only in relation to another player or players and the situation in which power is
being exercised. A nation may appear powerful because it possesses many military assets, but
the assets may be inadequate against those of a potential enemy or inappropriate to the
nature of the conflict. The question should always be: power over whom, and with respect to
6
what?
Multidimensional Interrelationship. National power is historically linked with military
capacity, a natural relationship since war in the international arena is the ultima ratio of
power. Nevertheless, one element of power alone cannot determine national power. For
instance, there is the huge size of Brazil, the large population of Pakistan, the industrial
makeup of Belgium, and the first-class army of Switzerland. Yet none of these states is a
first-rank power. Morgenthau calls the mistaken attempt to define national power in terms of
one element of that power the “Fallacy of the Single Factor.” Another aspect of this fallacy is
the failure to distinguish between potential and actual power. Part of the problem stems from
the fact that the term “power” has taken on the meaning of both the capacity to do something
and the actual exercise of the capacity. And yet a nation’s ability to convert potential power
into operational power is based on many considerations, not the least of which is the political
and psychological interrelationship of such factors as government effectiveness and national
7
unity.
In this context, the elements of national power, no matter how defined, can be separated
only artificially. Together, they constitute the resources for the attainment of national
objectives and goals. And while those goals may be judged as moral, immoral, or amoral, the
elements of power are simply means to national strategic ends and as such are morally
neutral. It is possible, in other words, to reject the cynic’s belief that God is on the side of the
largest number of battalions, as well as the assumption that the side with the smallest
8
number always fights for the right.
Relations and Dynamics. National power is relative, not absolute. Simply put, a nation
does not have abstract power in and of itself, but only power in relation to another actor or
actors in the international arena. To say that the United States is the most powerful nation on
earth is to compare American power with that of all nations as they currently exist.
Nevertheless, leaders of a nation at the peak of its power can come to believe that such power
has an absolute quality that can be lost only through stupidity or neglect. In reality the
superior power of a nation is derived not only from its own qualities, but from that of other
actors compared with its own. Many observers in the late 1930s, for example, perceived
France as more than a match for Nazi Germany, since the French military of that era was
superior in quality and quantity of troops and weaponry to the victorious French forces of
1919. But the French military power of 1919 was supreme only in the context of a defeated
and disarmed Germany; that supremacy was not intrinsic to the French nation in the manner
of its geographic location and natural resources. Thus, while the French military of 1939 was
superior to that of 1919, a comparison of 1939 French military power to that of Germany in the
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same year would have shown a vastly different picture for many reasons, not the least of
9
which was the German adoption of the military doctrine of blitzkrieg.
Closely allied to all this is the fact that national power is dynamic, not permanent. No
particular power factor or relationship is immune to change. In this century, in particular,
rapid changes in military technologies have accelerated this dynamism. America’s explosion
of a nuclear device instantly transformed its power position, the nature of warfare, and the
very conduct of international relations. A war or revolution can have an equally sudden effect
on power. The two world wars devastated Europe, caused the rise of the flank powers, the
United States and the Soviet Union, and set the developing world on a road to decolonization
that in less than 50 years dismantled a system that had been in existence for over three
centuries. Economic growth can also quickly change a nation’s power position, as was the case
with Japan and Germany after World War II. In addition, the discovery of new resources, or
their depletion, can alter the balance of power. Certainly OPEC’s control over a diminishing
supply of oil, coupled with its effectiveness as a cartel, caused a dramatic shift in power
10
relations after 1973.
Such shifts are not always so immediately discernible. Power, as Hobbes long ago pointed
out, is what people believe it is until it is exercised. Reputation for power, in other words,
confers power on a nation-state regardless of whether that power is real or not. At the same
time, there are examples throughout history of nations that continued to trade on past
reputations, only to see them shattered by a single event. For France, the battles of Sedan
11
produced just such effects in 1870 and again in 1940.
This subjective characteristic of power also plays a key role in deterrence, the exercise of
negative power as state A influences actor B not to do x. The influence is effectively exercised
because B perceives that A not only has the capability to prevent B from doing x, but the
willingness to use that capability as well. In other words, national credibility must be a
concomitant of national capability for deterrence to work. When the combination doesn’t
occur, as Britain and France discovered when Hitler discounted their guarantee of Poland in
the summer of 1939, the result can be war. “The men of Munich will not take the risk,” the Nazi
12
leader explained to his commanders on August 14, 1939.
Situational. Some elements of national power or combinations of power cannot be applied
to certain situations involving certain actors. The United States in 1979-80, for instance, was
powerless to rescue American citizens held hostage in Teheran, and American nuclear power
during the Cold War had little value in causing nonaligned countries to modify their policies;
nor did it deter North Korea or North Vietnam in their attempts to unify their countries.
The Vietnam War also illustrates another contextual aspect of national power, that of
cost-risk-benefit analysis, in which power can be exercised but the costs and risks are
perceived to be disproportionate to the benefit achieved. Power, in other words, must be
relevant in the existing circumstances for the particular situation. This explains why, during
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the United States was not able to persuade its European allies to
allow American planes to use NATO bases for refueling and maintenance. The overall
economic and military strength of the United States as well as the political bonds of alliance
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solidarity proved less influential on European decisionmakers than the possible economic
loss of their access to oil. This type of American power was equally irrelevant in late 1994
when Britain and France, with troops involved in peace operations on the ground in Bosnia,
turned down a U.S. plan for NATO air strikes to support Muslims in the besieged town of
13
Bihac.
This aspect of the contextual nature of national power introduces even more complications
when the diversity of actors in the international arena is taken into account. In an
increasingly multi-centric world, nation-states will increasingly deal with transnational
actors in the exercise of national power. The European Union is just one example of
international government organizations in which the confluence of political and economic
trends has created a supra-national regional unit that transcends in many ways both the
legal- territorial aspects of the state and the psychological unity of the nation. This type of
challenge is abetted by international nongovernmental actors ranging from multinational
corporations focused on self-interested profit and national liberation movements seeking to
establish new governments within existing states, to organizations such as Amnesty
International or Greenpeace, seeking to mobilize international public opinion in order to
14
bring pressure on national governments to alter particular policies.
Some of these actors respond more willingly to one aspect of national power than to
another. Multinational corporations, for example, will generally react to economic factors
more rapidly than the United Nations or a national liberation movement. Conversely,
negotiations and appeals to human morality may prove to be more powerful at the United
Nations than in the corporate boardroom or in the field. And the allegiance of an uneducated
people in a newly independent country may help create a powerful national liberation
movement, yet be meaningless for a multinational corporation or the United Nations.
National power, then, is contextual not only in its application to other states, but to other
15
global actors as well.

THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER.
It is convenient to organize the study of national power by distinguishing between natural
and social determinants of power. The natural determinants (geography, resources, and
population) are concerned with the number of people in a nation and with their physical
environment. Social determinants (economic, political, military, psychological, and, more
recently, informational) concern the ways in which the people of a nation organize themselves
and the manner in which they alter their environment. In practice, it is impossible to make a
clear distinction between natural and social elements. For instance, resources are a natural
factor, but the degree to which they are used is socially determined. Population factors, in
particular, cut across the dividing line between both categories. The number of people of
working age in the population affects the degree of industrialization of a nation, but the
16
process of industrialization, in turn, can greatly alter the composition of the population.
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NATURAL DETERMINANTS OF POWER.
1. Geography. Geographical factors, whether they are location and climate or size and
topography, influence a nation’s outlook and capacity. Location, in particular, is closely tied to
the foreign policy of a state. Vulnerable nations, like Poland caught geographically between
Russia and Germany, have even had to deal with the loss of national existence. Conversely,
Great Britain, the United States, and Japan have been protected by large bodies of water
throughout their histories. Each, in turn, used the combination of a large navy and overseas
trade to become a great power. With its oceanic moats, the United States was able to follow
George Washington’s advice to avoid entangling alliances and expand peacefully for almost a
century, free of external interference. In addition, that expansion came about primarily
without conquest, through the purchase of huge land tracts from European powers that found
the location of the territories too remote to defend easily.
The connection between foreign policy and location is, in fact, so fundamental that it gave
rise in this century to geopolitics as a field of study. At its most extreme, geopolitics can
succumb to Morgenthau’s “Fallacy of the Single Factor” or be distorted as it was at the hands
of Karl Haushofer and his disciples into a kind of political metaphysics with a call for
adequate national living space (Lebensraum) that was put into ideological service for Nazi
Germany. At its best, geopolitics has many insights to offer. Consider, for instance, the
connection between the British and American development of democracy and civil rights and
the relatively secure strategic locations of both countries, as opposed to the authoritarian
regimes of Germany and Russia, direct neighbors for much of history, lying exposed on the
North European plain. Or consider the continuing Russian drive for warm-water ports and
the continuing value of choke points, as was demonstrated when Egypt’s closure of the Straits
of Tiran in May 1967 led to war. The persistence of this field of study was reflected in the Cold
War by Raymond Aaron, who described the forward deployment of U.S. troops as analogous in
geographical terms to earlier British policy:
In relation to the Eurasian land mass, the American continent occupied a position comparable to that
of the British Isles in relation to Europe: the United States was continuing the tradition of the insular
state by attempting to bar the dominant continental state’s expansion in central Germany and in Ko17
rea.

Location is also closely tied to climate, which in turn has a significant effect on national
power. The poorest and weakest states in modern times have all been located outside the
temperate climate zones in either the tropics or in the frigid zone. Even Russia has chronic
agricultural problems because all but a small part of that country lies north of the latitude of
the U.S.-Canadian border. Russia is also a good example of how geographical factors such as
size and topography can have advantages and disadvantages for a nation. The Soviet Union,
with its 11 time zones, was able to use its vast size during World War II to repeat the historical
Russian military method of trading space for time when invaded. At the same time, that
immense size certainly played a role in the complex ethnic and political centrifugal forces that
eventually pulled apart the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In a similar manner, the
predominantly north-south Russian rivers are great natural resources that would have been
economically and politically more valuable had they run in an east-west direction. In the
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future, technology may mitigate some of these factors in the same way that intercontinental
missiles affected the importance of insular locations. But here, as in other areas, there are
many geographical obstacles to the acquisition of power that are costly or impossible to
18
overcome.
2. Population. Demographics in the form of size, trends, and structure are an important
aspect of national power. A large population is a key prerequisite, but not an automatic
guarantee of strength. Thus, there is Canada, more powerful than the more populous but less
industrialized Mexico. And Japan, with a small population marked by widespread technical
skills, has been able to exercise national power far in excess of China for all its masses. At the
same time, trends in population growth and decline can have significant effects on national
power. The Prussian unification of the German-speaking peoples in 1870, for example,
instantly created a great power with a population that grew by 27 million between then and
1940, even as that of France reflected the shift in European power, increasing by only four
million in the same period. In another example, the historical increase in American power
was partly due to the arrival of more than 100 million immigrants between 1824 and 1924.
During the same century, Canada and Australia, comparable in territory and developmental
level but with populations less than a tenth of America’s, remained secondary powers. That
such trends could have more complex causes dealing with other elements of power was
illustrated by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had a large and growing population
during most of that period, but also remained a secondary power because it was divided
ethnically, weak politically, and at an extremely low level in terms of industrial
19
development.
In the future, global trends also will affect the structure and balance of national
populations, particularly those of the poorest countries. In 1830, the global population
reached one billion for the first time; it required 100 years to double. It took only 45 more years
(1975) for the population to double again to four billion. In the next 21 years the population
increased almost two billion, reflecting a growth rate of about 90 million a year. For the next
several decades, 90 percent of this growth will occur in the lesser-developed countries, many
already burdened by extreme overpopulation for which there is no remedy in the form of
20
economic infrastructure, skills, and capital.
Population structure and balance are also significant for developed nations. Important
here is the percentage of the population in the most productive cohort, generally considered to
be somewhere between the ages of 18 and 45, that can best meet the needs of the nation’s
military and industry as well as create the following generation. Comparing the numbers in
this group to those in the younger cohort also provides a more accurate picture of population
trends and the interaction of demographics with all power elements. Israel, for example, has
to deal with its relatively small population and the fact that the military siphons off a
significant segment of the civilian workforce in the middle cohort. One consequence is
government emphasis on education across all age groups. Another is the government’s
military focus on sophisticated weaponry, mobility, air power, and the preemptive strike in
order to avoid drawn-out land warfare that could be costly in manpower. Finally, a
comparison of the middle population group to the older will provide a picture of trends that
can have significant consequences for a nation’s power. For example, any nation with an

92

increasing cohort of retired people coupled with generous social welfare benefits will
eventually have to face hard choices between guns and butter on the one hand, and possible
limits to its national power as well as to its investment and economic growth potential on the
other. These choices already face the United States as the “baby boomer” generation
approaches retirement age against the backdrop of a staggering explosion in social
21
entitlements.
3. Natural Resources. Large amounts of natural resources are essential for a modern
nation to wage war, to operate an industrial base, and to reward other international actors
through trade and aid, either in modern industrial products or in the raw materials
themselves. But these resources, whether they be arable land and water or coal and oil, are
unevenly distributed around the world and are becoming increasingly scarce. Moreover, as in
the case of the geopolitical ownership of strategic places, the physical possession of natural
resources is not necessarily a source of power unless a nation can also develop those resources
and maintain political control over their disposition. In their raw state, for example, minerals
and energy sources are generally useless. Thus, the Mesabi iron deposits had no value to the
Indian tribes near Lake Superior, and Arabian oil a century ago was a matter of indifference
to the nomads who roamed above it. Conversely, those nations with great industrial
organizations and manufacturing infrastructures have traditionally been able to convert the
potential power of natural resources into actual national power.
Very few nations, however, are self-sufficient. A country like the United States has a rich
store of natural resources, and yet may be dependent on imports because of its voracious
consumption. Japan, on the other hand, has few natural resources; it is dependent on imports
for 100 percent of its petroleum, bauxite, wool, and cotton; 95 percent of its wheat; 90 percent
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of its copper; and 70 percent of its timber and grain. Nations have traditionally made up for
such difficulties in several ways. One time-honored method is to conquer the resources, a
principal motivation for the Japanese expansion that led to World War II and the Iraqi
invasion that led to the Gulf War. A second method is to develop resources in another country
by means of concessions, political manipulation, and even a judicious use of force—all used
earlier to considerable effect by the United States in Latin America. In an age of increasing
interdependence, this type of economic penetration has long since lost its neocolonial identity,
particularly since both of America’s principal World War II adversaries now regularly
exercise such penetration in the United States.
The third and most common method for obtaining natural resources is to buy them. In
recent years, however, the combination of rapid industrial growth and decline of resources
has changed the global economy into a seller’s market, while providing considerable economic
leverage to nations in control of vital commodities. OPEC’s control of oil, for example,
provided its members influence all out of proportion to their economic and military power. A
similar transformation may occur in the future with those nations that are major food
producers as the so-called “Green Revolution” faces the prospect of more depleted lands and
encroaching deserts. Finally, there is the short supply of strategic and often esoteric minerals
so necessary for high technology and modern weapons. One consequence of this diminishment
of raw materials has been the emergence of the sea bed, with its oil and manganese reserves,
as a new venue of international competition, in which those nations with long coastlines and
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extensive territorial waters have the advantage. Such shortages are a reminder of how closely
connected is the acquisition of natural resources to all the elements of power, particularly for
a truly dependent nation like Japan, which can neither feed its people nor fuel its
high-technology economy without access to overseas markets. Absent its alliance with the
United States as a means to ensure its access to such resources as Persian Gulf oil, Japan
would be forced to expand its “self-defense” military force, perhaps even becoming a declared
23
nuclear power.

SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF POWER.
1. Economic. Economic capacity and development are key links to both natural and social
determinants of power. In terms of natural resources, as we have seen, a nation may be well
endowed but lack the ability to convert those resources into military hardware,
high-technology exports, and other manifestations of power. Ultimately, however, economic
development in a nation flows from the social determinants of power, whether they be
political modernization and widespread formal education, or geographic and social mobility
and the ready acceptance of innovation. All this, of course, is worked out against the backdrop
of balanced military investment. An excess of military spending can erode the underlying
basis for a nation’s power if it occurs at the expense of a larger economy and reduces the
national ability to invest in future economic growth. For developing countries already short of
economic investment capital, military spending represents a serious allocation of resources.
But even advanced countries, especially since the end of the Cold War, have to make some
choices between guns and butter. Because a nation’s political stability as well as the
legitimacy of its government are increasingly linked to domestic economic performance,
excessive military spending, as the former Soviet Union discovered, can be dangerous for
large and small countries alike.
Strong domestic economies also produce non-military national power in the international
arena. Leading industrial nations have available all the techniques for exercising power,
including rewards or punishment by means of foreign trade, foreign aid, and investment and
loans, as well as the mere consequences their domestic policies can have on the global
economy. This type of power can be weakened, however, if a nation suffers from high inflation,
a large foreign debt, or chronic balance-of-payment deficits. In short, the strength of a nation’s
economy has a direct effect on the variety, resiliency, and credibility of its international
economic options. The size of the US budget and trade deficits, for example, means that the
Federal Reserve must maintain interest rates high enough for deficit financing, which limits
its ability to stimulate the economy with lower rates. And American foreign aid is becoming
less influential as an economic instrument of power as budgets decline. On the other hand, US
trade policy has become increasingly important to the US economy, with American exports,
24
as an example, expected to create 16 million jobs by the year 2000. That such economic
considerations are closely interrelated to other elements of power is demonstrated by the
perennial question of whether most-favored-nation status, which is nothing more than
normal access to U.S. markets, should be made conditional on progress in human rights by
countries such as China.
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Finally, increasing interdependence has caused major changes in the economic element of
national power. National economies have become more dependent on international trade and
on financial markets that have become truly global in scope. This in turn makes it more
difficult for a nation to raise short-term interest rates or to coordinate monetary policy with
other international actors. In a similar manner, the ability of nations to use exchange rates to
further their national interests has declined as governments deal more and more with
international capital flows that dwarf the resources available to any nation to defend its
currency. From a security perspective, this type of economic interpenetration is reflected in
the mutual vulnerability of national economies. Moreover, a nation’s economic policy is now
influenced by myriad international governmental organizations such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), while
multinational corporations stand ready to manipulate the domestic politics of nation-states
25
to further their transnational interests.
2. Military. Military strength is historically the gauge for national power. Defeat in war
has normally signaled the decline if not the end of a nation’s power, while military victory has
usually heralded the ascent of a new power. But military power is more than just the
aggregation of personnel, equipment, and weaponry. Leadership, morale, and discipline also
remain vital factors of military power. Despite rough quantitative parity between the Iraqi
military and the allied coalition, the dismal Iraqi performance in the Gulf War demonstrated
the enduring relevance of those intangibles. That performance also showed how political
interference or the gradual infection of a nation or its military by incompetence, waste, and
corruption can weaken a nation’s armed forces. By contrast, there is the example of the U.S.
military working over the years in tandem with political authorities to move from the hollow
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force of the immediate post-Vietnam period to the joint military machine of Desert Storm.
The Gulf War also highlights how important power projection and sustainability are in the
modern era for military effectiveness. For a global power like the United States, the focus on
these factors produced not only the unique air and sea lift capability that provided
transportation for a half million troops to the Persian Gulf in 1990-91, but incredible resupply
feats in an environment in which a single division during the 100-hour ground offensive
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consumed 2.4 million gallons of fuel, brought forward in 475 5000-gallon tankers. Allied to
these factors, of course, are readiness considerations ranging from training and maneuver
opportunities to the availability of fuel and repair parts. In a similar manner, a nation’s
potential for rapid mobilization may also play a key role. Israel, for example, has a permanent
force of only 164,000 highly trained and ready soldiers. But that force can be augmented
within 24 hours by almost three times that many combat-ready troops. And Sweden has the
capability to mobilize a force almost overnight that can equal many European standing
28
armies.
The quality of arms technology also has become a vital military factor for all nations in a
period marked by rapid and important scientific breakthroughs. Timely inventions ranging
from the crossbow to the airplane have often been decisive when accompanied by appropriate
changes in military organization and doctrine. When these two components lag technological
change, however, as they did in the American Civil War and World War I, the results can be
horrific diminishment and waste of military power. In addition, new technologies in the
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hands of rogue states or non-state actors such as terrorist groups will continue to be an
important consideration for nations in the exercise of military power. Weapons of mass
destruction are and will probably continue to be of primary concern in this regard. But even
relatively cheap, recently developed conventional weapons in the appropriate situation can
be decisive, as was illustrated by the American-built, shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft
missiles that enabled the Afghan mujahedeen guerrillas to neutralize Soviet air power.
Finally, technological advances are a useful reminder once again that military power, like all
elements of national power, is contextual. Technology is not an automatic panacea for
producing quick victories and low casualties, particularly absent clear political direction and
coherent strategy. There comes a time, as Britain’s thin red line discovered under the weight
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of the Zulu offensive at Isandhewana, when quantity has a quality all its own.
3. Political. This element of power addresses key questions, many of which are related to
the psychological element: What is the form of government, what is the attitude of the
population toward it, how strong do the people want it to be, and how strong and efficient is it?
These questions cannot be answered with simple statistics, yet they may be paramount in any
assessment of national power. If a government is inadequate and cannot bring the nation’s
potential power to bear upon an issue, that power might as well not exist. Nor can an analysis
turn upon the type of government a state claims to have, for even the constitution of a state
may be misleading. The 1936 Soviet Constitution, for example, was a democratic-sounding
organic law that had little in common with the actual operation of the Soviet regime. And the
German Weimar Constitution, a model of democratic devices, did not prevent Hitler from
reaching power and from creating his own “constitutional law” as he proceeded.
What is clear is that the actual forms of government, each with its own strengths and
weaknesses, play a role in the application of national power. An authoritarian system, for
instance, restricts in varying degrees individual freedom and initiative, but permits
formulation of a highly organized state strategy. Democratic systems, by comparison, require
policy formation by consensus-building and persuasion in an open, pluralistic society.
Consequently, it is extremely difficult for democracies to develop and implement a long-range
state strategy or to change policy direction as abruptly as, for example, Nazi Germany and the
USSR did in the ideological volte-face marked by the August 1939 non-aggression treaty. In
addition, the level of political development within a state is also important. This development
involves both the capability, and more particularly the efficiency and effectiveness, of a
national government in using its human and material resources in pursuit of national
interests. Thus, administrative and management skills are crucial if a nation is to realize its
full power potential.
A government also takes the shape and operates the way it does for very complex reasons,
many of which reflect the experience of a people and their attitude toward, and expectations
of, what the government is to do and how strong, as a consequence, it should be. For example,
a fear of too much state power caused the Founding Fathers deliberately to make the United
States government inefficient (in the sense of a quick, smooth operation) by means of “checks
and balances.” In a similar manner, the French fear of a “man on horseback” in the wake of
their second experience with Bonapartism caused a curtailment of executive powers that
resulted in the weakness of the French governments after the Franco-Prussian War. Under
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both the Third and Fourth French Republics, as a result, the French strengthened the
legislative branch to a degree that made strong executive leadership almost impossible. The
French preferred to suffer the executive weakness rather than run the risks entailed in a
strong government. Consequently, while the United States had 14 administrations between
1875 and 1940, and the British 20, France had 102. After World War II, the Fourth French
30
Republic averaged two regimes a year.
4. Psychological. The psychological element of power consists of national will and
morale, national character, and degree of national integration. It is this most ephemeral of
the social power determinants that has repeatedly caused nations with superior economic
and military power to be defeated or have their policies frustrated by less capable actors. Thus
there was Mao’s defeat of Chiang Kai-shek when Chiang at least initially possessed most of
China’s wealth and military capability, the ability of Gandhi to drive the British from India,
and that of Khomeni to undermine the Shah. And it is almost a cliché that any measurement
of U.S. economic and military power vis-à-vis that of the North Vietnam-Vietcong
combination during the late 1960s would have led to the conclusion that US superiority in
these two categories would result in an American victory. Harry Summers recounts a story, in
this regard, that was circulating during the final days of the US retreat from Vietnam:
When the Nixon Administration took over in 1969 all the data on North Vietnam and on the United
States was fed into a Pentagon computer—population, gross national product, manufacturing capability, number of tanks, ships, and aircraft, size of the armed forces, and the like.
The computer was then asked, “When will we win?”
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It took only a moment to give the answer: “You won in 1964!”

National will and morale are defined as the degree of determination that any actor
manifests in the pursuit of its internal or external objectives. For a given international actor,
however, will and morale need not be identical at all levels of society. During 1916 and early
1917, the Russian nobility continued to plan for new offensive action even as Russian troops
were abandoning their weapons and their battlefield positions. National character has an
equally complex relation to national power inasmuch as that character favors or proscribes
certain policies and strategies. Americans, for example, like to justify their actions. Thus, the
United States did not enter World War I until Wilsonian idealism had to confront the loss of
American ships and American lives. The elevation of “moralism” in the conduct of foreign
policy, in turn, diminishes the ability of the United States to initiate a truly preemptive
action. In the Cuban missile crisis, for example, the choice of a blockade over an air strike was
based in part on the argument that from the standpoint of both morality and tradition, the
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United States could not perpetrate a “Pearl Harbor in reverse.” In all such cases, as with will
and morale, it is extremely difficult to identify the constituent parts of and sources behind
national character. Historical experiences and traditional values undoubtedly are important,
as are such factors as geographic location and environment. Russian mistrust of the external
world, for instance, is historically verifiable as part of the national character, whether it is
because of the centuries of Tartar rule, three invasions from Western Europe in little more
than a century, or something else. And Russian stoicism is a character trait, whether the
33
cause is Russian Orthodox Christianity, communism, or the long Russian winters.

97

Finally, there is the degree of integration, which refers simply to the sense of belonging
and identification of a nation’s people. In many ways, this contributes to both national will
and morale as well as character. In most cases there is a direct correlation between the degree
of perceived integration and the extent of ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural
homogeneity, all of which contribute to a sense of belonging, manifested in a sense of
citizenship. On the other hand, despite examples to the contrary (Belgium, Canada, and the
states of the former Yugoslavia), a lack of integration need not necessarily cause a lack of
identity. Swiss unity has continued across the centuries despite low degrees of integration in
34
ethnicity, language, and religion.
5. Informational. The communications revolution, which began over a century ago with
the advent of global transmission of information, has taken on new momentum in recent
decades with the development of fax machines, television satellites, and computer linkages.
As the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe demonstrated in the fall of 1989, a new fact
of life in the international arena is that it is no longer possible for any nation-state to deny its
citizens knowledge of what is taking place elsewhere. Ideas, in other words, move more freely
around the world than at any other time in the past. This has had particularly fortunate
results for the United States. Even as some other aspects of power have gone into relative
decline, America’s influence as a source of ideas and as a shaper of culture has increased. This
“soft power,” in Joseph Nye’s words, has been a major factor in formulating the U.S. national
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security strategic objective of “enlargement.” So in one sense, information has contributed
to the concept of the world as a global village.
This combination of enhanced communication and dissemination of information,
however, is a two-edged sword that cuts across all the social determinants of power in
national strategy. In the economic realm, for instance, global interdependence has been
enhanced by information-communication improvements. On the other hand, near
instantaneous downturns of major economies are always a possibility with the immediate
transmission of adverse economic news concerning any nation-state or transnational
economic actor. Politically, instantaneous and pervasive communication can enhance the
ability of governmental elites to lead the people in a democracy or to act as a national consoler
in times of tragedy, such as the Challenger explosion or the Oklahoma City bombing. At the
same time, these developments can also aid the demagogues, the great simplifiers always
waiting in the wings to stir fundamental discontents and the dark side of nationalism. In
terms of psychological power, Winston Churchill demonstrated repeatedly that the pervasive
distribution of targeted information can have momentous effects on intangibles such as
national will. Conversely, however, this type of ubiquity has the pernicious potential of
altering in a matter of years basic values and cultural beliefs that take generations to create.
Nowhere is the effect of developments in communications and access to information more
far-reaching than on warfare. In the purely military realm, information dominance can create
operational synergies by allowing those systems that provide battlespace awareness,
enhance command and control, and create precision force to be integrated into the so-called
“system of systems.” One result of all this is to compress the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels of war, previously considered as separate and distinct loci of command and
functional responsibilities. The commander will be faced in the future with the much more
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complex job of recognizing those events occurring simultaneously at all three levels and
integrating them into the calculation that results from the traditional consideration at the
operational level of which tactical battles and engagements to join and which to avoid.
Equally important, shorter time for decisions—occasioned by both the compressed continuum
of war and electronically gathered information—means less time to discover ambiguities or to
analyze those ambiguities that are already apparent.
At the higher level of cyberwar, the two-edged potential of communications and
information is even more evident. In the future, nations will wage offensive information
warfare on another state’s computer systems, targeting assets ranging from
telecommunications and power to safety and banking. Such an onslaught could undermine
the more advanced aspects of an adversary’s economy, interrupt its mobilization of military
power, and by affecting the integrity of highly visible services to the population, create almost
immediate pressure on government at all levels. As activities rely increasingly on information
systems rather than manual processes and procedures, information infrastructures of the
most developed nations, such as the United States, become progressively more vulnerable to
state and non-state actors. Even as there are advances in information security technologies,
hacker tools are becoming more sophisticated and easier to obtain and use. One analyst
concludes in this regard that, for the United States, “the possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor
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cannot be dismissed out of hand.”

EVALUATION.
Evaluation of national power is difficult. The basic problem, as we have seen, is that all
elements of power are interrelated. Where people live will influence what they possess; how
many they are will influence how much they possess; what their historical experience has
been will affect how they look at life; how they look at life will influence how they organize and
govern themselves; and all these elements weighed in relation to the problem of national
security will influence the nature, size, and effectiveness of the armed forces. As a
consequence, not only must each separate element be analyzed, but the effects of those
elements on one another must be considered. These complexities are compounded because
national power is both dynamic and relative. Nation-states and other international actors
change each day in potential and realized power, although the rate of change may vary from
one actor to another. And because these changes go on continually, an estimate of a state’s
national power vis-à-vis the power of another actor is obsolescent even as the estimate is
made. The greater the rate of change in the actors being compared, the greater the
obsolescence of the estimate.
In other words, like all strategic endeavors, more art than science is involved in the
evaluation of where one nation-state stands in relation to the power of other regional and
global actors. This has not deterred one former government official from creating a formula to
develop a rough estimate of “perceived” national power—focused primarily on a state’s
37
capacity to wage war:
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Pp = (C + E + M) x (S + W) in which:
Pp = Perceived power
C = Critical mass: population and territory
E = Economic capability
M= Military capability
S = Strategic purpose
W= Will to pursue national strategy

Regardless of its prospective contribution in calculating a Pp value, this formula has some
important lessons. The more tangible elements (C, E, M) that can be objectively quantified
also involve varying degrees of subjective qualifications: territory that is vast but covered
with mountain ranges and has few navigable rivers; a population that is large but unskilled
and uneducated; or cases in which, despite qualitative military superiority in technology and
weapons on one side, the opponent is able to prevail through superior intangibles ranging
from leadership to morale. Most important, by demonstrating that national power is a
product—not a sum—of its components, the formula is a reminder of how important the
relational and contextual aspects are. The United States discovered in Vietnam that no
matter how large the sum of the more tangible economic and military capabilities in relation
to an adversary, their utility is determined by the intangibles of strategic purpose(S) and
national will(W). Zero times any number, no matter how large, is still zero.
These considerations are particularly important in evaluating what some might consider
to be irrational acts by states that use force to alter the status quo. In fact, these states may
simply differ from others in the perception of low risks where others perceive high ones,
rather than in the willingness to take risks. There is growing evidence that the 1990 Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait falls into this category. In another era, many of Hitler’s “Saturday
surprises” in the 1930s were considered reckless by those who would eventually have to
redress their consequences. These incidents came about, however, not because the Nazi
leader willingly tolerated a high probability of conflict, but because he was certain that the
other side would back down. When the German military opposed such policies as the
Rhineland coup and the Anschluss with Austria on the basis that they were too dangerous,
Hitler did not argue that the risks were worth the prizes, but that instead, taking the social
determinants of power in Germany and the other countries into consideration, the risks were
negligible. In terms of the concept of gain and risk assessment displayed in the figure below,
Hitler’s analysis of potential opposition came to rest at the MAXIMIN approach of Quadrant
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2, not that of MAXIMAX in Quadrant 1.

Gain

High
(MAX)
Low
(MIN)

Risk
High (MAX)
1
(MAXIMAX)
3
(MINIMAX)

100

Low (MIN)
2
(MAXIMIN)
4
(MINIMIN)

In the Rhineland episode of March 7, 1936, for example, the military correlation of forces
was quantifiably against Germany, as Hitler was well aware. “We had no army worth
mentioning,” he reflected later; “at that time it would not even have had the fighting strength
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to maintain itself against the Poles.” But unlike his military advisors, who were focused
firmly on French military capabilities, the Nazi leader considered other elements of power,
particularly the lack of political integration and coherency in the French Popular Front
government and the connection to the psychological component of French national will. As a
result, he concluded that France had no intention of responding militarily to the German
military incursion. On 9 March, the Wehrmacht commander received warning of impending
French military countermoves and asked to withdraw troops from major cities in the
Rhineland. Hitler, however, was still taking an essentially MAXIMIN (Quadrant 2) approach
and correctly discounted the possibility of intervention by a French government vacillating
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between two incorrect positions: MAXIMAX (Quadrant 1) and MINIMAX (Quadrant 3).

THINKING IN THE BOX.
A great deal of lip service has been paid of late to the need for students of strategy to “think
outside the box.” The “box” in this case presumably contains the traditional approaches to
those issues that affect America’s national security. It is natural, of course, in a time of great
change to search for a “Philosopher’s Stone,” or to look for the sword that can, in one clean
stroke, preclude the tedious unraveling of the Gordian knot of post-Cold War strategy. And
perhaps this will all be possible in an extra-box environment of the future. But such
explorations cannot and should not be made until the student of national security has learned
to think inside the box, and that begins with an understanding of concepts like national
power.
The concept of national power helps to provide an initial organizational focus as students
deal with the deceptively simple thought process that links strategic ends, ways, and means.
National elements of power, however they are described, provide the conceptual foundation
for this process at the national strategic level. An understanding of the characteristics and
the interrelationships of these elements allows the student to expand the process to
comprehend how derivative instruments of power can be combined most effectively as policy
options to achieve national strategic objectives. This is a key step in strategic maturation that
will play an increasingly larger role in the future for military and civilian professionals
concerned with national security strategy.
Military planners already deal with Flexible Deterrent Options, in which military
instruments of power are matched with instruments derived from other elements of power.
Military options in response to a challenge could include an increase in specific
reconnaissance activities, the exercise of certain prepositioned equipment, or the deployment
of small units. Politically, this could mean consultation by executive branch elites with
congressional leaders or initiation of a specific diplomatic demarche. At the same time,
economic options might include, alone or in combination, the enactment of trade sanctions,
the freezing of assets, and the restriction of corporate transactions. In all this, the
effectiveness of small discrete response options depends upon how well the instruments of
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power are wielded together. And that will depend to a great deal on how well military
strategists and their civilian counterparts understand the elements of national power from
41
which those instruments are derived.
The focus on these elements of national power as means to national strategic ends also
serves as an organizational link to the overall strategic formulation process. That process
begins by demonstrating how national strategic objectives are derived from national
interests, which in turn owe their articulation and degree of intensity to national values. This
linkage is also a useful reminder that power, the “means” in the strategic equation, ultimately
takes its meaning from the values it serves. Absent the legitimation provided by this
connection to national values, national power may come to be perceived as a resource or
means that invites suspicion and challenge; at worst it could be associated with tyranny and
aggrandizement. Without the bond of popular support and the justification that comes from
an overarching purpose, national power can be quick to erode and ephemeral as a source of
national security.
What takes place within the box in dealing with concepts like national power is an
educational process, a not inconsiderable achievement in an era mesmerized by techno-chic
innovations which tend to confuse training with that process and data collection with
knowledge.
In the final analysis, the study of national power is a valuable educational objective
because it is so difficult. Aspiring national security strategists must grapple with concepts
that overlap, that are subjective in many cases, that are relative and situational, and that
defy scientific measurement. All this teaches flexible thinking—the sine qua non for a
strategist. In short, it is this very complexity that causes students to mature intellectually, to
understand that within the box there is no such thing as a free strategic lunch. Equally
important, students learn that they cannot escape these limitations by moving outside the
box, a lesson that many futurists need to absorb.
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CHAPTER 9
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS:
FORWARD INTO THE 21ST CENTURY
Gabriel Marcella
Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others. Power derives from strength and
will. Strength comes from the transformation of resources into capabilities. Will infuses objectives
with resolve. Strategy marshals capabilities and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft seeks
through strategy to magnify the mass, relevance, impact, and irresistibility of power. It guides the
ways the state deploys and applies its power abroad. These ways embrace the arts of war, espionage,
1
and diplomacy. The practitioners of these three arts are the paladins of statecraft.
Chas W. Freeman, Jr.
The military is the hammer in America’s foreign policy toolbox. And it is a very powerful hammer. But
2
not every problem we face is a nail .
General Henry H. Shelton

THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS AND PURPOSEFUL ADAPTATION.
Ambassador Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. speaks to the skillful use of influence and power to
promote the national interests in a competitive world. General Shelton admonishes about the
limits of military power. The effective use of power in all of its variants is a tall order even for
the United States, the only fully equipped, globally deployed, interagency superpower. The
United States is the indispensable anchor of international order and the increasingly
globalized economic system. Nothing quite like it has ever existed. Indeed such great powers
as Rome, Byzantium, China, Spain, England, and France achieved extraordinary
sophistication, enormous institutional and cultural influence, and longevity, but they never
achieved the full articulation of America’s global reach.
Today the United States forward deploys some 250 diplomatic missions in the form of
embassies, consulates, and specialized organizations. It possesses a unified military
command system that covers all regions of the world and even outer space. It is the leader of
an interlocking set of alliances and agreements that promotes peace, open trade, the
principles of democracy, human rights, and protection of the environment. American capital,
technology, and culture influence the globe. American power and influence is pervasive and
multidimensional. All the instruments of national power are deployed. Yet the challenge of
strategic integration, of bringing the instruments into coherent effectiveness, remains.
Presidents and their national security staffs strive to achieve coherence, with varying levels
of success through use of the “interagency process.”

107

The American interagency decision making process is unique in character, size and
complexity. Given ever expanding responsibilities and declining resources in dollars and
manpower, it is imperative that national security professionals master it in order to work
effectively within it. The complex challenges to national security in the twenty-first century
will require intelligent integration of resources and unity of effort within the government.
The United States first faced the challenge of strategic integration within an embryonic
interagency process during World War II. Mobilizing the nation and the government for war
and winning the peace highlighted the importance of resources and budgets, of integrating
diplomacy with military power, gathering and analyzing enormous quantities of intelligence,
conducting joint and combined military operations, and managing coalition strategies and
balancing competing regional priorities, for example, the European versus the Pacific theater
in national strategy. From the war and the onset of the Cold War emerged a number of
institutional innovations. Among them: the structure of the modern Department of State,
Department of Defense (from the old War Department), a centralized intelligence system, the
Marshall Plan, the unified military command system, the Air Force, the predecessor of the
U.S. Agency for International Development (Point Four), NATO and other alliances, the
military assistance pacts, military advisory groups, and the United States Information
Agency.
There is probably no period in American history like the late 1940s and early 1950s that is
so formative of the kind of national and institutional learning that John P. Lovell calls
“purposeful adaptation.” He defines it as “the need to develop and pursue foreign policy goals
that are sensitive to national needs and aspirations and to the realities of a changing world
3
environment.” The evolution of the interagency process parallels America’s purposeful
adaptation to changing global realities of the last five decades. But it is not an orderly
evolution because of serious structural and cultural impediments, such as poor institutional
4
memory. Prominent historical markers along this path included such documents as NSC 68,
the intellectual framework for the containment strategy against the Soviet Union. Though a
different type of document, the Weinberger Doctrine articulated criteria for the use of
military power that dramatically influenced the shape of American strategy in the 1980s and
1990s.
In 1945, American statesmen faced three challenges: forging a system of collective
security, promoting decolonization, and building a stable international financial order. These
and four decades of intense threat from the other superpower had a decisive impact on
shaping the interagency process. With the end of bipolar ideological and geopolitical conflict,
the foreign policy and defense agenda is captured by free trade, democratization,
sub-national ethnic and religious conflict, failing states, humanitarian contingencies,
ecological deterioration, terrorism, international organized crime, drug trafficking, and the
proliferation of the technology of weapons of mass destruction. At the dawn of a new era, is the
policy making system developed and refined for the strategic imperatives of the Cold War
adequate to meet a very different set of challenges?
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THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:
COORDINATION VS. POLICYMAKING.
To bring strategic coherence, consensus, and decisiveness to burgeoning global
responsibilities, the National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council. Its
functions:
“The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic,
foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and
the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.”
“…other functions the President may direct for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies
and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the nations security…”
“…assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States…”
“…consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government
concerned with the national security…”

The statutory members are the President, the Vice President, Secretaries of State and
Defense. All others present are advisors: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director
Central Intelligence, and cabinet members. The Council need not convene formally to
function. Indeed, by late 1999 the Clinton NSC had met only once: March 2, 1993. There are
alternatives to formal meetings, such as the ABC luncheons of Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and Sandy Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, or the Deputies breakfasts and lunches. The “NSC system” of
policy coordination and integration operates 24 hours a day. The Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs directs the staff. The emergence of the modern “operational
5
presidency,” brought to the National Security Council greater authority over the
development and implementation of policy, thus creating a new power center that competes
for jurisdiction with the Departments of State and Defense.
The National Security Council staff, known as the Executive Secretariat, has varied in
size and function. In 1999 the staff comprised about 208 (of which 101 were policy personnel
and 107 administrative and support personnel) professionals covering regional and
functional responsibilities. Staffers are detailed from the diplomatic corps, the intelligence
community, the civil service, the military services (12 in policy positions in September 1999),
academia and the private sector. The staffing procedures are personalized by the President’s
style and comfort level. The structure of the staff, its internal and external functioning, and
the degree of centralized control of policy varies. Carter and Clinton have been very
centralized, Reagan and Bush less so. The first two Presidential Decision Directives of the
Clinton Administration, dated January 20, 1993, set forth the structure and function of the
NSC staff and groups that report to it, as depicted below:
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Figure 1. National Security Council System.
The Principals Committee members are the cabinet level representatives who comprise
the senior forum for national security issues. The Deputies Committee consists of under
secretaries who monitor the work of the interagency policy formulation and articulation
process, do crisis management, and when necessary, push unresolved issues to the Principals
for resolution. Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) are the heart and soul of the process.
They may be ad hoc, standing, regional or functional. They function at a number of levels,
meet regularly to assess routine and crisis issues, frame policy responses, and build
consensus across the government for unified action. The fluid nature of the process means
that IWGs do not always have to come to decisions. The system prefers that issues be decided
at the lowest level possible. If issues are not resolved there, they are elevated to the next level
and when appropriate, to the Deputies Committee. Who chairs the different IWGs and
committees can vary between the NSC director and a senior State Department official.
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The day-to-day policy coordination and integration is done by the National Security
Council Staff, divided into functional and geographic directorates:

Figure 2. National Security Council Staff.
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Policy is often made in different and subtle ways. Anthony Lake, writing in Somoza
Falling: The Nicaraguan Dilemma, A Portrait of Washington At Work, discusses how the
answer to an important letter can help set policy. Hence, the importance of interagency
coordination and the importance of being the one (bureau, office, agency) that drafts it.
“….policy flows as much from work on specific items – like the letter from [Venezuelan
President Carlos Andres] Perez [to Carter] – as it does from the large, formal inter6
agency ‘policy reviews’ that result in presidential pronouncements.”

Each action is precedent for future actions. Speeches, press conferences, VIP visits, and
presidential travels are important. Lake elaborates:
“Policy is made on the fly; it emerges from the pattern of specific decisions. Its wisdom is decided
7
by whether you have some vision of what you want, a conceptual thread as you go along.”

The NSC staff does the daily and long-term coordination and integration of foreign policy
and national security matters across the vast government. Specifically, it:
1. Provides information and policy advice to the President
2. Manages the policy coordination process
3. Monitors implementation of presidential policy decisions
4. Manages the interdepartmental dimensions of crises
5. Articulates the President’s policies
6. Undertakes long term strategic planning
7. Conducts liaison with Congress and foreign governments
8. Coordinates summit meetings and national security related trips
There is a natural tension between the policy coordination function of the NSC and
policymaking. Jimmy Carter’s Director of Latin American Affairs at the NSC, Robert Pastor,
argues that:
“…tension between NSC and State derives in part from the former’s control of the agenda and
the latter’s control of implementation. State Department officials tend to be anxious about the
NSC usurping policy, and the NSC tends to be concerned that State either might not implement
the President’s decisions or might do so in a way that would make decisions State disapproved of
8
appear ineffective and wrong.”

The NSC staff is ideally a coordinating body but it oscillates between the poles, taking
policy control over some issues while allowing the State or Defense to be the lead agency on
most national security and foreign policy issues. On some key issues, such as the Kosovo
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crisis of 1998-99, the NSC staff may take over policy control from State. Similarly, policy
towards Cuba and Haiti in 1993-95 was handled directly out of the White House because of
the deeply rooted domestic dimension of those issues. The Oliver North Iran-Contra caper
created an autonomous operational entity within the NSC staff. But this was an aberration
that does not invalidate the general rule. The salient point is that proximity to the President
gives the NSC staff significant policy clout in the interagency process. Such clout must be
used sparingly lest it cause resentment and resistance or overlook the policy wisdom and
skills available elsewhere in the executive departments.

TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS: HOW DOES
THE PRESIDENT MOBILIZE THE GOVERNMENT?
The interagency is not a place. It is a process involving human beings and complex
organizations with different cultures, different outlooks on what’s good for the national
interest and the best policy to pursue—all driven by the compulsion to defend and expand
turf. The process is political (therefore conflictual) because at stake is power, personal,
institutional, or party. The “power game” involves the push and pull of negotiation, the
guarding of policy prerogatives, of hammering out compromises, and the normal human and
9
institutional propensity to resist change. Regardless of the style of the President and the
structures developed for the management of national security policy, the NSC dominated
interagency process performs the same basic functions: identifies policy issues and questions,
formulates options, raises issues to the appropriate level for decisions, makes decisions where
appropriate, and oversees the implementation of decisions throughout the executive
departments.

Source: John P. Lovell, The Challenge of American Foreign Policy: Purpose and Adaptation, p. 26.

Figure 3. The Ideal Foreign Policy Process.
It is helpful to view policy at five interrelated levels: conceptualization, articulation,
budgeting, implementation, and post-implementation analysis and feedback.
Conceptualization involves the complex intellectual task of policy development, such as a
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD). Articulation is the public declaration of policy that the
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President or subordinates make. It is critical in a democracy in order to engage public
support. Budgeting involves testimony before Congress to justify policy goals and to request
funding. Implementation is the programmed application of resources in the field in order to
achieve the policy objectives. Post-implementation analysis and feedback is a continuous
effort to assess the effectiveness of policy and to make appropriate adjustments.
The ideal system would have perfect goal setting, complete and accurate intelligence,
comprehensive analysis and selection of the best options, clear articulation of policy and its
rationale, effective execution, thorough and continuous assessment of the effects, and perfect
learning from experience and the ability to recall relevant experience and information. Such
perfection is impossible. The reality is:

POLICY IN PRACTICE
TASK

CAPABILITY

Goal Setting

National interests are object of competing
claims; goals established through political
struggle

Intelligence

Always incomplete, susceptible to
overload, delays and distortions caused by
biases and ambiguity in interpretation

Option Formulation

Limited search for options, comparisons
made in general terms according to
predispositions rather than cost-benefit
analysis

Plans, Programs, Decisions

Choices made in accordance with
prevailing mind sets, often influenced by
groupthink and political considerations

Declaratory Policy

Multiple voices, contradictions and
confusion, self-serving concern for personal
image and feeding the appetite of the
media

Execution

Breakdowns in communication, fuzzy lines
of authority, organizational parochialism,
bureaucratic politics, delays

Monitoring and Appraisal

Information gaps, vague standards,
rigidities in adaptation, feedback failures

Memory Storage and Recall

Spotty and unreliable, selective learning
10
and application of lessons
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Effective policy requires vision, control, resources, and a system of accountability. The
most compelling challenge for the executive is to retain policy control. Since Presidents don’t
have the time and expertise to oversee policy making in detail (though Jimmy Carter tried),
they delegate responsibility. But “nobody is in charge” is an often-heard refrain of the
interagency process. By delegating responsibility, control becomes more diffused and the
policy effort diluted. Moreover, the quest for resources brings in another stakeholder.
Congress has the constitutional responsibility to scrutinize policy initiatives and vote monies
for foreign affairs and national defense. By then, a literal Pandora’s box of players and
expectations are opened. The numerous congressional committees and their staffs have
enormous impact on national security and foreign policy.
The President begins to mobilize his government immediately upon election. A transition
team works closely with the outgoing administration for the purpose of continuity. He begins
nominating his cabinet, which must then be confirmed by the Senate. Some 6,000
presidential level appointees will fill the subcabinet positions, staff the White House and the
National Security Council, take up ambassadorships (serving ambassadors traditionally
submit their resignation when the occupant of the White House changes), as well as second,
third, and fourth level positions in the executive departments. The purpose of these
nominations is to gain control and establish accountability to the President and his agenda.
In his first administration, Bill Clinton faced the impediment of never finishing staffing his
government.
Thus, there is a high turnover and the injection of new talent, at times inexperienced and
equipped with new predispositions about national security, at the top echelons of American
government every time the part that controls the White House changes. Continuity of
government resides in the nonpartisan professionals (neutral competence) of the federal civil
service, the diplomatic service, the military, and the intelligence community. The transition
to a new administration is a period of great anticipation about the direction of policy.
Consequently, the entire interagency produces transition papers to assist and inform the
newcomers, and to also protect the institutional interests of the various departments from
unfriendly encroachment.
The first months of a new administration are a period of learning. Newly appointed people
must familiarize themselves with the structure and process of policymaking. This necessity
invariably leads to a trial-and-error atmosphere. In anticipation of the passing of the mantle,
think tanks and the foreign policy and defense communities prepare for the transition by
writing papers recommending the rationale for policy. These will inform the new
administration about the central commitments of U.S. policy and provide opportunities for
departments and agencies to define institutional turf and stake a claim to resources. The
administration itself will also mandate policy reviews (Presidential Review Directives) that
eventually produce new guidance for policy.
Making speeches and declaring policy and doctrines is another way. The State of the
Union message is one of the preeminent sources of presidential activism that engages the
interagency. The Congressionally mandated National Security Strategy (NSS) document,
which bears the President’s signature and is supposed to be produced annually, is eagerly
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awaited, though not with equal intensity across departments, as an indicator of an
administration’s direction in national security and foreign policy.
The NSS is eagerly awaited for another reason; it is the best example of “purposeful
adaptation” by the American government to changing global realities and responsibilities. It
expresses strategic vision, what the United States stands for in the world, its priorities, and a
sensing of how the instruments of national power, the diplomatic, economic, and military will
be arrayed. Since it is truly an interagency product, the NSS also serves to provide direction
to the interagency system to understand the President’s agenda and priorities and develops a
common language that gives coherence to policy. It is also more than a strategic document. It
is political because it is designed to enhance presidential authority in order to mobilize the
nation. Finally, the NSS tends to document rather than drive policy initiatives, especially in
election years. (For further insights on these points, see Chapter 10.)
The first NSS in 1987 focused on the Soviet threat. The Bush Administration expanded it
by including more regional strategies, economic policy, arms control, and transnational
issues and the environment. The Clinton document of 1994 proposed “engagement and
enlargement,” promoting democracy, economic prosperity, and security through strength.
The 1995 version added criteria on when and how military forces would be used. By 1997, the
integrating concepts of “shape,” “prepare,” and “respond” for the national military strategy
came into prominence. To the core objectives of enhancing security, promoting prosperity and
democracy were added fighting terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking, along
with managing the international financial crisis. Homeland defense against the threat of
mass casualty attacks and regional strategies completed the agenda.
Another instrument is the Presidential Decision Directive process. Other administrations
have titled these documents differently, such as Bush’s National Security Decision Directive
(NSDD). The two Clinton administrations produced over 70 PDDs by mid 2000. Bush
produced 79 National Security Directives, Reagan 325 National Security Decision Directives,
Carter 63 Presidential Directives, Nixon-Ford 348 National Security Decision Memoranda,
and Kennedy-Johnson 372 National Security Action Memoranda. Each administration will
put its own stamp on national security and foreign policy, though there is great continuity
with previous administrations. Whereas Reagan emphasized restoring the preeminence of
American military power and rolling back the “evil empire,” Clinton focused on strengthening
the American economy, open trade, democratization, conflict resolution, humanitarian
assistance, fighting drug trafficking and consumption, counter-terrorism and
11
nonproliferation. The most famous Reagan NSDD was 75: “U.S. Relations with the USSR.”
PDDs are macro level documents, normally classified, that take much deliberate planning
to develop. They result from intensive interaction among the agencies. The process begins
with a Presidential Review Directive, which tasks the relevant agencies to develop a new
policy based on broad guidance. For example, Clinton’s PDD 14 for counter narcotics, the
“Andean Strategy” of November 1993, emphasized greater balance between supply and
demand strategies. PDD 25, “U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations” (May
1994), set down an elaborate set of guidelines for U.S. involvement in peace operations. It
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became so effective that the United Nations adopted it for planning its own peace operations,
an excellent example of the international transfer of American purposeful adaptation.
An instructive example is the Latin American policy PDD 21. Effective on December 27,
1993, it emphasized democracy promotion and free trade. It was addressed to more than
twenty departments and agencies: Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of the
Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of
Labor, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, United States Trade
Representative, Representative of the United States to the United Nations, Chief of Staff to
the President, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of Central
Intelligence, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, Assistant to the President for
National Economic Policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Administrator of the Agency
for International Development, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and Director of the United States
Information Agency.
The point of listing departments and agencies is to identify the interagency stakeholders
in regional policy, though the size of the stake will vary greatly among them. The
stakeholders are related by functional interdependence; they have different resources,
personnel, and expertise that must be integrated for policy to be effective. It is an iron rule of
the interagency that no national security or international affairs issue can be resolved by one
agency alone. For example, the Department of Defense needs the diplomatic process that the
Department of State masters in order to deploy forces abroad, build coalitions, negotiate
solutions to conflict, conduct noncombatant evacuations (NEO) of American citizens caught
in difficult circumstances abroad, and administer security assistance. The Department of
State in turn depends on the logistical capabilities of Defense to deploy personnel and
materials abroad during crises, conduct coercive diplomacy, support military-to-military
contacts, and give substance to alliances and defense relationships. The Office of National
Drug Control Policy, a new cabinet position, must rely on a range of agencies to reduce the
supply abroad and consumption of drugs at home. Finally, all require intelligence input to
make sound decisions.
Ideally in response to the promulgation of a PDD, all agencies will energize their staffs and
develop the elements that shape the policy programs. But this takes time and seldom creates
optimum results, in part because of competing priorities on policy makers, limited time,
constrained resources, and congressional input. For example, with respect to Latin American
policy, the Haiti crisis of 1992-1994 and congressional passage of the North America Free
Trade Act would consume most of the kinetic energy of the Clinton Administration’s NSC
staff and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs of the Department of State during 1993-94.
The Central American crisis of the 1980s crowded out the broader agenda for Latin American
policy.
In theory, once the policy elements are put together, they are costed out and submitted to
Congress for approval and funding, without which policy is merely words of hopeful
expectations. The reality, however, is that a PDD is not a permanent guide to the actions of
agencies. Rarely is it fully implemented. It can be overtaken by new priorities, new
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administrations, and by the departure of senior officials who had the stakes, the personal
relationships, know how, and institutional memory to make it work. A senior NSC staffer,
Navy Captain Joseph Bouchard, Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control, remarked in
1999 that one cannot be sure about whether a PDD from a previous administration is still in
force because for security reasons no consolidated list of these documents is maintained.
Moreover, PDDs and other presidential documents are removed to the presidential library
and the archives when a new President takes over. A senior Defense Department official
states that PDDs are rarely referred to after they are final, are usually overtaken by events
soon after publication, and are rarely updated. In this respect the interagency evaluation of
PDD 56’s effectiveness, published in May 1997, is instructive: “PDD 56 no longer has senior
level ownership. The Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and the NSC
12
officials who initiated the document have moved on to new positions.”

PDD 56: EPHEMERAL OR PURPOSEFUL ADAPTATION?
It is useful to examine PDD 56 as an example of an interagency product and as a tool
intended to influence the very process itself. PDDs normally deal with the external world of
foreign policy and national security. PDD 56 is radically different, for it goes beyond that and
attempts to generate a cultural revolution in the way the U.S. Government prepares and
organizes to deal with these issues. PDD 56, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on
Managing Complex Contingency Operations, is perhaps the mother of all modern PDDs. It is
a superb example of codifying lessons of “purposeful adaptation” after fitful efforts by
American civilian and military officials in the aftermath of problematic interventions in
13
Panama (1989-90), Somalia (1992-1994), and Haiti (1994-1995).
The intent was to
institutionalize interagency coordination mechanisms and planning tools to achieve U.S.
Government unity of effort in complex contingency operations. It tried to institutionalize five
mechanisms and planning tools:
1. An Executive Committee chaired by the Deputies Committee (Assistant Secretaries)
2. An integrated, interagency Political-Military Implementation Plan
3. Interagency Rehearsal
4. Interagency After-Action Review
5. Training
The philosophy behind the document is that interagency planning can make or break an
operation. Moreover, early involvement in planning can accelerate contributions from
civilian agencies that are normally culturally impeded from strategic and operational
planning. An excellent Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency
Operations issued in August 1998, containing in easy digestible form much wisdom about how
to do it right. PDD 56 was applied extensively and adapted to new contingencies, such as
Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia, Hurricane Mitch in Central America, the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict
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since 1998, and the Kosovo contingency of 1998-99. The March 1999 review commented:
“PDD 56 is intended to be applied as an integrated package of complementary mechanisms
and tools…since its issuance in 1997, PDD 56 has not been applied as intended. Three major
issues must be addressed to improve the utility of PDD 56.” It recommended:
1. Greater authority and leadership to promote PDD 56
2. More flexible and less detailed political-military planning
3. Dedicated training resources and greater outreach
Imbedded in the three recommendations are the recurring problems of the interagency:
the need for decisive authority (“nobody’s in charge”), contrasting approaches and
institutional cultures (particularly diplomatic versus military) with respect to planning, and
the lack of incentives across the government to create professionals expert in interagency
work. PDD 56 is a noble effort to promote greater effectiveness. It may bear fruit if its
philosophy of integrated planning and outreach to the interagency takes root. In late 1999 the
PDD 56 planning requirement became an annex to contingency plans.

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS: AMBASSADORS AND REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDERS.
To this point we have discussed the national strategic level of the interagency process, that
is, what occurs in Washington. Actually, the interagency process spans three levels: the
national strategic, the operational, and the tactical. In the field, policy is implemented by
ambassadors and their country teams, often working with the regional unified commanders.
The embassy country team is a miniature replica of the Washington interagency system, with
which it is in constant communication. Within the country team, the rubber literally meets
the road of interagency implementation. The ambassador is responsible for all US
government programs in the country. Ambassadors and CINCs rely on each other to promote
policies that will enhance American interests in a country and region. CINCs have large
staffs and awesome resources compared to the small staffs and resources of ambassadors.
Moreover, their functions are different. The ambassador cultivates ties and is a conduit for
bilateral communications through the art of diplomatic discourse. He or she promotes
understanding of U.S. foreign policy, and promotes American culture and business, and is
responsible for American citizens in that country. By virtue of distance, both the ambassador
and CINC have a distinct advantage over the other actors within the Washington
interagency: greater cohesion of effort due to better control over their staffs and the policy
agenda. They also share a compelling interest: they are partners in fashioning the web of
relations of America’s defense diplomacy among the nations within their purview.
The ambassador is the President’s personal emissary. The President writes a letter of
instruction that charges the ambassador “to exercise full responsibility for the direction,
coordination, and supervision of all executive branch officers in (name of country), except for
personnel under the command of a U.S. area military commander….” There is enough
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ambiguity in the mandate to require both ambassador and CINC to use common sense and, in
a nonbureaucratic way, work out issues of command and control over U.S. military personnel
in the country. In effect control is shared, the ambassador having policy control and the CINC
control over day-to-day operations, though even here the Ambassador exercises oversight.
Thus, it is prudent that both cooperate to ensure that military operations meet the objectives
of U.S. policy.
This is particularly the case in military operations other than war. Before and during noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), peace operations, exercises, disaster relief and
humanitarian assistance, such cooperation will be imperative because of the different mixes
of diplomacy, forces, and preparation required. A successful U.S. policy effort requires a
carefully calibrated combination of diplomatic and military pressure, with economic
inducements added. The security assistance officer at the embassy (usually the commander
of the military advisory group) can facilitate communication and bridge the policy and
operational distance between the ambassador and the CINC. So can State’s Political Advisor
to the CINC, a senior foreign service officer whose function is to provide the diplomatic and
14
foreign policy perspective on military operations.
The personal and professional
relationship between the Political Advisor and the CINC is the key to success.
The CINC represents the coercive capacity of American power through a chain of
command that goes to the President. He and his sizable staff command operational tempo,
deployments, readiness, exercises, and training of divisions, brigades, fleets, and air
wings—resources, language, and culture that complementary the art of statecraft. Since all
military activities have diplomatic impact, it is prudent that both work harmoniously to
achieve common purpose. The Commander of the Military Advisory Group (also called
Military Liaison Office, Office of Defense Coordination) is the military representative on the
country team and a conduit between the ambassador and the CINC.
The relationship between the ambassador and the CINC will change in wartime. As the
environment transitions to war the CINC assumes greater authority and influence. Haiti
1994 is an excellent example of how the handoff from ambassador to CINC takes place. The
American ambassador in Port-au-Prince, William Swing, was in charge of U.S. policy until
General Hugh Shelton and the U.S. military forces arrived in September of that year. Once
the military phase was completed, policy control reverted to Swing, thus restoring the normal
pattern. Thus there is an interruption of ambassadorial authority under some circumstances
followed by return to the status quo ante. In the gray area of operations other than war or in
what is called an “immature” military theater, such as Latin America, disputes can arise
between ambassadors and CINCs about jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel in the
country. The most illustrative was in 1994 between the CINC of the U.S. Southern
Command, General Barry McCaffrey, and the U.S. Ambassadors to Bolivia, Charles R.
Bowers, and Colombia, Morris D. Busby. The dispute had to be adjudicated in Washington by
15
the Secretaries of State and Defense. The fact is that ambassador and CINC must work
closely together to coordinate U.S. military activities. There is another distinction: CINCs
have a regional perspective, strategies, and programs while ambassadors are intensely
focused on advancing the interests of the United States in one country.
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THE CONTINUING PROBLEMS OF THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS
Comparing Military Officers and Foreign Service Officers
Military Officers

Foreign Service Officers

Mission: prepare for and fight war

Mission: conduct diplomacy

Training a major activity, important for units and
individuals

Training not a high priority. Not important either for units
or individuals

Extensive training for episodic, undesired events

Little formal training, learning by experience in doing
desired activities (negotiating, reporting)

Uncomfortable with ambiguity

Can deal with ambiguity

Plans and planning—both general and detailed—are
important core activities

Plan in general terms to achieve objectives but value
flexibility and innovation

Doctrine: important

Doctrine: not important

Focused on military element of foreign policy

Focused on all aspects of foreign policy

Focused on discrete events and activities with plans,
objectives, courses of action, endstates

Focused on on-going processes without expectation of an
“endstate”

Infrequent real-world contact with opponents or partners
in active war fighting

Day-to-day real-world contact with partners and opponents
in active diplomacy

Officer corps commands significant numbers of NCOs
and enlisted personnel

Officers supervise only other officers in core (political and
economic) activities, but larger numbers of foreign
nationals

NCOs and enlisted personnel perform many core
functions (war fighting)

Only officers engage in core activity (diplomacy)

Leadership: career professional military officers (with
the military services and in operations)

Leadership: a mix of political appointees and career
Foreign Service professionals at headquarters and in field

All aspects of peace operations, including
civilian/diplomatic, becoming more important

All aspects of peace operations, including military,
becoming more important

Writing and written word less important, physical
actions more important

Writing and written word very important. Used
extensively in conduct of diplomacy

Teamwork and management skills are rewarded,
interpersonal skills important internally

Individual achievement and innovative ideas rewarded,
inter-personal skills important externally

Understand “humma-humma” and “deconflict”

Understand “démarches” and non-paper”

Accustomed to large resources, manpower, equipment,
and money

Focus meager resources on essential needs

Adapted from Robert Johnson, Foreign Service Officer, “Teaching Notes,” Department of National
Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College, 1998.

The tensions generated by cultural differences and jealousy over turf will always be part of
the interagency process. The diplomatic and the military cultures dominate the national
security system, though there are other cultures and even subcultures. The former uses
words to solve problems while the latter uses force. Cultural differences are large but
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communicating across them is imperative.
cultures of military officers and diplomats.

The table on the previous page compares the

The principal problem of interagency decision making is lack of decisive authority; there is
no one in charge. As long as personalities are involved who work well together and have
leadership support in the NSC, interagency efforts will prosper, but such congruence is not
predictable. The world situation does not wait for the proper alignment of the planets in
Washington. There is too much diffusion of policy control. It is time to implement and
NSC-centric national security system, with appropriate adjustments that align budget
authority with policy responsibility. It would consolidate in the NSC the functions now
performed by the Policy Planning Staff at State and the strategic planning done at Defense.
Such reorganization recognizes the reality that the White House is where an integrated
approach to national security planning must take place.
Asymmetries in resources are another impediment. The Department of State, which has
the responsibility to conduct foreign affairs, is a veritable pauper. Its diplomats may have the
best words in town, in terms of speaking and writing skills, and superb knowledge of foreign
countries and foreign affairs, but it is a very small organization that has been getting smaller
budget allocations from Congress. The corps of Foreign Service officers of nearly 5,000
equates to an Army brigade (3,600) plus. The Department of State’s technology is primitive
and officer professional development of the kind that the military does is not promoted.
Moreover, unlike the military, State lacks a strong domestic constituency of support. The
18
military has more money to conduct diplomacy.
The resource barons, those with people, money, technical expertise, and equipment reside
in DOD and the military services. Consequently, the military, especially the Army, is
constantly being asked to provide resources out of hide for nation-building purposes, for
example in Haiti and Panama. It is tempting to reach out to it because it is the only
institution with an expeditionary capability, and fungible resources and expertise. It can get
there quickly, show the flag, bring significant resources to bear, stabilize a situation, and
create an environment secure enough for other agencies to operate. On a much smaller scale
the Agency for International Development is a baron, because it has money and technical
expertise to promote development and institution building. Other baronies exist, such as
intelligence, Department of Justice, Commerce, and the Office of National Drug Control
Policy.
Finally, the personnel systems of the various agencies of the U.S. Government do not
promote professionalization and rewards in interagency jobs. What is needed is a systematic
effort to develop civilian and military cadres that are experts in interagency policy
coordination, integration, and operations. Some of this takes place. Military officers are
assigned to various departments. For example, 35 officers from all services work in the
regional and functional bureaus of the Department of State. Diplomats are also allocated to
military and civilian agencies, such as Political Advisors at the regional unified commands,
the Special Operations Command, to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, various key
positions in the Pentagon, and the war colleges. These programs must be expanded. There
ought to be incentives for national security professionalism, as there are for service and joint.
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For civilians, something akin to the Goldwater-Nichols Act for jointness in the military is
needed to include the Department of State. Promotions should be based not only on
performance at Foggy Bottom and in Embassies abroad, but on mandatory interagency tours
as well. Similarly professional development incentives should apply to civil servants that
work in the national security arena.
Admittedly, mandatory interagency tours would require significant changes in personnel
systems and career tracking. The Report of the National Defense Panel of 1997,
st
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21 Century, recommended creating “an
interagency cadre of professionals, including civilian and military officers, whose purpose
19
would be to staff key positions in the national security structures. This would build on the
jointness envisioned by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Report also recommended a
national security curriculum for a mix of civilian, military, and foreign students. The Defense
Leadership and Management Program of the Department of Defense, a Master’s level
initiative in national security studies for civilian personnel, is an important step in this
direction.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MILITARY PROFESSIONAL.
There are critical implications for the military warrior. The nature of future warfare is
likely to be more operations other than war, requiring more mobile, flexible light forces.
Future war will also require a more intellectual military officer, one who understands the
imperative of having to work with the panoply of civilian agencies, nongovernment
organizations, the national and international media, and with foreign armed forces. It is a
commonplace of strategy that American forces will rarely fight alone again; they will do so in
coalition. Thus, the strategic Clausewitzian trinity of the people, the armed forces, and the
government now encompasses the global community. The implications are clear; the military
officer will have to develop greater diplomatic and negotiating skills, greater understanding
of international affairs, capability in foreign languages, and more than a passing
acquaintance with economics.
Moreover, the warrior will likely work with civilian counterparts across a spectrum of
activities short of war. These include: strategic planning and budgeting, humanitarian
assistance, peace operations, counter narcotics, counter terrorism, security assistance,
environmental security, human rights, democratization, civil-military relations, arms
control, intelligence, war planning and termination strategy, command and control of forces,
continuity of government, post-conflict reconstruction, technology transfer, crisis
management, overseas basing, alliances, noncombatant evacuation operations, and
homeland defense.
Therefore, the future officer will also need greater appreciation of the institutional
diversity and complexity of government, because of the need to advise a diversity of civilians
on the utility of military power in complex contingencies that are neither peace nor war, as
Americans are accustomed to think of them. He or she will have to work in tandem with
civilian agencies and nongovernmental organizations unaccustomed to command systems
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and deliberate planning, and who often do not understand the limits of military power.
Lastly, instruction on the interagency system and process should be mandatory for civilians
and military alike. It must have a sound theoretical foundation in national security
decisionmaking, strategic planning, and organizational behavior, expanded by sophisticated
case studies of relevant historical experiences.
What attributes should the military officer bring? Above all, holistic thinking, the ability
to think in terms of all the instruments of national power and respect for the functions and
cultures of diverse departments and agencies. Communication skills are paramount. The
effective interagency player writes and speaks well. He or she will be bilingual, able to
function in military as well as civilian English. Bureaucratic jargon is the enemy of
interagency communication. The military briefing, an excellent vehicle for quickly
transmitting a lot of information in formatted style, is less appreciated by other cultures. One
must be less conscious of rank because ranks will vary among the representative around a
table. Some one of lower rank may be in charge of a meeting. A sense of humor, patience,
endurance, and tolerance for ambiguity and indecisiveness will help. The ability to “stay in
your box” and articulate the perspective of your department will be respected, though the
temptation to poach on other domains will be there. The ability to anticipate issues, to
consider the second and third order effects from the national level down to the country team
and theater levels, will be invaluable. Finally, the interagency requires diplomatic and
negotiating skills, the ability to network, and mastery of the nuances of bureaucratic politics
21
and language.
The most evolved democracy in the world has the most cumbersome national security
decision-making process. Inefficiency is the price the founding fathers imposed for
democratic accountability. But some of the inefficiency is the result of American strategic
culture, with its multiplicity of players, plentiful but diffused resources, and the propensity to
segment peace and diplomacy from war and military power. Major structural changes must
be made in the interagency system in order to harness human talent and resources
intelligently. It is time to move away from one for 1947 to one for the next century.
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CHAPTER 10
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY:
DOCUMENTING STRATEGIC VISION
Don M. Snider
John A. Nagl
INTRODUCTION.
SEC. 603. ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
. . . Sec. 104. (a)(1) The President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive
report on the national security strategy of the United States ...
(2) The national security strategy report for any year shall be transmitted on the date on
which the President submits to Congress the budget for the next fiscal year under section
1105 of Title 31, United States Code.
(b) Each national security strategy report shall set forth the national security strategy of
the United States and shall include a comprehensive description and discussion of the
following:
(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the
national security of the United States.
(2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the
United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy
of the United States.
(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and
other elements of national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and
achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1).
(4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security
strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of
all elements of national power of the United States to support the implementation of the
national security strategy.
(5) Such other measures as may be helpful to inform Congress on matters relating to the
national security strategy of the United States.
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(c) Each national security strategy report shall be transmitted in both a classified and an
1
unclassified form.
By the above language, a small section of a much larger reform package known as the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the Congress
amended the National Security Act of 1947 to require annually a written articulation of grand
strategy from each succeeding President. In so doing, Congress was attempting to legislate a
solution to what it, and many observers, believed to be a legitimate and significant problem of
long standing in our governmental processes. The Executive Branch has more often than not
failed to formulate, in an integrated and coherent manner judiciously using resources drawn
from all elements of national power, a mid- and long-term strategy necessary to defend and
further those interests vital to the nation’s security.
Few in the Congress at that time doubted that there existed a grand strategy. The nation
had been following “containment” in one form or another for over 40 years. What they
doubted, or disagreed with, was its focus in terms of values, interests and objectives; its
coherence in terms of relating means to ends; its integration in terms of the elements of power;
and its time horizon. In theory, at least to the reformers, a clearly written strategy would
serve to inform the Congress better on the needs for resources to execute the strategy, thus
facilitating the annual authorization and appropriation processes, particularly for the
Department of Defense.
There have now been several such reports published. In this essay we will review eight of
them: two from the second Reagan administration (1987 and 1988), three from the Bush
administration (1990, 1991 and 1993), and three from the two Clinton administrations (1994,
1997, 1998).
This monograph, co-authored by the individual responsible for the preparation of the 1988
report, in cooperation with the officials responsible for drafting the 1990, 1991, 1993, and
2
1994 reports, and by a military scholar who has both executed the strategy and taught it to
future generations of officers, draws on their experiences to provide insights into the process
as well as the individual products.

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT.
Before discussing the individual reports, we must understand the larger context in which
these reports are produced, beyond that in the National Security Council and its staff where
they are initially drafted and ultimately approved. First, it should be understood that the
requirement for the report did not originate solely, or even mainly, from within the Congress.
In fact, the Congress was, at the time of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, much more
interested in reforming the Department of Defense; what was reformed east of the Potomac
3
was of much less interest.
Like most pieces of legislation, the idea for a Presidential statement of grand strategy had
been percolating for several years in many locations—in think tanks, from public-minded
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citizens, from former government officials, from professional associations, from the academic
literature, and from specific interest groups formed for the express purpose of fostering the
requirement for such a report. As expected from an open, pluralistic process, each proponent
had its own purposes for desiring such a statement, resulting in differing expectations of what
the structure, content and use of the final report would be. In retrospect, it is clear that
inclusion of the requirement for such a report in the final Goldwater-Nichols bill followed one
of the better known maxims of the policy community— “if we can agree on what we want, let’s
not try to agree on why we want it.”
Secondly, in this particular topic there is always the issue of imprecise language. Just
what is national security strategy, as opposed to grand strategy, or defense strategy, or even
national military strategy? And what are the distinguishable elements of power of the United
States, and the boundaries between them? How can national security strategy subsume
foreign policy as the Act seems to imply by its language? Obviously, there was, and is, no real
consensus on this language either in academia, where the public servants in Washington
earlier took their training, or in Washington where they practice their arts.
But, as we all know, language does make a difference, particularly within the Executive
Branch where authorities and responsibilities represent power. Even more so, within the
interagency arena, where responsibilities for the preparation for this particular report are
viewed as direct access to the President’s overall agenda, and thus highly desirable, there
initially exists little consensus as to the components of a national security strategy and what
represents coherence. This imprecision in the language of the strategic art compounds the
problem even among those who want a quality product.
The flip side of this positive, “I want to be part of the process,” view is the recognition
within the Executive Branch that this is not the only, or the principal, or even the most
desirable means for the President to articulate publicly his strategic vision. What President
in a fast-paced, media-oriented world wants to articulate once a year, in a static, written
report a detailed statement of his forward-looking strategic vision? If ever there is a surefire
means of insuring that one’s boss will be “hoisted on his own petard,” this is it to many of the
President’s closest political advisors. To influence public opinion and resource allocations it is
considered far better to depend on current, personal testimonies by administration officials
before the Congress, supported by Presidential and cabinet-level media interventions, to
create a coherent and wide-spread campaign of public diplomacy to the electorate of America.
Unfortunately, this view relegates the content of the National Security Strategy Report
(NSSR) to mushy “globaloney” to be fed to Congress.
We must also provide, for context, a feel for the political atmosphere within which the 1987
and 1988 reports were prepared. Dr. Snider’s tenure on the staff of the National Security
Council began just after the Iran-Contra fiasco and during the implementation of the Tower
4
Commission recommendations. To say that White House/congressional relations were at
absolute gridlock would be true, but would also vastly understate the passionate hostile
intensity and hyper-legalistic approach being taken by both sides on most every item of the
mutual agenda. Whether it be war powers, strategic modernization, strategic defenses, or
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regional foreign and defense policies, there was a pervasive modus vivendi of little quarter
being asked, and only rarely any given.
During the Bush administration the atmosphere improved significantly for the first two
years, but thereafter “gridlock” again prevailed. Similarly, after the first year of the Clinton
administration relations between the Executive and Congress deteriorated appreciably,
particularly on matters of foreign policy; the spirit of cooperation between the legislative and
executive branches was not fostered by the impeachment proceedings of 1999. Thus in every
case the operating atmosphere in which the strategy report was prepared was one of intense,
adversarial politics. It was clear from the beginning of each cycle that this report was not to be
a neutral planning document as many academics and even some in uniform think it to be.
Rather it was, and still is in our judgement, intended to serve five primary purposes.
First, the central, external purpose of the report beyond the Executive Branch is to
communicate strategic vision to Congress, and thus legitimize a rationale for the allocation of
resources. The stated intent of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is broadly accepted as valid
for effective political discourse on issues affecting the nation’s security; the Congress and the
Executive need a common understanding of the strategic environment and the
administration’s intent as a starting point for future dialogue. That said, however, it is
understood that in the adversarial environment that prevails, this report can only provide a
beginning point for the dialogue necessary to reach such a “common” understanding.
The second purpose is to communicate the same vision to a number of other quite different
constituencies. Many of these are foreign, and extensive distributions through the United
States Information Agency have proven most effective at communicating changing U.S.
intentions to the governments of many nations not on our summit agendas.
The third purpose is to communicate to selected domestic audiences, often political
supporters of the President who want to see their particular issue prominently displayed
under Presidential signature. Others, less political and more public-minded, want to see
coherence and farsightedness in the security policies of their government: a strategy they
could, as citizens, fully support.
Fourth, there is the internal constituency of those in the Executive Branch to whom the
process of creating the document is recognized to be of immense substantive value. This is so
because the process of creating the report also creates internal consensus on foreign and
defense policies. This point cannot be overemphasized. Every new and second-term
administration faces this challenge as it transitions from campaign to governance,
particularly if foreign policy has not been a major issue in the campaign. The fact is, it is
simply impossible to document a strategy where none exists! Few things educate new political
appointees faster as to their own strategic sensings or to the qualities and competencies of the
“permanent” government they lead within executive bureaucracies, than to have to commit in
writing to the President their plans for the future and how they can be integrated, coordinated
and otherwise shared with other agencies and departments. The ability to forge consensus
among these competing views on direction, priorities and pace, and getting “on board”
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important players three political levels down from the President is recognized as an
5
invaluable, if not totally daunting, opportunity for a new or re-newed administration.
And lastly, any Presidential document, regardless of originating requirement, always
must be viewed in the context of how it contributes, both in terms of substance and
presentation, to the overall agenda of the President. Unfortunately, Congress unwittingly
insured that the document would usually be submitted in a low-profile manner since it is
required early in January with the budget submission—just before one of the President’s
premier communication events of the year, the State of the Union address. Well coordinated,
the two activities can be mutually supportive, but more normal to date is, appropriately, the
dominance of the State of the Union address.
Thus, with these five purposes in mind, all legitimate and necessary but understood to
require difficult trade-offs in their completion, someone on the NSC staff sets out in the name
of the President to task the Cabinet officials and their strategy-minded deputies to articulate
the preferred national security strategy for the United States. What follows is an iterative,
interagency process of some months (or years in the case of the Clinton administration),
culminating in multiple drafts and several high level meetings, including the NSC, to resolve
differences and ultimately approve the final document.

THE 1987 AND 1988 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY REPORTS.
Since the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was approved late in 1986, the 1987 report was
prepared in a very limited period of time and reflected the intent to document only current
strategic thinking. In its two major sections, one each on foreign policy and defense policy, the
document reflected the Reagan administration’s strong orientation toward Cabinet
government and a strong emphasis on military instruments of power, almost to the exclusion
of the others. Taken as a whole, of course, the document portrayed a comprehensive strategic
approach toward the Soviet Union. The section on integrating elements of power referred to
the “NSC system” as the integrator, rather than documenting current strategies toward
regions or subregions. The NSC system in the Reagan administrations had produced by then
over 250 classified national security decision directives (NSDD). It was believed that these
represented at any point a set of substrategies “effective in promoting the integrated
employment of the broad and diverse range of tools available for achieving our national
6
security objectives.”
Two major changes from the 1987 strategy were introduced in the 1988 report. With the
twin deficits of the federal budget and the balance of trade prominent on the political agenda
the first change was to emphasize all the elements of national power in an integrated
strategy, particularly the economic element which scarcely had been discussed in the
previous report. This logically led to the second adjustment, which was to present separate
strategies for each region while integrating the various instruments of power. Both efforts
probably rate an “A” for idea and effort, and no more than a “C” for results as seen on the
printed page or implemented by the administration. Behind the printed page, however, we
are confident that those who participated in this interagency process were subsequently
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much more inclined to appreciate and to seek the use of integrated policy instruments toward
the resolution of U.S. security challenges in a region or subregion.

THE 1990 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY REPORT.
The 1990 report was prepared in a vortex of global change. The Bush administration
began with a detailed interagency review of security strategy in the spring of 1989. This
effort—and the natural turbulence of a new administration shaking out its personnel and
procedures, notably the Tower nomination—had pushed the preparation of the 1989 report
into the early fall. Then events in Eastern Europe promptly made sections of the report, as
well as the underlying policy, obsolete. The original Goldwater-Nichols legislation had
implicitly assumed a fairly steady state in the international environment, with the annual
report articulating incremental changes to both perceptions of and responses to that
environment. The pace of change throughout the last half of 1989 pushed the publication of
the next report into March 1990.
In content the 1990 report attempted to embrace fully the reality of change in the Soviet
Union and, especially, in Eastern Europe. The response to that change as discussed in the
report, however, was admittedly cautious. At least one critic described the document as
schizophrenic, with the reading of the environment in the front at significant variance with
the prescribed response in the back. This demonstrates once again how much easier it is in a
rather open, pluralistic process to gain consensus on what is being observed, as opposed to
how the nation should respond to that observed change. The process in 1989-90 did show,
however, the potential of the statutory requirement for a documented strategy to force public
assessments of events and developments that might otherwise have been avoided, either
because of their difficulty or their political sensitivity.

THE 1991 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY REPORT.
The quickening pace of world change-and a deepening crisis leading, ultimately, to war in
the Middle East—served again to delay the 1991 report. Key decision makers focused on
multiple, demanding developments. After August 2nd at least, the foreground of their view
was filled with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, coalition building and military actions. In the
background, and occasionally intruding to the fore, were fundamental changes in the
U.S.-Soviet relationship, major treaties on strategic and conventional weaponry, and the
final dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. There was little room in anyone’s focus, particularly
within the NSC staff, to develop, coordinate and publish a comprehensive and definitive
Presidential statement of strategy. Although its major elements had been drafted by
February, the 1991 report was not published until August.
Like its predecessors, events forced the focus of the 1991 report to the U.S.-Soviet
relationship as the departure point for any discussion of future American strategy. More than
preceding reports, however, this one attempted to broaden the definition of national security.
In purely military terms, it proclaimed regional conflict as the organizing focus for American
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military capabilities, and suggested that new terms of reference for nuclear deterrence would
shortly be needed. Politically, it attempted to turn the compass on arms control from
east-west to north-south for a much expanded discussion of policy to retard proliferation.
Even more than the previous reports, the document attempted to communicate the idea that
American economic well-being was included in the definition of national security, even
though discussions of specific programs to improve competitiveness or to combat trade and
budget deficits were generally lacking.

THE 1993 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY REPORT.
The last of the three strategy reports of the Bush administration was published in
January 1993, just before the inauguration of President-elect Bill Clinton. A draft had been
prepared in early 1992, but several summits and the press of the unsuccessful 1992 campaign
precluded its completion. Another contributing factor was the content of that campaign,
which focused almost exclusively on the domestic economy, obviating the political usefulness
of a new statement of security strategy.
Unlike the previous reports in both the Reagan and Bush administrations, this one was
intended quite clearly to document the accomplishments of the past rather than to point to
the way ahead. The Republicans were leaving the White House after 12 years of stewardship
of the nation’s foreign and defense policies, including in their minds a remarkably successful
conclusion to, and transition out of, the Cold War. As the titles of two of the report’s sections
attest—“Security through Strength: Legacy and Mandate,” and “The World as It Can Be, If
We Lead and Attempt to Shape It as Only America Can”—they wanted to document their
accomplishments in strategic terms, as well as to put down markers by which the Clinton
administration’s foreign policy could be judged.
In terms of strategic content, however, there was little change between this report and the
1991 version. Both emphasize a steady, deliberate transition from a grand strategy of
containment to one of “collective engagement” on a regional basis. Militarily, both contain the
7
same defense strategy of four pillars as developed earlier by the Cheney-Powell team. What
differences exist can be found in the 1993 report’s heavy emphasis on a broad goal of
“democratic peace” and the absolute necessity of American leadership in attaining it, even if
only to a limited degree, in a world of increasing interdependencies.

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION.
In June 1994, the Clinton administration published its first NSSR containing that
administration’s strategy of “engagement and enlargement.” A number of reasons were
offered as to why it was a year and a half into the first term before a comprehensive statement
of strategy was finished: “the President was elected to focus on, and is focusing on, difficult
and time-consuming issues of domestic policy”; “it has taken longer than anticipated to
recruit political appointees such that the government ‘reflects America’”; “we have announced
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our strategy through a series of speeches, and will get to the congressional report later”; and
so forth.
In fact, the lack of a published strategy reflected the lack of an initial consensus within the
administration, and the difficulty that caused in formulating a new grand strategy. This is
not to imply that the administration, or at least parts of it, had not given much thought and
discussion to various aspects of an overall security strategy—the report of the Department of
8
Defense’s Bottom-Up Review documenting one such effort. But, by one official’s personal
count, the first Clinton NSSR went through 21 drafts between early 1993 and publication in
July 1994. The odyssey of the drafts portrays a lack of guidance and attention, shifting
priorities among too many goals, a series of bureaucratic battles between the principal
protagonists—the Departments of Defense and State-several restarts, and constant
intrusions from the realities of foreign affairs beyond the anticipation of the administration.
This portrayal is, however, superficial in many ways. There are more fundamental
reasons for the lengthy and arduous process through which the Clinton administration
persevered to produce its view of the world and America’s role in it. First, it took a long time
for the administration to settle on a set of principles from which to design and implement a
consistent foreign policy. Second, the process by which they set about formulating their
strategy was, to say the least, undisciplined.
The Clinton administration created a national security structure within the Executive
Branch that provided each major point of view on security policy an institutional power base
just short of the President, with no other office capable of integrating them. The important
viewpoints and their organizational bases were particularly relevant to crisis management
but also applicable to formulating strategy for a NSSR. They were: the military options for
security and stability in the Department of Defense; bilateral relations and transnational
issues with a regional focus in the Department of State and on the White House staff;
considerations of economic security, particularly as they influence the domestic economy, in
the new National Economic Council supported by very strong Treasury and Commerce
Departments and the U.S. Trade Representative; and issues of environmental security in the
Office of the Vice President. When working as the National Security Council, opinions of
cabinet-level representatives of this structure could only be melded together by the President
9
himself, not by the National Security Advisor or the White House Chief of Staff.
Finally, there was the political situation of the President, who won only 43 percent of the
popular vote running as a “New Democrat” in 1992. In addition to dealing with a Republican
majority in Congress, he had to create consensus within the Democratic party, since he was
largely opposed in a unified manner by the Republicans except on issues of international
trade. After the first six months, and particularly after the congressionally mandated
withdrawal from Somalia and the subsequent dismissal of his Secretary of Defense, the
President’s foreign policy record also became a major issue for his opponents. This was even
more so in June and July 1994 when the President’s polls on foreign policy were the worst
ever, showing no boost whatsoever for his participation in the G-7 summit and his subsequent
European tour. The concern of one White House staffer was revealing: “To publish a detailed
report of national security strategy now would just provide chum for the sharks.”
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THE 1994 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY REPORT.
This turned out, however, not to be the case. As published, the 1994 Clinton National
Security Strategy Report contains a remarkably different vision of how to provide for
America’s “security” in the future. First, the conception of security is much more broad than
that used by earlier administrations. Given the new environment with apparently no military
threats to the nation’s physical security, the administration has defined security as
“protecting our people, our territory, and our way of life.” The addition of the last clause
underlines the recognition that the strategy must be designed as much, if not more, for
exploiting “the opportunities to make the nation more safe and prosperous,” as it is for
protecting it from a new class of “dangers” to its security. When contrasted to the necessities
and burdens of the Cold War, this seizing of the historical opportunity based on a vision of
improving the lot of America’s domestic life as well as promoting its democratic and economic
aspects overseas is a refreshingly positive and attractive approach.
Further, there is a simple elegance in using only three national security goals—enhancing
our security, promoting prosperity at home, and promoting democracy-under which to
integrate all of the government’s efforts to advance U.S. interests. This makes the many ways
in which various means contribute to these ends and the interrelationships involved more
readily apparent, as are the trade-offs between them (to the consternation of some who have
for decades seen their particular contribution to national security as their undeniable claim
on resources!) As conceived and published, the strategy, for instance, makes clear that the
contribution of various means to provide for “environmental security” contributes to the first
goal—“enhancing our security”—in much the same way as does “maintaining a strong
defense capability.”
But, even with this truly post-Cold War conception of U.S. security coupled with a much
more sweeping array of policy instruments for its preservation—from population control, to
environmental security, to nonproliferation initiatives—one is left with the impression that
some of the more traditional, but vitally effective, means of providing for our national security
were inadequately addressed in the strategy. Nuclear deterrence is only the most obvious
example. Equally noticeable by their absence in this globalist approach were the priorities
necessary to make this strategy operative. While the “engagement” of the United States in the
future is “to be selective,” dependent on the intensity of the interest involved, there is little
discussion of how U.S. leadership—“Never has American leadership been more essential”—is
to be effective without direct engagement of our national capabilities, and the specific causes
or regions in which that must be done are not made clear. In fact, the foreign policy record of
the first Clinton administration demonstrates this to be one of the strategy’s major
shortcomings.

THE 1997 AND 1998 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY REPORTS.
Issued in May 1997, the first National Security Strategy Report of the second Clinton
administration bore the title “A National Security Strategy for a New Century.” Its goals were
the same as those of the 1994 report: to enhance American security, to bolster America’s
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economic prosperity, and to promote democracy abroad. However, perhaps in response to
criticisms like the ones enumerated above of both the written and implemented foreign
policies of the first Clinton administration, there was a new focus on enumerating priorities
for America abroad.
The list of priorities began with the fostering of a peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe,
reflecting the substantial investment in NATO expansion and in resolving the war in Bosnia
of the previous four years. The second priority was the creation of a stable and prosperous
Asian-Pacific community, again unsurprising in light of the Asian financial crisis at the time
of writing. Non-regional priorities included expanding open markets and advancing the rule
of law; serving as an “unrelenting” force for peace; countering transnational threats; and
preserving a strong and ready military and diplomatic corps. Unobjectionable in themselves,
the Administration could still be accused of a reach which exceeded its grasp, and it was also
criticized for its low priority on military readiness at a time when cracks in the Department of
10
Defense began to be more apparent. Stung by criticism of its inaction in Rwanda and
heartened by apparent success in Bosnia, the 1997 Report also put priority on what it called
“The Imperative of Engagement,” arguing that “American leadership and engagement in the
world are vital for our security.”
The other notable change from the 1994 Report was a new focus on strategy
implementation, built around the concepts of shaping the international environment,
responding to international crises, and preparing now for an uncertain future. A range of
policy tools were noted as effective in each of these areas. “Shaping” could be performed
through diplomacy, international assistance, arms control, nonproliferation initiatives and
military activities; to the extent that shaping the international environment in America’s
interest was successful, it would become less necessary to respond to crises, from
transnational threats to major theater warfare. Interestingly, national interests conceivably
necessitating American responses were categorized as vital, important, or humanitarian.
Finally, the task of “Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future” was given an increased
emphasis in light of the increasing recognition that what some called a “defense budget train
wreck” was brewing as a result of failures to replace equipment purchased during the Reagan
11
defense buildup.
The 1997 Report concluded with a listing of “Integrated Regional Approaches” for Europe
and Eurasia; East Asia and the Pacific; the Western Hemisphere; the Middle East, Southwest
and Southeast Asia; and Africa, the last of which was promised increased emphasis in years
to come.
The 1998 National Security Strategy Report, issued in October, shared both a title and
much substance with the 1997 report. Differences were of emphasis and degree, highlighted
by a deeper recognition of increased global economic interdependence as a result of the
long-term effects of the Asian financial crisis. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, with its
pointed conclusions about the need to rebuild aging weapons platforms and concurrent
stresses on military forces as a result of the deployments to Bosnia and Iraq, also played a
12
hand in the revisions. So, too, did an increasing awareness of the challenges presented by
domestic terrorism, resulting in two Presidential Decision Directives (PDD 62 and 63) which
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created structures to respond to domestic terrorism and to protect better a national
infrastructure which was recognized to be vulnerable to both conventional and cyber attacks.
The 1998 report also demonstrated a more integrated regional focus than did the 1997 report,
with the three missions of enhancing security, promoting prosperity, and promoting
democracy in each region separately highlighted.
The 2000 National Security Strategy Report, not yet released as of this paper’s writing,
can be expected to differ little from the 1998 report. If past trends are followed, it will become
more a codification of the foreign policy accomplishments of the two Clinton administrations
than a statement of true strategic principles. Like earlier reports issued in the twilight of
administrations, it will play to the historical constituency of President Clinton and will
attempt to provide a springboard for his chosen successor in the 2000 elections.
Our assessment of the Clinton Administrations’ successes in foreign policy reveals a
decidedly mixed record. Foreign policy issues seemed to be dealt with as they arose, too often
with much more concern for how they would play at home than for their longer term impact
abroad. This was not true in every case, and the Clinton administration had some notable
successes: agreement on GATT and NAFTA trade accords; de-nuclearization in Russia and
Ukraine; extension of security assurances, even if somewhat weak, eastward into Central
Europe by the Partners for Peace program in NATO; and, an agreement with North Korea on
plutonium production were among the first administration’s successes. In other important
instances-abandonment of the original policy of “assertive multilateralism” after a tactical
reversal in Somalia and several failed policy initiatives in Bosnia; a brief attempt to
de-nuclearize South Asia; and, before finally acting, an extended vacillation over what to do
about an illegal regime in Haiti—the process sought more often a quick resolution and
“victory” for the President than it did to define and fulfill the longer term roles and interests of
the United States in a very disorderly world.
Similar comments and compliments could be made about the second Clinton
administration. It appeared to recognize the important role of force in foreign policy with the
summer 1995 airstrikes in Bosnia leading to the Dayton Agreement, but did not internalize
the right lessons from that success. The lessons of the 1999 campaign in Kosovo have not yet
been clearly drawn although pundits have already proclaimed a new “Clinton Doctrine” for
the use of force: the United States will intervene in humanitarian emergencies when the
expected costs are low and there is minimal risk to U.S. forces; when there is a real chance of
doing long-term good as a result of the intervention; and when national interests as
traditionally defined are involved or threatened. The inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic,
and Hungary into NATO can also be seen as a success for the administration, but at least as
much credit is probably owed to the Congress, which largely played to domestic constituencies
in approving expansion of America’s most important alliance. Similarly, perhaps more credit
is owed to the Senators responsible for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program as to the administration; certainly, blame for the failure of Senate ratification for the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should be distributed between both branches of government.
In the months and years ahead the issue of the effectiveness of American leadership may
well be the linchpin of any strategic formulation for advancing America’s interests in the
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world. There are several reason for this. First, allies and friends no longer need our assistance
with their security, or so they perceive and act. As a result, the leverage that extended
deterrence and other strategic arrangements of the Cold War accrued to our leadership has
withered. Second, the economic aspects of Clinton’s foreign policy may be perceived as
intrusive from the perspective of a nation whose markets we want to be opened to our exports.
This has already caused several former allies and friends to distance themselves from what
they see as economic nationalism, and a leadership that is fostering it. Third, America’s
problems at home, particularly faltering education, unrelenting cultural wars and rising
racial divisions, have dimmed the message America sends to promote the spread of
democracy abroad. If these are the result of our form of democracy, as many rising industrial
nations believe, we are promoting a form of cultural imperialism that they can do without.

CONCLUSIONS.
Several conclusions about the formulation of American national security strategy can be
drawn from the experiences of these eight reports, conclusions of process and substance that,
perhaps, are arrived at uniquely from the perspective of the National Security Council.
The first is obvious from the earlier discussions, but so deeply pervades all else that it
should be stated explicitly—there is no operative consensus today as to the appropriate grand
strategy for the United States. More importantly, this lack of consensus is due far less to any
type of constraint on strategic thinking than it is to the fundamental value differences in our
electorate, and the resulting legacy of federal government divided between the political
parties and buffeted by the myriad of factions that effectively cross party lines on separate
issues. It is easy to agree with those academics concerned that the dysfunction of “divided
13
government” and “demosclerosis” increasingly preclude coherent strategic behavior on the
14
part of our nation.
After all, grand strategy is really the idea of allocating resources to create in both the
short- and long-term various instruments of power, instruments with which the nation then
provides for its defense and the furtherance of its aims in the world. True, there have been
extraordinary changes in the external environment, and we won the Cold War. But to many,
including those working to formulate security strategy through these decades of intense
change, the erosion of consensus on foreign policy was apparent far earlier. One need look no
further than the foreign and economic assistance allocations from roughly 1984 onward, or
the endless clashes on modernization of strategic defenses, or the constant tug of war on war
powers and treaty obligations, or the Reagan administration’s attempts to buttress
“aggressive unilateralism” and the Clinton administration’s short-lived attempt to pursue
“assertive multilateralism.” And, as the Iran-Contra fiasco showed to all, without a modicum
of consensus there can be no effective security strategy or policy.
This conclusion is stated first because it conditions those that follow, and because it
conditions one’s expectations for the specific mode of formulating national security strategy
that is discussed in this monograph. A Presidential strategy report can never be more than it
really is: a statement of preference from the Executive Branch as to current, and perhaps
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future, grand strategy. Given our government of shared powers, it remains for a
constructively adversarial process with the Congress to refine that preferential strategy into
one that has any chance of being effective—one around which there can be created domestic
political consensus, and thus an allocation of resources effective in creating instruments of
national power.
The second conclusion focuses on the function of long-range planning, or strategic
planning, which is the base from which security strategy formulation must be built. Simply
stated, in our experience the Executive Branch does not do long-range planning in a
substantive or systematic manner. (We make a sharp distinction between planning and
programming.) To be sure, there are pockets of planning activity within the “permanent”
government of many departments and agencies, particularly Defense and State. Some of this
is good, comprehensive planning from the perspective of that particular agency. But it is
devoid of the political dynamic which can be provided only by the participation of those who
have won elections, which under our system of government provides the authority to set
future directions and pace in security policy and strategy. Taken as a whole then, particularly
given the number of departments and agencies within which there is little planning activity,
we are comfortable stating this conclusion in a stark form.
This paucity of strategic planning is well documented in academic writings, particularly
15
the memoirs of former officials. The causes are well known to political scientists; two stand
out. The first is the limit of what is physically possible for elected officials to do in any given
amount of time. Long-range planning and strategy formulation will always run a poor second
to the pressing combination of crisis management and near-term policy planning and
implementation. There is seldom a week in which the NSC staff and the planning staffs of the
principal Cabinet officers are not fully involved in either preparation for or clean-up after a
presidential trip, a summit, a visit by a head of state (or government), or a major negotiation.
And this is as it should be; the maxim is true in diplomatic and political activity at this
level—if today is not cared for, tomorrow will not arrive in a manageable form. Secondly, the
pernicious effects of divided government, manifest in micromanaging and punitive legislation
on the one hand and intractable stonewalling and relentless drives for efficiency on the other,
preclude resources for permanent, long-range planning staffs that could institutionalize such
a process.
In place of a systematic approach to long-range or strategic planning, what the Executive
Branch does do, and in some cases rather well, is episodic planning for particular events. This
is how we describe the creation of each of the published strategy reports—a focused,
comprehensive effort of some 4-6 months involving political leadership and the permanent
bureaucracies in the development of common vision and purpose for the near-term future.
The often cited NSC-68 and PRM-10 reviews are historic examples of other successful, but
16
episodic, strategic planning events. Recent examples are the lkle-Wohlstetter Commission
17
18
of 1988 and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 1997. To be sure, in most cases
these were incremental responses made by administrations, often new, who were stewards of
an evolving grand strategy. The fact that the changes were incremental has much more to do,
in our view, with the nature of divided government than it does with the quality of the review
process itself; in most cases a reasonable range of alternatives were, in fact, presented to
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civilian decision makers. Even if they chose narrowly, these episodic events did produce
in-depth reviews across the range of interests and instruments of national power, and
resulted in much more than rhetorical change to the overall strategy.
The relevant question now, it seems, given the inherent constraints to systematic,
long-range planning noted above, is whether it is wise in the future to attempt anything more
than broad, but episodic, planning exercises for the formulation of grand strategy. More
specifically, should the Executive attempt a new statement of grand strategy every year as
the current legislation requires? We conclude that comprehensive strategy reviews should
only be executed twice during an administration’s tenure, during the first and third years to be
presented early to each two-year session of the Congress. Further, if the pace of change in
external events subsides, a valid case could probably be made to conduct such a review only
once, during the first year of a new administration, in preparation for the QDR.
Beyond the problems of finding the time to work on strategy, we believe that there is
another shortcoming of a different nature in the current process. The art of formulating
strategy is that of combining the various elements of power and relating them to the desired
end—the key is integration. This belief is derived as much from experience in crisis
management as in strategy formulation. Too often, after a crisis erupts, it is clear that there
had been little prior coordination or integration of policy instruments focused on a particular
region or country before the crisis. Too often the only effective instruments for immediate
leverage are military. In retrospect it was clear that if the administration had been pursuing a
well-documented and integrated strategic approach toward the region or country in question,
one in which the current policy instruments drew from all elements of power, the ability for
more effective responses would have been greatly enhanced.
Increasingly in this post-Cold War era, those ends toward which we are developing a
strategic approach are being defined at the regional and subregional level. Even strategies for
such transnational issues as cyberwar, environmental security, terrorism and narcotics
trafficking focus on implementation at the subregional level or even that of an individual
nation. But planning for the effective integration of policy instruments for the various regions
and subregions remains problematic.
Lastly, we conclude, contrary to some of what might be taken from this monograph, that
we should not concentrate exclusively on institutions and processes when discussing the
development of national security strategy. As we have seen so often, it is people who really
define the character of the institutions and who make the processes what they are. Almost
uniformly we have observed people of intelligence and goodwill respond to the need to place
national interests above those of organization or person. This is not to conclude, however, that
all is well and we can count on such people consistently overcoming the real constraints on
strategic thinking and behavior in our government. Rather, it is to conclude that it is much too
early for a cynical approach to the on-going reformulation of America’s role in the world.
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CHAPTER 11
WHY IS STRATEGY DIFFICULT?
David Jablonsky
Colonel (Ret.) Arthur Lykke has taught an entire generation of U.S. Army War College
students that strategy at any level consists of ends or objectives, ways or concepts, and means
or resources. This three-element framework is nothing more than a reworking of the
traditional definition of strategy as the calculated relationship of ends and means. Yet the
student response is always overwhelmingly favorable, with Lykke’s framework invariably
forming the structure for subsequent seminar problems on subjects ranging from the U.S.
Civil War to nuclear strategy. This is due, in part, to the fact that students weaned on the
structural certitude of the five-paragraph field order and the Commander’s Estimate
naturally find such structure comforting in dealing with the complexities of strategy. But
those students also know from their experience in the field that there are limits to the
scientific approach when dealing with human endeavors. As a consequence, they can also
appreciate the art of mixing ends, ways, and means, using for each element the part
subjective, part objective criteria of suitability, feasibility, and applicability-the essence of
1
strategic calculation.
The ends-ways-means paradigm also provides a structure at all levels of strategy to avoid
confusing the scientific product with the scientific process. The former involves production
propositions that are logically related and valid across time and space. The search for these
immutable principles over the centuries by students of war failed because they looked on
classical strategy as something like physical science that could produce verities in accordance
with certain regularities. This was further compounded by military thinkers who made
claims for scientific products without subjecting those products to a scientific process. Both
Jomini and Mahan, for instance, ignored evidence in cases that did not fit their theories or
2
principles of strategy. The strategic paradigm, then, serves as a lowest common denominator
reminder that a true scientific product is not possible from the study of strategy. At the same
time, however, that paradigm provides a framework for the systematic treatment of facts and
evidence-the very essence of the scientific process. In this regard, Admiral Wylie has pointed
out:
I do not claim that strategy is or can be a “science” in the sense of the physical sciences. It can and
should be an intellectual discipline of the highest order, and the strategist should prepare himself to
manage ideas with precision and clarity and imagination. . . . Thus, while strategy itself may not be a
science, strategic judgment can be scientific to the extent that it is orderly, rational, objective, inclu3
sive, discriminatory, and perceptive.

All that notwithstanding, the limitations of the strategic paradigm bring the focus full
circle back to the art involved in producing the optimal mix of ends, ways, and means.
Strategy, of course, does depend on the general regularities of that paradigm. But strategy
does not always obey the logic of that framework, remaining, as the German Army
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Regulations Truppenfuhrung of 1936 described it, “a free creative activity resting upon
4
scientific foundations.” The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate why, despite
increasingly scientific approaches to formulation and implementation, strategy remains
principally an art rather than a science, and why within that art the “creative activity” of
blending the elements in the strategic paradigm has become progressively more difficult over
the centuries.

FROM REVOLUTIONS TO TOTAL WAR.
In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, there was a growing recognition of the increased
complexity of strategy, summarized in Carl von Clausewitz’s warning that “there can be no
question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military
5
scheme to solve it.” At the tactical level, the Prussian philosopher wrote, “the means are
fighting forces trained for combat; the end is victory.” For the strategic, however, Clausewitz
concluded that military victories were meaningless unless they were the means to obtain a
6
political end, “those objects which lead directly to peace.” Thus, strategy was “the linking
together (Verbindung) of separate battle engagements into a single whole, for the final object
7
of the war.” And only the political or policy level could determine that objective. “To bring a
war, or any one of its campaigns to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national
8
policy,” he pointed out. “On that level strategy and policy coalesce.” For Clausewitz, this
vertical continuum (see Figure 1) was best exemplified by Frederick the Great, who embodied
both policy and strategy and whose Silesian conquests of 1741 he considered to be the classic
example of strategic art by demonstrating “an element of restrained strength, . . . ready to
9
adjust to the smallest shift in the political situation.”

Figure 1. The Policy Continuum.
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With his deceptively simple description of the vertical continuum of war, Clausewitz set
the stage for the equivalent of a Copernican shift in the strategic ends-ways-means paradigm.
Now that paradigm was more complex, operating on both the military and policy levels with
the totality of the ends, ways, and means at the lower levels interconnected with the political
application at the policy level of those same strategic elements. This connection was the
essence of Clausewitz’s description of war as a continuation of political intercourse (Verkehr)
with the addition of other means. He explained that:
We deliberately use the phrase “with the addition of other means” because we also want to make it
clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. . . . The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are
political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace. . . . War cannot be divorced
from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the
10
two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.

THE INDUSTRIAL AND FRENCH REVOLUTIONS.
This growing complexity in dealing with the strategic paradigm was compounded by two
upheavals. Clausewitz was profoundly aware of one, the French Revolution; he was totally
ignorant of the other, the industrial/technological revolution. Prior to the French Revolution,
eighteenth-century rulers had acquired such effective political and economic control over
their people that they were able to create their war machines as separate and distinct from
the rest of society. The Revolution changed all that with the appearance of a force “that
beggared all imagination” as Clausewitz described it,
Suddenly, war again became the business of the people-a people of thirty millions, all of whom considered themselves to be citizens. There seemed no end to the resources mobilized; all limits disappeared
in the vigor and enthusiasm shown by governments and their subjects.... War, untrammelled by any,
conventional restraints, had broken loose in all its elemental fury. This was due to the peoples’ new
share in these great affairs of state; and their participation, in its turn, resulted partly from the impact
that the Revolution had on the internal conditions of every state and partly from the danger that
11
France posed to everyone.

For Clausewitz, the people greatly complicated the formulation and implementation of
strategy by adding “primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as a
blind natural force” to form with the army and the government what he termed the
remarkable trinity (see Figure 2). The army he saw as a “creative spirit” roaming freely
within “the play of chance and probability,” but always bound to the government, the third
element, in “subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason
12
alone.”
It was the complex totality of this trinity that, Clausewitz realized, had altered and
complicated strategy so completely.
Clearly the tremendous effects of the French Revolution . . . were caused not so much by new military
methods and concepts as by radical changes in policies and administration, by the new character of
government, altered conditions of the French people, and the like. . . . It follows that the transformation
13
of the art of war resulted from the transformation of politics.
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Figure 2. The Remarkable Trinity.
But while that transformation had made it absolutely essential to consider the elements of
the Clausewitzian trinity within the strategic paradigm, the variations possible in the
interplay of those elements moved strategy even farther from the realm of scientific certitude.
“A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between
them,” Clausewitz warned in this regard, “would conflict with reality to such an extent that
14
for this reason alone it would be totally useless.”
Like most of his contemporaries, Clausewitz had no idea that he was living on the eve of a
technological transformation born of the Industrial Revolution. But that transformation, as it
gathered momentum throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, fundamentally
altered the interplay of elements within the Clausewitzian trinity, further complicating the
formulation and application process within the strategic paradigm (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. The Impact of Technology.
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In terms of the military element, technology would change the basic nature of weapons
and modes of transportation, the former stable for a hundred years, the latter for a thousand.
Within a decade of Clausewitz’s death in 1831, that process would begin in armaments with
the introduction of breech-loading firearms and in transportation with the development of the
15
railroads.
Technology had a more gradual effect on the role of the people. There were, for example,
the great European population increases of the 19th century as the Industrial Revolution
moved on to the continent from Great Britain. This trend led, in turn, to urbanization: the
mass movement of people from the extended families of rural life to the “atomized,”
impersonal life of the city. There, the urge to belong, to find a familial substitute, led to a more
focused allegiance to the nation-state manifested in a new, more blatant and aggressive
nationalism.
This nationalism was fueled by the progressive side effects of the Industrial Revolution,
particularly in the area of public education, which meant, in turn, mass literacy throughout
Europe by the end of the nineteenth century. One result was that an increasingly literate
public could be manipulated by governments as technology spawned more sophisticated
methods of mass communications. On the other hand, those same developments also helped
democratize societies, which then demanded a greater share in government, particularly over
strategic questions involving war and peace. In Clausewitz’s time, strategic decisions dealing
with such matters were rationally based on Realpolitik considerations to further state
interests, not on domestic issues. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Rankeian Primat
der Aussenpolitik was increasingly challenged throughout Europe by the need of
governments for domestic consensus-a development with far-reaching implications for the
16
conduct of strategy at the national level within the basic ends-ways-means paradigm.
During much of that century, as the social and ideological upheavals unleashed by the
French Revolution developed, military leaders in Europe generally attempted to distance
their armed forces from their people. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Prussian
cum German military, where the leaders worked hard over the years to prevent the
adulteration of their forces by liberal ideas. “The army is now our fatherland,” General von
Roon wrote to his wife during the 1848 revolutions, “for there alone have the unclean and
17
violent elements who put everything into turmoil failed to penetrate.” The revolutions in
industry and technology, however, rendered this ideal unattainable. To begin with, the
so-called Technisierung of warfare meant the mass production of more complex weapons and
forever-larger, standing military forces. The key ingredients for these forces were the great
population increases and the rise of nationalism as well as improved communications and
governmental efficiency-the latter directed at general conscription of national manhood,
which, thanks to progress in railroad development, could be brought to the battlefield in
unlimited numbers.
At the same time, this increased interaction between the government/military and the
people was also tied to other aspects of the impact of technology on the Clausewitzian trinity.
Technological innovations in weaponry during this period, for example, were not always
followed by an understanding of their implications, societal as well as military. Certainly,
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there was the inability on the part of all European powers to perceive the growing advantage
of defensive over offensive weapons demonstrated in the Boer and Russo-Japanese wars.
That inability was tied in with a trend in Europe at the time to combine elan with a military
focus on moral force, bloodshed, and decisive battles. The result was that the military leaders
18
of France, Germany, and Russia all adopted offensive military doctrines in some form.
The fact that these doctrines led to the self-defeating offensive strategies of World War I
ultimately had to do with the transformation of civil-military relations within the
Clausewitzian trinity in their countries. In France, as an example, the officer corps distrusted
the trend by the leaders of the Third Republic toward shorter terms of military service, which
it believed threatened the army’s professional character and tradition. Adopting an offensive
doctrine and elevating it to the highest level was a means to combat this trend, since there
was general agreement that an army consisting primarily of reservists and short-term
conscripts could only be used in the defense. “Reserves are so much eyewash,” one French
general wrote at the time, “and take in only, short-sighted mathematicians who equate the
19
value of armies with the size of their effectives, without considering their moral value.
Although these were setbacks for those who shared this sentiment in the wake of the Dreyfus
Affair and the consequent military reforms, it only required the harsher international climate
after the Agadir crisis of 1911 for General Joffre and his young Turks to gain the ascendancy.
Their philosophy was summed up by their leader, who explained that in planning for the next
war he had “no preconceived idea other than a full determination to take the offensive with all
20
my forces assembled.”
Under these circumstances, French offensive doctrine became increasingly unhinged
from strategic reality as it responded to the more immediate demands of domestic and
intragovernmental politics. The result was France’s ill-conceived strategic lunge in 1914
toward its former possessions in the East, a lunge that almost provided sufficient margin of
assistance for Germany’s Schlieffen Plan, another result of military operational doctrine
driving policy. In the end, only the miracle of the Marne prevented a victory for the Germans
21
as rapid and complete as that of 1870.
There were other equally significant results as the full brunt of technological change
continued to alter the relationship between the elements of the Clausewitzian trinity in all
the European powers. The larger, more complex armies resulted in the growing specialization
and compartmentalization of the military-a trend that culminated in the emulation of the
German General Staff system by most of the European powers. It is significant that
Clausewitz had ignored Carnot, the “organizer of victory” for Napoleon, when considering
military genius. Now with the increase in military branches as well as combat service and
combat service support organizations, the age of the “military-organizational” genius had
arrived. All this in turn affected the relationship in all countries between the military and the
government. For the very increase in professional knowledge and skill caused by technology’s
advance in military affairs undermined the ability of political leaders to understand and
control the military, just as technology was making that control more important than ever by
extending strategy from the battlefield to the civilian rear, thus blurring the difference
22
between combatant and noncombatant.
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At the same time, the military expansion in the peacetime preparation for war began to
enlarge the economic dimensions of conflict beyond the simple financial support of
Clausewitz’s era. As Europe entered the twentieth century, new areas of concern began to
emerge ranging from industrial capacity and the availability and distribution of raw
materials to research and development of weapons and equipment. All this, in turn, increased
the size and role of the European governments prior to World War I—with the result, as
William James perceptively noted, that:
the intensely sharp competitive preparation for war by the nation is the real war, permanently increasing, so that the battles are only a sort of public verification of mastery gained during the “peace: inter23
vals.

Nevertheless, the full impact of the government’s strategic role in terms of national
instruments of power beyond that of the military was generally not perceived in Europe,
despite some of the more salient lessons of the American Civil War. In that conflict, the South
lost because its strategic means did not match its strategic ends and ways. Consequently, no
amount of operational finesse on the part of the South’s great captains could compensate for
the superior industrial strength and manpower that the North could deploy. Ultimately, this
meant for the North, as Michael Howard has pointed out, “that the operational skills of their
24
adversaries were rendered almost irrelevant.” The Civil War also illustrated another aspect
of the changes within the strategic paradigm: the growing importance of the national will of
the people in achieving political as well as military strategic objectives. That social dimension
of strategy on the part of the Union was what prevented the early southern operational
victories from being strategically decisive and what ultimately allowed the enormous
industrial-logistical potential north of the Potomac to be realized.

THE REVOLUTIONS JOINED: THE AGE OF TOTAL WARS.
Strategy changed irrevocably with the full confluence in World War I of the trends set in
train by the Industrial and French revolutions. In particular, the technology in that war
provided, as Hanson Baldwin has pointed out, “a preview of the Pandora’s box of evils that the
25
linkage of science with industry in the service of war was to mean.” How unexpected the
results of that linkage could be was illustrated by, a young British subaltern’s report to his
commanding general after one of the first British attacks in Flanders. “Sorry sir,” he
26
concluded. “We didn’t know it would be like that. We’ll do better next time.”
But of course there was no doing better next time, not by British and French commanders
in Flanders, not by Austrian troops on the Drina and Galician fronts in 1914, not by the
Russian officers on the Gorlice-Tarnow line in 1915. The frustration at this turn of events was
captured by Alexander Solzhenitsyn in his novel August 1914. “How disastrously the
conditions of warfare had changed,” he wrote,
making a commander as impotent as a rag doll! Where now was the battlefield . . ., across which he
27
could gallop over to a faltering commander and summon him to his side?
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It was this milieu that demonstrated the inadequacy of classical strategy to deal with the
intricacies of modern warfare. Napoleon had defined that strategy, as the “art of making use
28
of time and space.” But the dimensions of these two variables had been stretched and
rendered more complex by the interaction of technology with the elements of Clausewitz’s
trinity. And that very complexity, augmented by the lack of decisiveness at the tactical level,
impeded the vertical continuum of war outlined in Clausewitz’s definition of strategy as the
use of engagements to achieve policy objectives.
Only when the continuum was enlarged, as the Great War demonstrated, was it possible
to restore warfighting coherence to modern combat. And that, in turn, required the classical
concept of strategy, to be positioned at a midpoint, an operational level, designed to
orchestrate individual tactical engagements and battles in order to achieve strategic results
(see Figure 4). Now, a military strategy level, operating within the ends-ways-means
paradigm on its own horizontal plane, was added as another way station on the vertical road
to the fulfillment of policy objectives. This left the concept of strategy, as it had been
understood since the time of Clausewitz, transformed into:
the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained
to accomplish strategic objectives. . . . Activities at this level link tactics and strategy. . . . These
activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they provide the means by
29
which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.

Figure 4. The Continuum of War.
At the same time, the full impact of technology on the Clausewitzian trinity in each of the
combatant states during World War I substituted the infinitely more complex concept of
national strategy for that of policy. To begin with, the growing sophistication and quantity of
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arms and munitions, as well as the vast demands of equipment and supply made by the
armies, involved the national resources of industry, science, and agriculture-variables with
which the military leaders were not prepared to deal. To cope with these variables,
governments were soon forced to transform the national lives of their states in order to
provide the sinews of total war.
Looking back over 50 years later on the totality of this change in what Clausewitz had
termed policy, Admiral Eccles defined the concept of national strategy that emerged in World
War I as “the comprehensive direction of all the elements of national power to achieve the
30
national objectives.” The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is more explicit, defining the
new level of strategy that emerged at the national level after 1914 as the “art and science of
developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together
31
with its armed forces during peace and war, to secure national objectives.”
National strategy, then, involves all the elements of national power. Those elements, in
turn, can be conveniently broken down on a horizontal plane into the categories described in
the DoD definition of national strategy: political, economic, psychological, and military (see
Figure 5).

Figure 5. National Strategy: The Horizontal Plane.
The linchpin in this horizontal design is the military instrument of power at the national
strategic level-the apex, as we have seen emerging in World War 1, of the vertical continuum
of war (see Figure 6).
Thus, the mix of ends, ways, and means at the national military strategic level will directly
affect (and be affected by) the same paradigm operating at each level of the vertical
continuum. Adding to the complexity is the interplay on the horizontal plane of national
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Figure 6. National Strategy and the Vertical Continuum of War.
military strategy with the other strategies derived from the elements of national power, each
operating within its own strategic paradigm and all contributing to the grand design of
national strategy, as that strategy evolves within its own overall mix of ends, ways, and
means. That this horizontal and vertical interplay has rendered the formulation and
implementation of strategy at every level more difficult has become increasingly obvious.
“Because these various elements of power cannot be precisely defined, compartmented, or
divided,” Admiral Eccles concluded about the “fog” of strategy, “it is normal to expect areas of
ambiguity, overlap, and contention about authority among the various elements and
32
members of any government.”

CONCLUSION.
The United States is in an era in which the strategic landscape has changed and is
continuing to change. Nevertheless, the core problems that make strategy so difficult for a
global power remain essentially the same as they did for earlier powers ranging from Rome to
Great Britain. To begin with, there are challenges to U.S. interests throughout the globe. In a
constantly changing strategic environment, however, it is difficult in many cases to
distinguish which of those interests are vital, not to mention the nature of the challenge or
threat to them. In any case, there are never enough armed forces to reduce the risk
everywhere; strategic priorities have to be established.
In addition, like the leaders of earlier great powers, U.S. governmental elites have to
grapple with the paradox of preparing for war, even in peace-time, if they wish to maintain
the peace. The dilemma in the paradox that makes strategy in any era so difficult is that to
overdo such preparations may weaken the economic, psychological, and political elements of
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power in the long run. The solution is to so balance the total ends, ways, and means that the
natural tension in national security affairs between domestic and foreign policy is kept to a
minimum while still securing the nation’s vital interests with a minimum of risk. This
solution, as the leaders of the great global powers of the past would assuredly agree, is not
easy to achieve. In an ever more interdependent world in which variables for the strategist
within the ends-ways-means paradigm have increased exponentially, strategists are no
nearer to a “Philosopher’s Stone” than they ever were. Strategy remains the most difficult of
33
all art.
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CHAPTER 12
FORCE PLANNING AND U.S. DEFENSE POLICY
John F. Troxell
You cannot make decisions simply by asking yourself whether something might be nice to have. You
have to make a judgement on how much is enough.
Robert S. McNamara
April 20, 1963

As the preceding chapters of this book argue, strategy formulation begins with an
understanding of the nation’s security goals and objectives. To complete the process of
developing a coherent military strategy, and perhaps the most difficult step, is to plan the
forces needed to implement the strategy. It is clear that declaratory policy must come first,
but then follows the complex task of force planning, best defined as the attempt to create a
military force structure of the right size and right composition to achieve the nation’s security
1
goals. Force planning involves an evaluation of the threats to the national interests, the
establishment of military requirements within given constraints, and finally an assessment
of the risk of failure. The risks in the ends-ways-means strategy formulation process can be
manifested as an ends-means mismatch, or a ways–means mismatch. Strategists and force
planners consequently find themselves engaged in an iterative process of minimizing the
mismatches by either modifying the ends, adjusting the ways, or changing the means to
2
maximize the ability to protect and further the national goals. The process of risk
management will be covered in more detail in the next chapter.
Ever since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been struggling to gain
consensus on an appropriate force planning methodology and answer the question “how much
is enough” concerning the size of its military establishment. This was the principal topic of the
first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Defense Panel’s (NDP)
Alternative Force Structure Assessment, and remains an important task for the U.S.
Commission on National Security/21st Century and, most likely, future QDRs.
Most defense analysts would claim that during the Cold War the force planning task was
relatively straightforward. The threat posed by the Soviet Union required the fielding of
forces capable of conducting a global war, with priority placed on defending Western Europe.
This situation served as the agreed scenario around which to design and develop forces and
measure risks if specific force goals were not met. Force modernization programs were also
directly linked to maintaining a qualitative advantage over projected improvements in Soviet
capabilities. In addition, the Cold War force was so large that all other military requirements,
such as forces for forward presence, smaller scale interventions, and humanitarian
operations, could be met as lesser-included requirements. One author has described this
3
process as the “classic” force planning approach.
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During the post-Cold War period, the sizing function that replaced the global war scenario
has been the requirement to be able to prosecute major theater war (MTW). This requirement
evolved during the last years of the Bush administration as the rationale for the Base Force.
The first act of the new Clinton administration was to study the issue, producing the Bottom
Up Review (BUR) Force. The Base Force and the BUR Force were both sized against the
requirement to fight two MTWs. This force-sizing requirement was revalidated in the 1997
Quadrennial Defense Review but continues to generate a great deal of controversy.
Depending on the point of view, the force structure associated with this posture is attacked for
4
being over-stuffed, unaffordable, or totally inadequate. The purpose of this chapter is to
examine force-planning techniques used to determine the appropriate means to successfully
execute U.S. defense and military strategy, and to suggest some options and adjustments that
force planners can apply in the future.

FORCE PLANNING METHODOLOGIES.
In designing forces to protect U.S. national interests, military planners must accomplish
three tasks: determine how much force is required to protect those interests with a certain
degree of assured success or a minimum degree of acceptable risk; determine how to posture
that force; and finally convince Congress and the public that the solutions for the first two
5
tasks are reasonably correct. The issue of creating well-reasoned force structure
requirements and convincing cost conscious politicians is not an inconsequential matter.
Since the advent of the Cold War, military planners have used two very different
6
force-planning methodologies. The easiest to conceptualize is threat-based planning. This
methodology is preeminent when threats to U.S. interests are easily recognized and
identified. The task for the planner is to postulate a reasonable scenario, or a specific military
contingency, then determine the amount of force needed to prevail in that scenario. This
approach lends itself to dynamic and static modeling and provides a quantifiable rationale for
the recommended force structure, and answers the question: Can the United States defeat
the opponent or prevail in the postulated contingencies? The logic of this approach is very
compelling and greatly facilitates accomplishing the planner’s third task—convincing the
public and Congress.
The second major methodology is generally referred to as capabilities-based planning.
Somewhat harder to conceptualize, analysts have proposed several variants of the same basic
theme. Capabilities-based planning is most in vogue when threats to U.S. interests are
multifaceted and uncertain, and do not lend themselves to single point scenario-based
analysis. Instead of focusing on one or more specific opponents, the planner applies a liberal
dose of military judgment to determine the appropriate mix of required military capabilities.
Capabilities-based planners claim to focus on objectives rather than scenarios. Forces are
sized either by a resource constraint emphasis (budget driven), or by focusing on generic
military missions required to protect U.S. interests. A major problem planners have with this
approach is convincing Congress that military judgment has established the proper linkage
7
between this uncertain future environment and the specific force levels requested. The
general characteristics of these two methodologies are summarized in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Force Planning Methodologies.

FORCE PLANNING IN THE COLD WAR.
Threat-based planning was the principal method employed to size U.S. forces during the
Cold War. With the acceptance by the National Security Council of NSC 68 on April 7, 1950,
the Soviet threat was clearly recognized. In the words of Secretary of State Acheson, the
Soviet Union confronted the United States with a “threat [which] combined the ideology of
communist doctrine and the power of the Russian state into an aggressive expansionist
8
drive.” The first task for military planners was to develop a strategic nuclear deterrent, both
to protect survival interests and to extend this deterrent to protect vital interests represented
by regional alliances, the most important of which was NATO. Military planners also
addressed the need for conventional forces. In accordance with the threat-based methodology,
war in central Europe became the dominant scenario. NATO developed a series of force goals
designed to counter a predetermined level of Soviet forces. In the Lisbon Agreement of
February 1952, for instance, the NATO ministers set a goal for 1954 of 9,000 aircraft and 90
9
divisions. President Eisenhower, however, desired “security with solvency” and had as one of
his administration’s principal goals, the cutting of the federal budget. To stabilize defense
spending, the “New Look” defense program de-emphasized conventional forces and stressed
the deterrent and war-fighting potential of nuclear weapons. The risk associated with
conventional force shortfalls was ameliorated by U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. Limited
war capabilities however, were not completely discounted. General Maxwell Taylor, while
Army Chief of Staff, established the requirement for the Army to be able “to close a corps of
three divisions in an overseas theater in two months,” with the necessary logistical backup to
10
fight those forces. Force planning in the fifties, although firmly grounded in threat-based
analysis, also contained important elements based on resource (Ike’s New Look) and mission
based capabilities analysis (Taylor’s corps).
The Kennedy administration discarded the “New Look” and adopted the concept of
“Flexible Response” as the foundation of its defense policy. At the center of “flexible response”
theory was the assumption that deterring and fighting with nonnuclear forces would reduce
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the likelihood of nuclear escalation. Secretary of Defense McNamara argued that the U.S.
needed a “two-and-one-half-war” conventional war capability sufficient to: mount a defense of
Western Europe against a Soviet attack; defend either Southeast Asia or Korea against a
11
Chinese attack; and still meet a contingency elsewhere. McNamara recognized the
challenges of conducting defense planning under uncertainty, notably the need for defense
programs to provide capabilities that would eventually be used in unforeseen contingencies.
From this arose the concept of rationalizing force structure in terms of the most stressing
12
threats (the Soviet Union and China), but training and equipping the forces for flexibility.
Army Chief of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, claimed:
. . .we have created versatile, and flexible general purpose forces which can be tailored to the requirements of emergency situations. For these purposes, the relatively new United States
Strike Command (STRICOM), has been provided eight combat-ready Army divisions, a commensurate amount of Tactical Air combat power, and the necessary airlift to cope with a number
13
of limited war situations.

STRICOM’s mission was to provide a general reserve of combat ready forces to reinforce
other unified commands, and plan and conduct contingency operations. McNamara used
contingency planning to hedge against uncertainty and reasoned that if U.S. forces could cope
with the most threatening contingencies, they should suffice to deal with the other,
14
unexpected challenges that might arise. Once again, force planners combined elements
from threat and capabilities based planning.
The Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations chose a less conservative strategy. As
National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger launched a reexamination of the assumptions of
the 2 ½- war strategy. The collapse of the Sino-Soviet bloc and recognition that the United
States had never generated the forces required for the 2 ½-war strategy, led to the adoption of
the 1 ½-war strategy. President Nixon outlined the rationale in his report to Congress in
February 1970:
In the effort to harmonize doctrine and capability, we chose what is best described as the “1
½-war” strategy. Under it we will maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, . . . and contending
15
with a contingency elsewhere.

Within this more conservative framework, planning under uncertainty was always a theme.
In 1976, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger employed multiple planning scenarios in his
guidance to the military departments, similar to the Illustrative Planning Scenarios of today.
The DoD Annual Report two years later noted that U.S. general purpose forces “must be
trained, equipped, and supplied so that they can deploy and fight in a wide variety of
16
environments against a range of possible foes.”
Flexibility in force planning was advanced further during the Carter administration. The
issue of regional contingencies was raised with a particular focus on the Persian Gulf. A 1979
DoD study identified a variety of threats and contingencies and proposed programs to provide
broad capabilities for the region without focusing on a single threat or scenario. This
capabilities-based effort eventually led to the formation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task
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Force and still later U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). After the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in December 1979, however, military planners turned almost exclusively to the
17
Soviet threat to Iran as the likely scenario for action in the Persian Gulf.
During the Reagan years military planning was much more clearly grounded in a
threat-based approach focused on possible global war with the Soviet Union. The Soviet
Union appeared to be capable of aggression in several theaters, and U.S. planning had to
consider the possibility of simultaneous wars in Southwest Asia and Central Europe. The
Office of the Secretary of Defense adopted a force sizing-scenario that postulated a Soviet
invasion of Iran as the initial event in such a global war. This scenario raised the possibility of
war with the Soviet Union on several fronts, either because of Soviet aggression in multiple
theaters or because the U.S. might escalate “horizontally” by conducting offensives in regions
18
of Soviet weakness. Despite this possibility of multifront operations however, it was clear
that the defense of central Europe was the dominant case for defining military requirements.
Nevertheless, the rapid deployment force (RDF) made continued progress during the Reagan
buildup. That the purpose and framework of this force were anchored in capabilities-based
planning was illustrated in the 1984 DoD Annual Report:
. . . we need a “rapid deployment capability” primarily for those areas of the world in which the U.S. has
little or no nearby military infrastructure or, in some cases, maintains no presence at all. There are
many locations where we might need to project force, not only in SWA and the Middle East, but also in
Africa, Central America, South America, the Caribbean, and elsewhere. Each of these areas has special requirements, but it would be too costly to try to tailor a unique force for each. Therefore we must
set priorities . . . and, at the same time, build flexible capabilities that can serve our needs in more than
19
one region.
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Figure 2. Cold War Force Planning.
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Force planning during the Reagan years, and indeed for all administrations during the
Cold War, was threat-based, but not to the exclusion of important contributions derived from
the capabilities-based approach. “Threat analysis was an important variable in the strategy
development process,” one RAND analyst concludes in this regard, “but it was far from the
20
only factor, or even the most important.” During the entire period, Secretaries of Defense
were consistently concerned with planning under uncertain conditions and thus made
regional distinctions and considered contingencies other than the standard Soviet attack on
21
Central Europe. In addition, U.S. Cold War force structure was generally large and diverse
22
enough to respond to numerous lesser-included contingencies. In the end, the combination
of force planning methods worked well for the U.S. in the Cold War. But, as Figure 2
demonstrates, it was the threat-based foundation that primarily contributed to the
widespread political support for decades of high defense spending.

POST-COLD WAR FORCE PLANNING.
“Uncertainty is not a mere nuisance requiring a bit of sensitivity analysis,” Paul Davis
23
points out; “it is a dominant characteristic of serious planning.” The U.S. military is well
aware of this fact, but has had difficulty during the current transition in selling it to Congress
and the public. The principal problem is the lack of the all-consuming threat that focused the
nation’s attention on the problem of containing the USSR for over four decades. This force
planning framework has evaporated in the post-Cold War era, leaving little agreement on
appropriate threats, contingencies, or required capabilities against which to focus the defense
establishment.

THE BASE FORCE.
In an effort to demonstrate military responsiveness to changes in the strategic and
budgetary environments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell,
developed the Base Force in the early 1990s. This force was considered the minimum force
that would still allow the armed forces to meet mission requirements with acceptable risk.
The Base Force was developed through a close-hold process by the Program and Budget
Analysis Division (PBAD) of the Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J-8)
of the Joint Staff, with little analytical support, or formal input from the Services or the
CINCs. The suspension of the Joint Strategic Review (JSR) process and the development of
the Base Force are manifestations of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and dramatically
demonstrated the shifting focus of the force planning process from the services to the Joint
24
Staff.
The Base Force straddled both the Soviet revolutions of 1988 and 1991, causing the
justification and rationale behind the chosen force levels to evolve over time. The initial focus
of the Base Force was on a capabilities-based approach to defense planning, driven largely by
resource constraints. As a result, the J5 strategists were given the task of determining:
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. . . whether J-8’s resource-driven force structure and the Chairman’s recommended force posture provided the capability to pursue US objectives. Thus he was to validate from a strategic perspective the
25
force structure that the J-8 had already validated from a programming and budgetary perspective.

The threat was very ill-defined at this point. “I’m running out of demons,” General Powell
commented in April 1991, “I’m running out of villains. . . . I’m down to Castro and Kim Il
26
Sung.” In such an environment, Powell stressed, there were some very real limitations to
threat-oriented contingency analysis. The resource-constrained force, he concluded, should
instead focus on the combat capabilities needed to ensure that a sufficient array of assets
27
would be present to perform the multiple missions demanded on the modern battlefield. The
mission-focused aspect of the Base Force was evident in the three conceptual conventional
force packages that eventually became part of the 1992 National Military Strategy (NMS)
(Figure 3). Forces for the Atlantic would include forward-based and forward deployed units
committed to Europe, and heavy reinforcing forces for Europe, the Middle East, and the
Persian Gulf based in the United States. The Pacific Forces differed from the Atlantic
package, reflecting the maritime character of the area. Contingency Forces would consist of
28
U.S. based ground, air, and naval forces capable of worldwide deployment as needed.
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Figure 3. Base Force.
Unfortunately, the advent of and ensuing focus on Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm precluded the Pentagon’s strategic planners from completing the analytical construct
behind the Base Force, a task that then-Representative Les Aspin was more than willing to
undertake. In the first of two national security papers, Aspin attacked capabilities-based
force planning, charging that decisions concerning what capabilities were required of U.S.
forces could not be done in a vacuum. Instead, he concluded, “. . . it is critical to identify threats
to U.S. interests that are sufficiently important that Americans would consider the use of
29
force to secure them.” Shortly thereafter, Aspin outlined in a second paper his concept of the
“Iraqi equivalent” as the generic threat measure for regional aggressors and the “Desert
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Storm equivalent” as the most robust building block for U.S. forces. The purpose was to
establish a clear linkage between the force structure and the sorts of threats the forces could
be expected to deal with. Aspin also envisioned his “threat-driven” methodology to be flexible
enough to include aspects of a typical capabilities-based approach. The building blocks for the
methodology, he pointed out, were generic capabilities.
Although each is informed by a careful review of pertinent historical cases, I am not suggesting
we acquire forces which would be suited only to a few places and precedents. I’m suggesting instead generic military capabilities which should be effective against the full spectrum of categor30
ical threats in the uncertain future.

At the same time, within the Pentagon, the rationale for the Base Force evolved into a
combined capabilities-based and threat-based approach and became firmly anchored to the
two-MTW requirement. In late 1992, General Powell began promoting the Base Force as both
capabilities oriented as well as threat oriented. In a few cases such as Korea and Southwest
Asia, he pointed out, it was possible to identify particular threats with some degree of
31
certainty. These developments had no effect on the regional focus of the force. In 1992,
Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney reported that, “the ability to respond to regional and
32
local crises is a key element of our new strategy.” The “Base Force” National Military
Strategy of 1992 concluded that U.S. “plans and resources are primarily focused on deterring
33
and fighting regional rather than global wars.” Although neither of these documents
specified a two-MTW requirement, the sizing function for this requirement continued to
evolve behind the scenes. Both the 1991 and 1992 Joint Military Net Assessments (JMNAs)
focused on the warfighting analysis for Major Regional Contingency-East
(MRC-East)—Southwest Asia, and MRC-West—Korea. According to Army force planners,
the principal focus of US operational planning was “regional crisis response—to include a
34
capability to respond to multiple concurrent major regional contingencies.” In his
autobiography General Powell clearly states what his National Military Strategy did not:
“The Base Force strategy called for armed forces capable of fighting two major regional
35
conflicts ‘nearly simultaneously.’”

THE BOTTOM UP REVIEW FORCE.
With a new administration, the Base Force title was jettisoned; but the underpinnings of
U.S. force structure remained largely intact. Upon assuming office, Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin initiated a comprehensive review of the nation’s defense strategy and force structure
and published the Report of the Bottom Up Review (BUR) in October 1993. The methodology
for the BUR combined all threat-based and capabilities-based aspects of the force-planning
methodologies. To begin with, there was the traditional assessment of threats and
opportunities, the formulation of a strategy to protect and advance U.S. interests, and the
determination of the forces needed to implement the strategy. At the same time, there was an
evaluation of military missions that included fighting MTWs, conducting smaller scale
operations, maintaining overseas presence, and deterring attacks with weapons of mass
destruction. The ultimate force-sizing criterion was to “maintain sufficient military power to
be able to win two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously.” The planning
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and assessment for these MTWs were based on two illustrative scenarios viewed as
representative yardsticks with which to assess in “gross terms the capabilities of U.S.
36
forces.” From this perspective, the BUR continued the dual focus on both threat and
capabilities that had evolved in the Base Force. “The Clinton defense policy,” noted RAND
analyst Richard L. Kugler points out,
represents continuity rather than a revolutionary departure, for the changes it makes are relatively
small. . . . The chief difference lies in the new policy’s call for a smaller conventional posture, but only
37
10-15 percent smaller than the Bush administration’s Base Force.

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR) AND THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE PANEL (NDP).
Despite a degree of continuity and general agreement within the nation’s defense
establishment concerning the overall framework for the size and posture of U.S. military
forces, planners continued to have difficulty with their third task—convincing Congress and
the public. The greatest difficulty was persuading Congress that the Pentagon was
sufficiently focused on the 21st century and preparing the military to execute the most likely
conflicts. As a result, in 1996 Congress passed legislation directing the Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a review of the U.S. defense program
and provide a report in 1997. Their review was directed to include
a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, in38
frastructure, budget plan and other elements of the defense program . . .

Congress also provided for an independent body of defense experts, designated the National
Defense Panel, to both review and comment on the QDR, as well as look slightly further into
the future.
The QDR was designed as a strategy-driven review and upon its completion to serve as the
overall strategic planning document for the Defense Department. From a force planner’s
perspective the key features of the QDR were the newly articulated defense strategy of
“shape, respond and prepare,” and several refinements to force sizing and planning
considerations. However, the bottom-line remained an overall requirement “that U.S. forces
39
must be capable of fighting and winning two major theater wars nearly simultaneously.”
The shape-respond-prepare strategy recognized the requirements for U.S. military forces
to operate in support of U.S. interests across the entire spectrum of operations, from
peacetime to wartime. Military forces assist in shaping the international environment
through overseas presence, rotational deployments, and various military-to-military
programs. Shaping requirements have normally been viewed as a lesser-included capability
provided by a larger war-time focused structure. The QDR, however, specifically indicated
that the overseas presence mission plays a significant role in determining the size of U.S.
40
naval forces. Responding to the full spectrum of crises, to include major theater wars,
remained the most stressing requirement. Although the QDR revalidated the centrality of a
2-MTW force structure, it also placed increased emphasis on capabilities needed for smaller
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scale contingencies (SSC). These contingencies are viewed as the most likely challenge for
U.S. forces, and the QDR noted a requirement to be able to conduct multiple concurrent
41
smaller-scale contingency operations. One of the difficulties in using this approach as a
force structure determinant, however, is that while the military is relatively confident that it
knows the types and quantity of forces needed to fight an MTW, it is much less certain of what
is needed for SSCs that have a wide variety of objectives and occur in diverse regions of the
42
world. The Joint staff sponsored the Dynamic Commitment wargame series that attempted
to identify and quantify a list of military capabilities for smaller scale contingencies. These
capabilities, however, are still viewed as a lesser-included subset of the MTW force.
The QDR’s analysis continued to represent a blend of threat-based and capabilities-based
planning. The principal scenarios remain focused on the threat posed by regional aggressors
on the scale of Iraq or North Korea. A slightly expanded scenario set was used to examine
threat use of asymmetric strategies, differences in warning time, U.S. force size, and the
degree of commitment to ongoing SSCs. The QDR also tested projected capabilities against a
range of more challenging threats—a postulated major regional power in the 2014 timeframe.
In addition, generic scenarios used a threat force based on the projected capabilities of nations
not currently allied with the United States. As the report concludes, “this analysis enabled us
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to test our projected capabilities against a range of more challenging threats.”
The report of the National Defense Panel highlighted another dilemma faced by force
planners—building forces for the present or focusing on future requirements. Concerning the
present, the NDP acknowledged that the United States cannot afford to ignore near-term
threats and that “the two-theater construct has been a useful mechanism for determining
what forces to retain as the Cold War came to a close, [and] to some degree, it remains a useful
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mechanism today.” But the panel also argued that today’s threats are not necessarily the
ones the U.S. will face in the future, expressing concern that the two MTW construct is
becoming an inhibitor to achieving the capabilities needed in the 2010-2020 time frame. The
panel suggested a fundamental change: “The United States needs a transformation strategy
that enables us to meet a range of security challenges in 2010-2020 without taking undue risk
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in the interim.”
Before leaving this brief look at recent force structure reviews, one additional effort
deserves mention as a significant capabilities-based force design effort. At the same time that
the United states was engaged in the QDR and NDP, the United Kingdom was also trying to
determine the appropriate size and posture for its military forces to respond to the changing
environment of the 21st Century. Their effort was called the Strategic Defence Review (SDR).
Although the QDR and SDR followed similar processes, the report of the SDR is valuable
because it is much more detailed and transparent. Beginning with a policy review that
identified national interests and commitments, the SDR focused on specific missions and
military tasks and assessed the forces and capabilities needed to conduct those tasks. The
capabilities assessments relied primarily on a concept called “scale of effort.” Scales of effort
are planning tools that postulate a projected size of an operation, for example, a medium scale
operation is a brigade size deployment similar to Bosnia, and a large scale operation is a
division size deployment similar to the contribution to the Persian Gulf war. Planners
determined the force elements required for each military task given assumptions about the
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scale of effort. This approach is similar to the Dynamic Commitment wargame mentioned
above, however, in this case, the force elements for each task—the lesser-included
requirements—are clearly delineated in attached tables. The detailed capabilities
assessment was validated by scenario-based analysis of medium and large scale force
projection operations. The overall force sizing construct was a requirement to conduct two
concurrent medium scale operations or one full scale operation. The SDR concluded that “not
to be able to conduct two medium scale operations at the same time would be an unacceptable
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constraint on our ability to discharge Britain’s commitments and responsibilities.” The
SDR is probably the closest model available of a detailed capabilities-based planning effort,
and yet it also relied on scenario-based analysis for validation.

TWO-MTW RATIONALE.
In examining the rationale for the two-MTW requirement, it is important to remember
that the requirement is not a strategy, but represents the sizing function for the Clinton
administration’s defense program—the principal determinant of the size and composition of
U.S. conventional forces. The nature of this sizing function was clearly articulated by Defense
Secretary William Perry in 1996:
Previously, our force structure was planned to deter a global war with the Soviet Union, which we considered a threat to our very survival as a nation. All other threats, including regional threats, were
considered lesser-but-included cases . . . Today, the threat of global conflict is greatly diminished, but
the danger of regional conflict is neither lesser nor included and has therefore required us to take this
47
danger explicitly into account in structuring our forces.

The current version of the two-MTW requirement states that the principal determinant of the
size and composition of U.S. conventional forces is the capability
preferably in concert with allies, . . . to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border ag48
gression in two distant theaters in overlapping timeframes.

Inherent in the acceptance of the 2-MTW force-sizing requirement is the recognition that the
U.S. will not be able to conduct sizable contingency operations at the same time it is fighting
49
in two major theaters.
Three principal reasons for this sizing function have emerged during the post-Cold War
period. First, as a nation with global interests, the U.S. needs to field a military capability to
avoid a situation in which it lacks the forces to deter aggression in one region while fighting in
another. “With this capability,” the BUR points out,
we will be confident, and our allies as well as potential enemies will know, that a single regional conflict
50
will not leave our interests and allies in other regions at risk.

The historical evidence in support of the 2-MTW requirement is much stronger than
detractors are willing to acknowledge. There have been, for instance, 22 nearly simultaneous
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crises requiring the deployment and use of military force from 1946 to 1991. The likelihood
of such occurrences has increased in the absence of the Cold War superpower restraints.
A second reason is that a force capable of defeating two regional adversaries should
provide the basic wherewithal to support a defense against a larger-than-expected threat
from, as examples, continental-scale adversaries such as Russia or China, or a coalition of
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regional opponents. Although a peer competitor is not envisioned in the near term, the
possibility of confrontations with a larger than MTW threat must be guarded against. This
hedge against uncertainty is also required as a practical matter because of the time needed to
reconstitute a larger force. “If we were to discard half of this two-MTW capability or allow it to
decay,” the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, concluded a few
years back, “it would take many years to rebuild a force of comparable excellence. In today’s
turbulent international environment, where the future posture of so many powerful nations
54
remains precarious, we could find ourselves with too little, too late.”
Finally, the 2-MTW sizing function recognizes the increased operational deployment of
American forces and allows the U.S. to deter latent threats from regional adversaries when
portions of the force are committed to important smaller-scale contingencies and engagement
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activities in other theaters. Although U.S. participation in smaller-scale contingency
operations should not be viewed as a given, if the National Command Authorities (NCA)
decide to commit U.S. forces to such operations, the strategy and force structure, as sized by
the 2-MTW requirement, could adequately support that commitment.

FORCE PLANNING INTO THE 21st CENTURY.
Force planning in the 21st century is destined to be as controversial and thus as difficult as
it has been in the 1990s. A clear understanding of two issues should make the job easier:
mission, and the use of scenarios. The strategy formulation process around which the
chapters of this book are built clearly emphasizes interest-based, and in turn strategy-driven
analysis.

MISSION.
Without an agreement on the mission or strategy, force planning will continue to
disappoint. Unfortunately, at the present juncture there is little agreement concerning the
mission of the armed forces. The on-going debate has two dimensions: shaping and
peacekeeping versus warfighting; and current versus future focus. Numerous politicians,
defense analysts and several senior military leaders have concluded that the two-MTW
requirement should be adjusted to specifically include force-sizing for peace operations. This
argument is based on the experiences of the first decade of the post-Cold War period. During
that time the operational commitment of U.S. military forces has increased 300 percent, and
the vast majority of those deployments have been at the low end of the spectrum of
conflict—shaping activities and smaller scale contingencies, not MTWs. Jeffrey Record
argues that the 2-MTW force has little relevance in a world in which a “modern-day version of
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imperial policing is likely to consume much of U.S. military effort.” The most recent
articulation of this position was contained in the Phase II report of the U.S. Commission on
National Security/21st Century, entitled “Seeking a National Strategy: A Concept for
Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom.” The report claims that:
the “two major theater wars” yardstick for sizing U.S. forces is not producing the capabilities needed
for the varied and complex contingencies now occurring and likely to increase in the years ahead.

It calls for a portion of U.S. force structure to be specifically tailored to humanitarian relief
57
and constabulary missions. Two noted RAND analysts have proposed replacing the
two-MTW criteria with three simultaneous sizing criteria: force needs for environment
shaping; force needs for one tough MRC plus stability operations in other theaters; and force
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needs for two “moderately difficult MRCs.” Even the Defense Department has begun to
waver on the issue slightly. The most recent edition of the DoD Annual Report, in addressing
the use of military force in support of primarily humanitarian interests, has removed the
previous qualifier that “the U.S. military is generally not the best means of addressing a
59
crisis.” This shift in emphasis is further supported by a focus on peacetime military
engagement (PME) activities as the “best way” of reducing the sources of conflict and shaping
60
the international environment.
Strong voices, however, remain on the other side of the issue. General Shelton, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated that the U.S. military should not carve out a portion of its
force structure exclusively to handle peacekeeping missions because those operations could
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quickly escalate into situations that only trained warfighters could handle. Chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee, Floyd Spence, in rejecting the Commission on National
Security’s call to abandon the two-MTW yardstick, indicated that he fundamentally disgreed
“with those who advocate shifting the composition of our armed forces toward peacekeeping
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and humanitarian operations at the expense of warfighting capabilities." The need for a
versatile and flexible force capable of responding and executing a wide range of missions is
clearly recognized. The disagreement concerns where on the operational spectrum should
risk be assumed—high end (major theater war) or low end (peacekeeping or humanitarian
operations)—or how to posture the force to minimize risk. Force planners will have a hard
time developing an acceptable force structure in the absence of consensus on this issue.
Force planners also must resolve the issue of whether to focus their efforts on the current
threat or future threats. According to the NDP:
. . . we must anticipate that future adversaries will learn from the past and confront us in very different
ways. Thus we must be willing to change as well or risk having forces ill-suited to protect our security
twenty years in the future. The United States needs to launch a transformation strategy now that will
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enable it to meet a range of security challenges in 2010 to 2020.

Proponents of this view contend that the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) will have
profound effects on the way wars are fought. This model would replace the 2-MTW force with
a “silicon-based” superior force that would be smaller and more flexible, emphasizing
mobility, speed and agility. Warfighters would benefit from technological achievements in
stealth, precision weapons, surveillance, and dominant battlefield awareness. Most RMA
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proponents also contend that at present the U.S. has a threat deficit and therefore can afford
to cut force structure and focus on research and development of new “sunrise systems,”
64
experimentation and innovation. Critics claim that both the QDR and NDP failed to propose
innovative and long-term changes in the defense program. General Shalikashvili’s response
to such criticism brings the issue full circle back to risk assessment and how that risk should
be allocated over time:
My admonition was that we need to do what we need to do to remain capable of defending our
country and winning our nation’s wars. I didn’t want to get an award for innovation’s sake. I
didn’t want anyone gambling with our nation’s security just so we could be called great innova65
tors.

PLANNING SCENARIOS FOR MAJOR THEATER WAR.
It is clear that elements of both the threat-based and capabilities-based approaches must
be applied to force planning. This is even more the case in periods of increased uncertainty, as
demonstrated by the Base Force and the BUR. Scenarios are extremely useful to the force
planner as a yardstick against which to measure the capabilities of the force. Because they
reflect key aspects of future challenges the U.S. might face, well-chosen scenarios help to
ensure that the yardstick used has some relationship to reality. It is also important to keep in
mind that no single scenario (or pair of scenarios) will ever be completely adequate to assess
force capabilities.
Does the use of scenarios, as assessment tools constitute “threat-based planning?” That
common question can best be answered by posing another: “Is it possible to do serious force
planning without reference, either explicitly or implicitly, to some scenarios?” The answer to
the second question is clearly no. Any force structure must ultimately be judged against some
expected set of operational requirements—those things that the force is expected to be able to
66
do. This is simply another way of saying “scenarios.” Nevertheless, just because scenarios
are used, the label “scenario-based” or “threat-based” planning should not be accepted.
Critics of the 2-MTW framework claim that the use of canonical scenarios (one in
Southwest Asia and one in Korea) suppress uncertainty and do not satisfactorily measure the
adequacy of U.S. force posture. Proposals include using an expanded scenario set, to include
nonstandard scenarios, and examining the “scenario-space” within that set of scenarios to
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determine capability envelopes. Scenario-space implies the iteration of numerous scenario
characteristics, such as alternative force levels (threat and friendly), buildup rates, military
strategies and warning time—thereby generating a range of required capabilities.
Nonetheless, the canonical scenarios—Korea and the Persian Gulf—are clearly the most
stressful and dangerous near-term contingencies, and have served the U.S. well by creating a
68
requirement for high-mobility forces and a diverse posture. But if fine-tuning military
capabilities requires a broader look, it may be appropriate to expand the scenario set and use
a scenario-space concept to examine all relevant factors.
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Reassessing the scenarios must also include relooking the threats used in the planning
scenarios. The Iraq and North Korean scenarios remain the most demanding, but in each case
69
threat capability is declining. In addition, the potential for opponents’ adopting
asymmetrical strategies could pose different security challenges than those currently
contained in the MTW planning scenarios. Iran’s purchase of Kilo-class submarines and its
improved anti-ship missiles is one example. Finally, the near-term transformation of China
into a “peer competitor” remains a concern that should be assessed in future planning
scenarios.
These factors highlight the dynamic nature and the importance of continuing to reassess
potential threats to U.S. interests. Adopting the scenario-space concept should account for
dynamic threat assessments and provide a more robust planning tool with which to examine
force requirements.

CONCLUSION.
Force planning has been and always will be a very dynamic process. Consequently, as the
strategic environment changes or as the understanding of its uncertainties matures, and as
both threat and friendly military capabilities evolve, there should be adjustments to the
defense program.
Force planning, particularly when it is done correctly, represents the purest application of
the strategic art—calculating a variable mix of ends, ways, and means. In a world
characterized by uncertainty and regional instability, in which the United States has security
interests that are truly global in scope, the ends are fairly clear although difficult to achieve.
As the United States enters the 21st Century, the ways and means to achieve those strategic
ends continue to be expressed by the 2-MTW framework. That framework is founded on a
logical integration of threat and capabilities-based planning. Planners need to adapt that
framework as necessary to accommodate appropriate adjustments. New approaches to
planning scenarios offer the potential for such adjustment concerning the “ways” of the
strategic paradigm, while force thinning and modernization are two important categories for
adjusting the affordability of the strategic “means.”
The experience of more than 40 years of force planning indicates that elements of both
threat-based and capabilities-based planning must be applied. Figure 4 summarizes the force
planning process and illustrates the integration of threat-based and capabilities-based
planning.
Drawing on the logic of threat-based planning, the force planner needs realistic scenarios
as a yardstick against which to measure the capabilities of a force. Adjusting the existing
canonical-MTW scenarios by adopting a scenario-space approach can better ensure that all
relative factors and resultant requirements are considered. As shown in the center of Figure 4
and reiterated in the NSS and NMS, the focus of force planning should remain on the
evaluation of the major theater planning cases. The vast majority of force requirements are
derived from these primary cases. However, it is also necessary to examine the full range of
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Figure 4. Force Planning.
missions directed by the National Security Strategy, such as smaller scale contingencies and
overseas presence missions in order to ensure that all unique force elements have been
identified. Most of the U.S. forces forward deployed constitute a deterrent posture
safeguarding areas of vital interest. Thus, in those areas, these forces represent the initial
crisis response portion of the MTW force. Likewise, most of the force structure elements
required to execute and sustain SSCs are derived from the 2-MTW force. Nevertheless, in
both cases there may be unique requirements or higher demands for certain assets not
otherwise identified. Finally, resource constraints must be applied to examine the internal
characteristics of the force posture and to build an affordable defense program.
The central role played by objectives in planning has been clearly demonstrated. At every
level, from the President’s National Security Strategy down to an individual Service’s
assessment of priorities, the first step in planning is to state explicitly what is to be
accomplished. In addition, any useful defense planning exercise must be completed within
the context of the anticipated budgetary resources available for defense. In the end, as
Richard Kugler points out, integration of threat-based planning with the two types of
capability-based planning ensures a process that operates in positive symbiosis:
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The central argument advanced here is that mission-based capability analysis can help gauge requirements for the U.S. conventional posture, and help build public understanding of why sizable forces are
needed in an era when threats to U.S. interests are unclear. This is not to imply, however, that this
methodology should entirely replace the other two approaches. Threat-based contingency analysis will
still be needed to examine specific conflicts to which U.S. forces might be committed, and resource-based capability analysis will be needed to examine the internal characteristics of the force posture. The three methodologies thus are best used in tandem, as a package of techniques that can work
70
together to shed illuminating light on conventional force needs.

Force planners and strategists must rely on an appropriate mix of threat and
capability-based planning that will allow the United States to achieve its strategic objectives
and provide the U.S. political leadership with the answer to the question, “how much is
enough?”
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CHAPTER 13
TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF MILITARY STRATEGY
Arthur F. Lykke, Jr.
What is military strategy? In ancient Greece, it was the “art of the general.” In its Glossary
of Military Terms, the U.S. Army War College lists eight definitions of military strategy. This
highlights the first of many problems in the study of this important but complex subject.
There is no universal definition, nor even the approximation of a consensus. Today the term
strategy is used altogether too loosely. Some consider a strategy to be lines drawn on a map
while others believe a laundry list of national objectives represents a strategy. The problem is
not just semantics; it is one of using competently, one of the most essential tools of the military
profession. In trying to decide between alternative strategies, we are often faced with a
comparison of apples and oranges, because the choices do not address the same factors. Only
with a mutual understanding of what comprises military strategy can we hope to improve our
strategic dialogue. There needs to be general agreement on a conceptual approach to military
strategy: a definition; a description of the basic elements that make up military strategy; and
an analysis of how they are related. For the purpose of this discussion, we will use the
definition approved by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff:
The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy
1
by the application of force, or the threat of force.

During a visit to the U. S. Army War College in 1981, General Maxwell D. Taylor
characterized strategy as consisting of objectives, ways and means. We can express this
concept as an equation:

Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means.
Component
Ends
Ways
Means

Definition
Objectives towards which one
strives
Course of action
Instruments by which some end can
be achieved

This general concept can be used as a basis for the formulation of any type strategy—military,
political, economic, etc., depending upon the element of national power employed. We should
not confuse military strategy with national (grand) strategy, which is:
The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a na2
tion, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.
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Military strategy is one part of this all-encompassing national strategy. The military
component of our national strategy is sometimes referred to as national military
strategy—military strategy at its highest level, and differentiated from operational
strategies used as the basis for military planning and operations. Military strategy must
support national strategy and comply with national policy—a broad course of action or
statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national
3
objectives. In turn, national policy is influenced by the capabilities and limitations of
military strategy.
With our general concept of strategy as a guide, Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means, we can
develop an approach to military strategy. “Ends” can be expressed as military objectives and
“Ways” are concerned with the various methods of applying military force. In essence, this
becomes an examination of courses of action (termed military strategic concepts) that are
designed to achieve the military objective. “Means” refers to the military resources
(manpower, material, money, forces, logistics, etc.) required to accomplish the mission. This
leads us to the conclusion that:
Military Strategy = Military Objectives + Military
Strategic Concepts + Military Resources.
This conceptual approach is applicable to all three levels of war: strategic, operational,
and tactical. It also reveals the fundamental similarities among national military strategy,
operational art, and tactics. Strategists, planners, corps commanders and squad leaders are
all concerned with ways to employ means to achieve ends.
Some readers may question this idea, thinking that while military resources are
necessary to support a strategy, they are not a component of that strategy. They would limit
military strategy to a consideration of military objectives and military strategic concepts.
However, in discussing the importance of superiority of numbers, Clausewitz states that the
4
size of military forces “is indeed a vital part of strategy.” And Bernard Brodie points out the
5
“Strategy in peacetime is expressed largely in choices among weapons systems...” By
considering military resources as a basic element of military strategy, we may also alleviate
the problem of disregarding the importance of military objectives and strategic concepts while
concentrating mainly on force structure issues.
There are two levels of military strategy: operational and force developmental. Strategies
based on existing military capabilities are operational strategies and are used as a foundation
for the formulation of specific plans for action in the short-range time period. This level of
strategy has also been referred to as higher or grand tactics and operational art.
Longer-range strategies may be based on estimates of future threats, objectives, and
requirements, and are therefore not as constrained by current force posture. Military
strategies can be regional as well as global, concerning themselves with specific threat
scenarios. These longer-range strategies are more often global in nature, and may require
improvements in military capabilities.
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Military objectives and military strategic concepts of a military strategy establish
requirements for resources, and are in turn influenced by the availability of resources. If we
fail to consider military resources as an element of military strategy, we may be faced with
what has been called a strategy-capabilities mismatch. This is the usual case when we are
developing a long-range strategy requiring improved military force structure capabilities.
However, it may be disastrous if we are concerned with an operational strategy upon which
contingency plans and military operations will be based. That is why operational strategies
must be based on capabilities.
Let’s discuss the first basic element of any military strategy—a military objective. It is
defined as a specific mission or task to which military efforts and resources are applied.
Several examples come to mind:
1. Deter aggression,
2. Protect lines of communication,
3. Defend the homeland,
4. Restore lost territory, and
5. Defeat an opponent.
The objectives should be military in nature. While Clausewitz, Lenin, and Mao have all
emphasized the integral relationship of war and politics, military forces must be given
appropriate missions within their capabilities. Liddell Hart stresses that:
In discussing the subject of “the objective” in war it is essential to be clear about, and to keep clear in
our minds, the distinction between the political and the military objective. The two are different but
not separate. For nations do not wage war for war’s sake, but the pursuance of policy. The military objective is only the means to a political end. Hence the military objective should be governed by the political objective, subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand what is militarily—that, is
6
practically—impossible.

In our definition of military strategy, the ultimate objectives are those of national policy.
Sometimes policy guidance is unclear, ambiguous or difficult to find. National policy also
concerns itself with all the basic elements of national power: political, economic,
socio-pyschological, and military. To make things even more interesting, national policies in
these various fields are often overlapping, and may even be contradictory. There are seldom
“purely military” or “purely political” objectives. National leaders may choose to use the
military instrument of power in pursuit of national policy objectives that are primarily
political or economic in nature. This can cause problems because sometimes-military force is
not the appropriate tool. Military commanders may then have difficulty in deriving feasible
military objectives from the objectives of national policy.
Now for an examination of a military strategic concept. It can be defined as the course of
7
action accepted as the result of the estimate of the strategic situation. Military strategic
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concepts may combine a wide range of options, such as: forward defense (forward basing
and/or forward deployment, strategic reserves, reinforcements, show of force, prepositioned
stocks, collective security, and security assistance. These are a few of the ways military forces
can be used either unilaterally or in concert with allies. The determination of strategic
concepts is of major importance. However, one should not make the mistake of calling a
strategic concept a strategy. Strategic concepts must always be considered in relation to
military objectives and resources.
Finally, we should study the “Means” portion—the military resources that determine
capabilities of our military strategy equation. These may include conventional
general-purpose forces, strategic and tactical nuclear forces, defensive and offensive forces,
active and reserve forces, war materiel and weapons systems as well as manpower. We should
also take into consideration the roles and potential contributions of our allies and friends. The
total force package must be well rounded with combat, combat support, and combat service
support elements that are adequately equipped and sustained. Depending upon the type of
strategy we are developing, the forces we consider employing may or may not currently exist.
In short-range operational strategies, the forces must exist. In longer-range force
developmental strategies, the strategic concepts determine the type of forces that should
exist and the way they are employed.

Figure 1. A Model for Military Strategy.
Now that we have looked at the basic elements of military strategy, let’s try to put them
together is some meaningful way. Figure 1 shows one possible model. National Security, our
most vital interest, is supported on a three-legged stool entitled Military Strategy. The three
legs of the stool are labeled Objectives, Concepts, and Resources. This simple analogy leads to
the observation that the legs must be balanced, or national security may be in jeopardy
(Figure 2). If military resources are not compatible with strategic concepts or commitments
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and/or are not matched by military capabilities, we may be in trouble. The angle of tilt
represents risk, further defined as the possibility of loss or damage, or of not achieving an
objective. It is, of course, the duty of the military to determine if there is risk associated with a
strategy and the degree of risk. It is also the duty of the military to bring it clearly and
forcefully to the attention of civilian leaders.To ensure national security, the three “legs” of
military strategy must not only exist, they must be balanced.

Figure 2. Unbalanced Military Objectives, Concepts, and Resources
May Jeopardize National Security.
Let us test our model with an example to see if it is useful in explaining military strategy.
The Carter Doctrine was a statement of national policy:
Let our position be absolutely clear. An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf
Region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. Such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

Let’s devise a military strategy to carry out this policy. One implied objective is securing
access to our Persian Gulf oil supplies. This economic/political objective must first be
translated into military objectives, such as maintaining freedom of passage through the
Strait of Hormuz and defending key oil fields, refineries, and ports. The strategic concept
might be by means of a rapid deployment force from our strategic reserves. But do we have
sufficient strategic mobility and power projection capabilities in place today to keep the stool
level? Which leg needs to be adjusted? Military resources? It may take years to program and
produce the required airlift and sealift forces. In order to have a feasible short-range
operational strategy, it may be wiser to change the strategic concept to that of forward defense
and station or deploy more U. S. military forces in the region.
Perhaps we have examined the subject of military strategy in sufficient depth to arrive at
some initial conclusions on its nature. First, it is not the title of a strategy that is important;
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it’s the content that counts. The names are often changed for cosmetic reasons reflecting little
substantive alteration. A study of history shows that military strategies have been identified
by a wide variety of labels such as: the “Massive Retaliation” of the Eisenhower
Administration, the “Flexible Response" of the Kennedy Administration, and the more recent
“Realistic Deterrence”. We had the “2 ½-war strategy” of the Johnson Administration
changing to a “1 ½-war strategy” following the Sino-Soviet split and the realization that
buying a military force in time of peace that could fight 2 ½ wars simultaneously was just too
costly. These latter examples of strategic statements describe procurement guidelines for a
force structure rather than military strategies. Other names for strategies over the years
have been attrition, annihilation, counter value, counter force, deterrence, warfighting,
direct and indirect approach, search and destroy, oil spot, assured destruction, containment,
and countervailing.
One should remember that under ideal circumstances military objectives and strategic
concepts determine force structure and worldwide deployments of military forces. However,
the capabilities and limitations of the military forces in being necessarily affect military
objectives and strategic concepts. Military strategy may be declaratory or actual. In other
words, as stated by our leaders, it may or may not be our real strategy. U.S. military strategy
has seldom been clearly expressed, and infrequently described in sufficient detail for all to
understand. Some say that it is unwise, impossible, or even dangerous to enunciate openly a
military strategy. This very act may limit our options in a crisis situation, or tip-off our
potential adversaries on what our actions might be. A nation may need more than one military
strategy at a time. For instance, if a nation has only a deterrent strategy, and deterrence fails,
what does it do then? Surrender? Submit to piecemeal attacks and incremental losses?
Unleash a massive strategic nuclear attack? These are some of the options if it does not also
have a warfighting strategy. Military strategy can change rapidly and frequently, since
objectives can change in an instant. However, it takes much longer to alter the military forces
so that they may be responsive to new objectives and concepts.
In summary, military strategy consists of the establishment of military objectives, the
formulation of military strategic concepts to accomplish the objectives, and the use of military
resources to implement the concepts. When any of these basic elements is incompatible with
the others, our national security may be in danger.
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CHAPTER 14
STRATEGIC RISK
James F. Holcomb, Jr.
In a tactical situation one is able to see at least half the problem with the naked eye, whereas in strat1
egy everything has to be guessed at and presumed.

The hierarchical chart of the Army War College strategy formulation model at Appendix I,
shows a final block labeled “Risk Assessment.” The implication of the diagram is that risk
assessment is peculiar to the development of military strategy. Indeed, it figures prominently
in that process, but not uniquely so. Policy and strategy properly arrived at, demand a
continuous and thorough assessment and reassessment of risk throughout the total process.
Strategists and strategic theorists throughout history have grappled with the concept of
risk and methodologies for its assessment. The motivation to eliminate uncertainty in policy
and strategy development as well as execution is natural if at times chimerical. There will
always be uncertainty. It often will be unmeasurable. The very nature of war and conflict and
the increasingly complex strategic environment ensures that this is so. Where then does this
leave the aspiring student of strategy? Is risk assessment simply the “comfort level that
2
senior planners experience as they assess key variables?” It is this and more. The concept of
risk assessment is worth examining in more detail to put some substance to the form.

DEFINING RISK.
Defining risk is a relatively simple task. John Collins, in his primer on grand strategy,
reduces it to its essentials: “Discrepancies between ends, which we have identified as
interests and objectives, and means-available resources-create risks, which can rarely be
3
quantified.” At its core, risk arises when ends and means are not in consonance. This is
known as an “ends-means mismatch.” Collins is on solid ground with this definition, the
legacy of which springs from Clausewitz and his discussion of “the political object of war and
4
the effort to be made.” B. H. Liddell-Hart also focused on this basic truth: “Strategy depends
for success, first and most, on a sound calculation and coordination of the end and the means
5
. . . An excess may be as harmful as a deficiency.” Strategic risk then is the probability of
failure in achieving a strategic objective at an acceptable cost. The concept is simple to
articulate and easy to understand. But, as in war, the simplest things in strategy are the most
difficult.
The first difficulty is in understanding what Clausewitz and others meant by “means” in
the ends-means equation. Current use of the term generally accepts that means constitute
resources, that is, personnel, treasure, equipment, political will, time and so on. Clausewitz
also intended a larger meaning that includes concepts or courses of action to achieve
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particular objectives; these coupled with resources constitute the means or “effort to be
6
made.” It has become increasingly useful to separate these two components of Clausewitz’
“means”, for consideration in strategy formulation without confusing Clausewitz’ original
intent. Consequently, risk can be represented by a mismatch in ends and ways or means.
Art Lykke makes the case for this approach in Chapter 12, developing a model comprising
three variables: ends (objectives), ways (concepts, options or courses of action for achieving
them) and means (resources). Using a simple metaphor of a three legged stool, he points out
that if the ends, ways and means (the legs of the stool) are not of equal length then we are left
with a stool (and a strategy) that is out of balance. Continuing the analogy, he defines this
angle of imbalance as risk. The greater the mismatch between ends, ways and/or means, the
greater the risk of not achieving ones objectives. This is a subtle but important addition to the
simple ends-means equation. One can correctly and accurately identify the objective to be
achieved and provide adequate resources to achieve it. However, if the “way” of achieving it is
not in balance then there is an inherent risk of failure to achieve the strategic objective. For
example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis the objective of the Kennedy administration was
fairly straightforward: Get the missiles out of Cuba. The means available were adequate and
deliverable. However, there were several different ways to achieve the objective. Graham
Allison identifies six major categories of possible response: Do nothing, apply diplomatic
pressure, secretly approach Castro, conduct an invasion, conduct air strikes, or
7
blockade. One can also see this in the continuing debate over the strategy for Kosovo and the
use solely of airpower to achieve particular political objectives. In the Lykke model of the
stool, the balance varies depending on which option is chosen. The degree of lopsidedness or
imbalance defines risk. Choosing the right policy option (or way) to achieve the strategic
objective is therefore a critical consideration even assuming a clear objective and adequate
means. That is, an adequately resourced “way” that is inappropriate to the “end” would still
create risk of failure to achieve the strategic objective.
Thus, the definition of risk is the degree to which strategic objectives, concepts and
resources are in or out of balance. Since strategy is a dynamic process, one must understand
that all three elements are variable and subject to change over time. The formulation of
effective strategy for any endeavor is a constant quest to ensure balance among the variables.
The definition applies to all aspects of strategy development whether dealing with national
security (grand) strategy, defense, military or theater strategies, business strategy or even
personal strategies.

WHY IS STRATEGIC RISK ASSESSMENT DIFFICULT?
The subtitle is borrowed from David Jablonsky’s piece “Why is Strategy Difficult?” (see
Chapter 11). The very nature of war and conflict presupposes a relationship between thinking
adversaries. This, in turn, ensures that a degree of ambiguity, uncertainty and yes, risk will
exist in any developed strategy. Indeed, Clausewitz devotes the central theme of On War to
this very premise; that is what distinguishes his work from his predecessors and ensures its
continued relevance to the present day. Clausewitz was not the only one to recognize the
subjective nature of war, but he was the first to mark that characteristic as preeminent.
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Throughout his work, there are allusions to “chance,” “luck,” “guesswork,” “uncertainty,”
“probabilities,” and so on. The search for hard truths is a frustrating one. This in itself is a
lesson. The analogies and metaphors the Prussian philosopher provides to help understand
the nature of war are not based on chess, but reflect “a duel on a larger scale,” “a pair of
wrestlers,” “commerce,” a “collision of living forces” or a “game of chance.” Formulating
strategy presupposes “an animate object that reacts” and moreover, reacts unpredictably.
This equates to Andre Beufre’s definition of strategy as the “art of the dialectic of two opposing
8
wills using force to solve their dispute.” Just as one actor identifies objectives, develops
concepts and allocates resources, so does the potential or actual adversary. The variables in
the strategic equation have now doubled, further complicating the task. Moreover, ambiguity
and uncertainty increase as one climbs up the strategic ladder as moral factors gain primacy
9
over material ones. The problem is that these moral factors can only be guessed at.
Clausewitz explicitly refers to this transition from certainty to uncertainty in strategic
analysis:
At this point, then, intellectual activity leaves the field of the exact sciences of logic and mathematics.
It then becomes an art in the broadest meaning of the term-the faculty of using judgement to detect the
10
most important and decisive elements in the vast array of facts and situations.

The strategist now faces a prospect “that Newton himself would quail before the algebraic
11
problems it could pose.” Risk assessment is difficult because strategy is difficult; strategy is
difficult because war is the most complex of human undertakings and filled with unknowns.
Liddell-Hart concludes in this regard: “This complicates calculation, because no man can
12
exactly calculate the capacity of human genius and stupidity, nor the incapacity of will.” It is
the inherent nature of war itself that sets the student adrift in a strategic sea of uncertainty.

GENIUS AND UNCERTAINTY.
Despite this uncertainty, there is comfort in the knowledge that others have navigated
these waters before. The challenge is to somehow structure or frame the strategic problem to
minimize the unknown or more importantly, to account for it. The effective strategist strives
13
for the “closest approximation of the truth” knowing that full knowledge is an impossibility.
Clausewitz identifies two preeminent qualities in a successful strategist that bear
consideration:
If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are
indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner
light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead (em14
phasis in the original).

These are the elements that define what Clausewitz terms “genius.” The aspiring
strategist should not be misled or discouraged by the use of the term however. Clausewitz
does not refer to the result of good genetics, but to the development of a mind through study
and experience. He is clear on this point as he continues his discussion: “It is the average
15
result that indicates the presence of military genius.” In other words, “genius” as Clausewitz
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describes it is not solely the unique gift of a Napoleon or Gustavus or Hannibal. It is an
achievable skill and the “inner light” can be taught and learned.
Von Moltke the Elder took up the same theme several generations later:
What is necessary is to discover the situation, such as it is, in spite of its being surrounded by the
fog of the unknown; then to appreciate soundly what is seen, to guess what is not seen, to take a
16
decision quickly, finally to act with vigour, without hesitation.

The message is that an education in strategic subjects, followed by continuous historical
study to maintain mental suppleness combined with vicarious experience through exercise,
and actual experience, all contribute to acquiring the skills necessary for finding the “closest
approximation of the truth.” Strategic ability is rarely born, more often learned, but
eminently achievable.
Acknowledging the theoretical uncertainties inherent in war, conflict and policy and
strategy development is an important, if unsatisfying, step in understanding risk
assessment. It allows a better framing of the strategic puzzle. It is simply a matter of knowing
what is not known in order to make better use of what is known and, as von Moltke suggests,
to guess what is not seen. Guessing well is an inherent part of the art of Grand Strategy.

THE ENDS, WAYS, MEANS CONUNDRUM IN RISK ASSESSMENT.
The essence of the challenge of strategy in general and risk assessment in particular is the
core problem of relating ends to ways and means. Compounding this basic conundrum is the
fact that most often the ends will be abstract while the ways and means will be relatively well
17
defined. In addition, the real test of the master of strategic art is to translate obtuse,
politically couched objectives into specific actions. This is likely to become more of a challenge
as the nature, scope and direction of potential threats multiply. Articulating the political
objective in the event of a major theater war is relatively easy; however, achieving significant
clarity in political objectives in multiplying crises around the world, especially where vital
U.S. interests are not at stake, will become increasingly problematic. One analyst notes in a
critique of the U.S. foreign policy process:
Any ambiguity in the ends-means relationship, any loss in the value roots of policy, or any failure to maintain a firm commitment to the achievement of the national purpose cannot help but
18
deprive a foreign policy of essential meaning and effectiveness.

A second related potential pitfall facing the grand strategist is the “tail wagging the dog”
phenomenon. In the absence of clear political objectives or policy guidance, the means can in
19
fact “deflect the direction of ends.” What gets done becomes what one has the capability of
doing. The ways and means can develop a momentum of their own and the result is strategy
by default, usually at the risk of desired political outcomes. The von Schlieffen Plan and
America’s experience in Vietnam are two stark historic examples of this effect.
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This problem has been ascribed to the “triumph of technique” in American foreign policy.
One critic specifically targets the militarization of foreign affairs during the Cold War and an
20
emphasis on quantitative assessments based solely on capabilities. In such cases,
Clausewitz’ “ephemeral factors” are discounted and “consideration of political subtleties
21
tends to be shunted aside.” Ferdinand Foch, writing in 1903, complained of the same
phenomenon but went further: “while the moral factors were depressed as causes [of war],
they were also suppressed as effects.” The unintended result is that strategy can become a
22
function solely of material factors. The dramatic changes of the last decade and the growing
complexities and dimensions of current and future world problems make simplistic,
capabilities-based approaches dangerous at their worst, or potentially ineffective at best.
Getting ends, ways and means right has always been hard; it is becoming harder.

DETERMINING RISK.
The simple definition of risk as an imbalance in ends, ways and/or means is
straightforward but clearly incomplete. How does one measure the degree of risk in any
particular strategic endeavor? This is the heart of the dilemma.

NEUCHTERLEIN AND NATIONAL INTERESTS.
Risk assessment is inherent to the entire strategy formulation process. Donald
Neuchterlein addresses risk in his discussion on identifying national interests and their
intensities, a fundamental prerequisite to policy and strategy development. He posits sixteen
23
criteria for assessing a particular issue as a vital interest. These are divided into value and
*
cost/risk factors :
Value Factors

Cost/Risk Factors

Proximity of the danger
Nature of the threat
Economic stake
Sentimental attachment
Type of government and
human rights
Effect on the balance of
power
National prestige at stake
Support of allies

Economic costs of hostilities
Estimated casualties
Risk of protracted conflict
Risk of enlarged conflict
Cost of defeat or stalemate
Cost of public opposition
Risk of UN opposition
Risk of congressional opposition

* Note that there is no direct correlation between value and
cost/risk factors; they are randomly listed.

Neuchterlein advocates using a simple valuation process by rating each factor high,
medium or low or even assigning numerical scores to the factors. Likewise, for a particular
issue, some factors may be more important than others and can be appropriately weighted or
prioritized. The factor scores are then totaled. If the value totals of a particular issue are high
compared to a low or medium cost/risk valuation, then the issue probably constitutes a vital
interest. Neuchterlein does not claim a scientific basis for his methodology, only that:
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it provides for systematic analysis of specific foreign policy issues; it should therefore lead to
better judgments about levels of interest for the United States and its antagonists and, one
24
would hope, to wiser policies than would otherwise be the case.

Thus, it provides a simple tool that assists in the discrimination of interests in relative terms.
Having determined “vitalness," the policy maker/strategist is in a better position to articulate
a balanced set of ends, ways and means in the strategy formulation process by accounting for
degrees of risk up front.

CALCULATED RISK.
The noted naval theorist, Admiral J.C. Wylie, took a more rigorous approach to the
25
problem in a tongue-in-cheek article published in 1953 entitled “The Calculation of Risk.”
The impetus for the short article apparently arose from the 1953 budget hearings in which the
Army representative answered difficult questions with the rejoinder “Mr. Congressman, that
is a calculated risk.” Of course no one knew what a calculated risk was or how to calculate it, so
26
Wylie decided to try. Although intended facetiously, Wylie’s little paper does merit
consideration in its own right. Using a series of variables and equations, he describes various
27
strategic characteristics.
P = Profit if successful
Cn = Cost if not attempted
Cf = Cost of attempt that fails
Cs = Cost of attempt that succeeds
S = Probability of success
Wylie defines risk as P/Cf, or the potential profit divided by the cost of a failed attempt. As
long as this is greater than 1, the enterprise (or strategy) is “encouraged”; likewise, if less than
1, “discouraged.” These machinations result in general determining equations:
If P x S < Cf (1-S) then “no go”
If P x S > Cf (1-S) then “go”
These equations describe what is already known instinctively: If the payoff times the
probability of success is greater than the cost of failure times the probability of failure, the
result is a winning strategy.
Risk is further defined by an equation:
Cf/Cs < S/(1-S)
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That is, the cost of a failed attempt over the cost of a successful attempt must be less than the
probability of success divided by the probability of failure.
Having had his fun with the reader, Wylie further stipulates that:
To insure success in its use, there is only one condition that must be met: the factors involved must
never be expressed in arithmetic quantities. That would blunt the fine edge of judgment and obscure
the true balance of intangibles.

Wylie clearly subscribes to the Clausewitzian notions of uncertainty and unpredictability
in war and he makes this clear in his important and short book Military Strategy: A General
Theory of Power Control. In it he further admonishes the reader to plan for a complete
spectrum of strategies in order to have a “reserve” of strategies for the inevitable changes that
will occur. He also warns that “the player who plans for only one strategy runs a great risk
simply because his opponent soon detects the single strategy-and counters it . . . planning for
28
certitude is the greatest of all military mistakes . . .” Wylie’s reserve of strategies is
essentially conceptual hedging for uncertainty with its inherent risk. This, to borrow from
operational art, is planning for strategic branches and sequels or for potential developments
requiring adjustments in ends, ways or means as a particular strategy is implemented.
Although Wylie’s formulations were intended to ridicule early whiz kids, he actually
produced a relatively sophisticated approach to a difficult concept. For example, an
examination of a recent study prepared by the CIA to address risk assessment and
29
management of threats to security, uses an identical formulation. Defining risk as the
potential of damage or loss to an asset, the study assesses the level of risk as the impact of loss
or damage to the asset and the likelihood (probability) that a specific vulnerability could be
30
exploited by a particular threat. The formulation is defensive in nature since it is addressing
security protection issues. Nevertheless, it equates exactly to Wylie’s Cf (1-S), that is, the
Cost of Failure times the Probability of Failure. Strategy and risk assessment are
31
indeed eternal.

RISK MANAGEMENT
The process of risk assessment is dynamic in nature over time and circumstance. That is,
the variables are in constant flux. Risk assessment is simply the constant effort to identify
and correct imbalances among the key variables. The first ability of the strategist is to
recognize when variables change. The second is to adjust the remaining variables to account
for the “delta” or, as it has been defined, the risk. This is known as risk management. In
32
simplest terms, the strategist has several clear options:

MODIFY ENDS.
When the price to achieve a particular objective is too high or the ability to affect a “center
of gravity” is limited, it may become necessary to reduce the overall objective to more realistic
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terms. Examples include the decision to forego a cross-channel attack in 1942 in favor of
North Africa, or accepting a lesser objective than the unification of the Korean peninsula after
the Chinese intervention.

MODIFY MEANS.
An increase or reallocation of resources may affect the ability to implement a strategy and
achieve the objective. This is, however, not simply a quantitative solution. A definition of
resources includes unpredictable and changeable elements as well. For example, public
support of a particular policy/strategy is a key consideration in a democracy and must be
accounted for even if difficult to measure. Vietnam is a classic example of not adequately
modifying means by calling up the reserves and generating sufficient public support for the
effort.

MODIFY WAYS.
Assuming that the objective is sound and resources are adequate, there will likely be
multiple ways to achieve the desired end-state. Use of the various elements of power
(political, military, economic, informational) in differing combinations with varying
emphasis may enhance the ability to achieve the same overall objective. The recent Kosovo
experience serves as a good case of modifying ways: The deployment of Task Force Hawk and
increasing information about planning for possible ground options coupled with retargeting
the air operation are thought to have contributed to Milosevic’s decision to withdraw forces.

REASSESS THE RISK.
Over time some of the going-in assumptions may be proven invalid. Additional
information may become available or gaps in knowledge filled. The strategist needs to
recognize the potential strategic effect of more or less information, recognizing that the 100%
solution will always be elusive due to the “ephemeral factors.” It is important to reemphasize
that this process is dynamic and “at once abstract and rational, [and] must be capable of
33
synthesizing both psychological and material data.” Indeed, one man’s risk is another man’s
certitude and therefore grist for the continuously grinding strategic mill.

FIVE PATTERNS OF STRATEGY FOR RISK ASSESSMENT
AND MANAGEMENT.
Andre Beaufre addresses the “ends-means” conundrum in his classic book Introduction to
Strategy. His intent is to provide a series of models, what he calls patterns of strategy, to
34
assist in the process of strategic thinking. The models are intended to show how various and
fundamentally differing strategies can spring from the dynamic relationship between ends,
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ways and means. These five patterns are macro-descriptors and it is clear to see that
countless variations are possible.
Ends Moderate, Means Large. This is described as a strategy of “direct threat”; nuclear
deterrence strategy is given as example of this pattern.
Ends Moderate, Means Limited. Consisting of a pattern of “indirect pressure,” this
pattern is useful when freedom of action is limited. It emphasizes political, diplomatic, and
economic elements of power at the expense of direct military action. It models the basis of
Soviet strategy, that is, avoiding direct military confrontation with the United States.
Ends Important, Ways Limited (Low Freedom of Action), Means Limited. This
pattern constitutes a combination of “direct threat” and “indirect pressure” applied in
successive actions and reflects the strategy of indirect approach as described by Liddell-Hart.
It is most appropriate to nations strong defensively but with limited resources.
Ends Important, Ways Unlimited (High Freedom of Action), Means Inadequate.
This reflects a strategy of protracted war but at a low level of military intensity. It is the
theoretical basis for Mao Tse-Tung’s theory of protracted struggle.
Ends Important, Means Unlimited. This traditional pattern is characterized by
“violent conflict aiming at military victory.” Beufre describes it as the classic strategy of the
Napoleonic era with Clausewitz as its principle theorist.
With these five patterns of strategy as a basis, Collins addresses risk specifically with
35
seven examples of how to balance the strategic equation:
-Eliminate waste [modifying ways and/or means]
-Compress objectives [modifying ends]
-Adjust strategy [modifying ways]
-Augment assets [modifying means]
-Reduce ends and increase means [modifying ends and means]
-Bluff [adversary misinterprets your ends, ways, means]
-Give up on the objective [the ultimate modification of ends]
Intended as examples, achieving strategic balance and hence strategic effectiveness may
require application of one, more or other creative elements to induce change in the strategic
equation.
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READINESS AND RISK.
There does exist detailed and rigorously institutionalized processes for measuring risk
within the U.S. defense establishment. The roots of these processes spring from the era of
McNamara and the introduction of systems analysis to defense planning. In general, these
methodologies represent an attempt to institutionally account for the unknown and help to
“guess well.” For example, the Joint Net Assessment (JNA) is the informal process that
“provides a strategic level risk assessment and provides the basis for developing risk
36
associated with alternative force structures and strategies.” The JNA draws on multiple
sources of information and contributes to other strategic assessments and potentially to
changes in the National Military Strategy. Normally a net assessment is developed every four
years but dramatic changes in the geostrategic environment can result in more frequent
assessments. One of the sources of information feeding the JNA process is the regularized
readiness reporting system. Therefore, bureaucratically and institutionally, at least in the
Department of Defense, strategic risk is related closely to readiness. That is the system. But
as recent events in Kosovo have demonstrated, the reality of risk assessment can have as
much to do with art as with science.

THE CHAIRMAN’S READINESS SYSTEM.
The Chairman’s Readiness System is the process by which the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff assesses the military’s readiness to fulfill the requirements of the National
Military Strategy (NMS). The vehicle for assessing and reporting readiness across the armed
37
forces is the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR).
The Chairman’s overall strategic assessment draws on three sources of information: The
individual services unit readiness reports, the Unified Combatant Commanders (CINCs)
joint readiness assessments and the Combat Support Agencies reports on their ability to
support the CINCs. A full JMRR takes place quarterly with an assessment of capabilities and
risk currently and out to 12 months in the future.
The assessments are scenario driven and derive from the current National Military
Strategy. The scenarios normally start with a real-world operation currently underway and
include a Smaller Scale Contingency (SSC) or one or two Major Theater Wars (MTW) “in two
38
distant theaters in overlapping timeframes” CINCs are then required to address potential
deficiencies in their ability to execute the scenario-based mission requirements. Deficiencies
are identified and categorized. Fixes are suggested or they are forwarded for consideration
and solution by other working bodies. Unresolved deficiencies are aggregated and considered
collectively. These are then termed “key risk elements.” Further aggregation may intensify
into “overall strategic concerns”; these are potential risks to implementation of the National
39
Military Strategy itself and constitute an overall strategic risk assessment.
The system is largely score-based, that is, commanders at all levels are charged with
assessing their own readiness and that of their subordinates and assigning a value to it.
Scores are aggregated as assessments and forwarded upward. The process would appear at
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first glance to be relatively sound, based as it is on seemingly quantitative assessments.
However, the “granularity” of assessment becomes less clear as the reports are progressively
aggregated. In fact, there are substantial opportunities for commanders to inject subjective
40
assessments into the process. It is here, as Clausewitz says, that “intellectual activity leaves
the field of the exact sciences of logic and mathematics. It then becomes an art in the broadest
41
meaning of the term.” Differing perceptions of readiness in turn drive differing perceptions
of the degree of ultimate risk for the armed forces to implement the National Military
Strategy, and by extension, elements of the National Security Strategy. This is the basis of the
readiness debate within the services, the Joint Staff, the Department of Defense and the
42
Congress today.
Although the system would appear to guess well on the surface, there is growing concern
that an ends-ways-means mismatch exists. Culturally, commanders are naturally reluctant
to report their commands unready to execute their missions. Likewise, senior commanders
are adverse to less than capable readiness assessments from their subordinates. Further
clouding the process is the political scrutiny under which it takes place. The measure of risk
may depend on how one interprets the current strategic mandate:
The United States [must be] able to deter and defeat large-scale cross-border aggression in
two distant theaters in overlapping time frames. In short, we must be able to fight and win
43
two major theater wars nearly simultaneously.
The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs assesses the risk factors for fighting and
44
winning the first Major Theater War as “moderate," but the second as “high.” What does this
mean in real terms, especially with the occasional Smaller Scale Contingency thrown in for
good measure? One’s point of view depends on where one sits. “Moderate” risk to the
Department of Defense may be acceptable to the Senate Armed Services Committee, but as it
is derived from an aggregated assessment, it may be considered downright dangerous by
CENTCOM or TRANSCOM.

THE CASE OF KOSOVO AND TWO MTW’S.
The conflict in Kosovo provides a fitting vehicle for examining in more real terms the
nature of risk in strategy formulation and implementation. It is not the intent to examine the
strategy for the conflict itself although this has proven to be a rich field of discussion and
debate, especially with regard to matching political ends to military objectives, courses of
action and resources. More interesting is the impact the conflict had on the ability to execute,
if need be, declared elements of the National Security and National Military Strategies and
the risk thereby incurred as a result of the commitment to the Kosovo operation.
As established, the National Military Strategy (as well as the National Security and
Defense Strategies) posit as a fundamental element the ability to “deter and defeat nearly
simultaneous, large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping
time frames.” Moreover, this obtains in an environment in which the United States is globally
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engaged and indeed conducting “multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations”
at the same time.
The National Security Strategy states that in the event of one or two MTW’s it may be
necessary to withdraw from ongoing contingency operations. In doing so, the NSS
acknowledges accepting a “degree of risk” since such a course is necessary to “reduce the
greater risk incurred if we failed to respond adequately to major theater wars.” What happens
when a smaller scale contingency takes on the characteristics, at least in part, of a major
theater war?
As outlined earlier, the Joint Monthly Readiness Report (JMRR) is the Chairman’s
snapshot of the U.S. Armed Forces ability to execute the National Military Strategy. The two
JMRRs crafted during and immediately following the Kosovo conflict highlighted some of the
risk entailed in the two-MTW component of the National Military Strategy.
The JMRR covering the April to June 1999 timeframe posited as a scenario an expanding
Kosovo operation lasting until September with a simultaneous outbreak of war on the Korean
45
peninsula. It assessed the risk of not prevailing in the Korean MTW as “moderate” and the
risk of successfully responding to a second, unstated MTW as “high." Moderate risk under the
given scenario was defined in terms of time and potential casualties:
This does not mean that U.S. forces would not prevail in either contingency [Kosovo and Korea],
but rather, that potentially longer timelines required to initiate the counter-offensive increase
the potential for higher casualties to forces in the interim and during the warfight.

As might be expected, the Air Force was particularly affected due to its significant
commitment to Kosovo. In fact, the Air Force level of effort in Kosovo constituted an MTW in
46
its own right.
The strategic concerns listed included mobility shortfalls,
logistics/sustainment shortfalls, and C4 and ISR deficiencies. Since strategic concerns are
“an aggregation of key risk elements that impact [on] readiness to execute the National
47
Military Strategy,” the JMRR in effect provides an overall and general articulation of risk.
The overall strategic effect of this risk was well articulated in the Kosovo After Action
Report to Congress:
Without question, a situation in which the United States would have to prosecute two major theater wars nearly simultaneously would be extraordinarily demanding-well beyond that required for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. It would involve our
complete commitment as a nation and would entail all elements of our total force . . . Consistent
with our defense strategy, U.S. forces could not have continued the intense campaign in Kosovo
48
and, at the same time, conducted two nearly simultaneous major theater wars.

In fact, in the course of operations in Kosovo, higher levels of risk were reassessed and
some measures were taken to bring the strategic variables into better balance. One
assumption notes that the forces in and around Southwest Asia, coupled with elements
enforcing the no-fly zone constituted an effective deterrent to Saddam. The air-bridge
supporting the Kosovo operation was also considered to be a positive asset if operations had to
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be redirected to the Gulf. However, in Northeast Asia some units were repositioned and
others put on a “tighter string” for a quicker response in the event of crisis. The objective was
to “maintain a very visible defense capability to discourage leaders in Baghdad and
49
Pyongyang . . . .” In other words, some adjustments in ways and means were undertaken to
reduce potential strategic risk in undertaking the Kosovo operation.
If all this language leaves readers slightly dissatisfied with the ability of the defense
establishment to measure and articulate risk, then they are in good company. Both the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs also acknowledge a shortcoming in
this particular strategic skill. The Kosovo experience brought home the potential impact that
smaller scale contingencies could have on the execution of the National Military Strategy,
especially the two-MTW capability.
Risk analysis is important in judging force readiness where commitments are made to support important and necessary operations but do not involve our vital interests. Some smaller scale contingencies
50
may be in this category.

In fact, the statement of the Secretary and Chairman before Congress acknowledged that:
managing these risks is a highly complicated endeavor that would benefit from a more structured and
dynamic set of tools for assessing our ability to conduct major wars when we respond to contingen51
cies.

The search for “the closest approximation of the truth,” like strategy, is eternal.

CONCLUSION.
Assessing and managing strategic risk is an inherently inexact process. It encompasses a
combination of inputs, both material and moral, that defy empirical resolution. Weighing
these inputs, identifying possible outcomes and planning for uncertainty should be done with
the clear understanding that a complete solution is impossible to achieve but always striven
for. Once a strategy is developed, the most important strategic skill and the true mark of
strategic “genius” is accounting for potential change and recognizing actual change in a
timely enough manner to adjust the strategic variables and thereby ensure a valid strategic
equation oriented firmly on achieving the political objectives at hand. This is increasingly
difficult to do in a dynamically changing strategic environment with myriad threats,
challenges, actors and unclear potential effects. This is why the development and execution of
strategy is primarily an art and why the requirement for developing masters of that art is so
essential. In the end though, the essential elements of strategic risk are unchanged through
the ages and consist in the proper balancing of ends, ways and means to achieve the desired
strategic outcome. Understanding that fundamental relationship and “guessing well”
through study, exercise and experience will ensure that assessing and managing strategic
risk rises above simply “the comfort level of strategic planners.” A gastro-intestinal
assessment is not good enough. It never was.
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CHAPTER 15
STRATEGIC ART:
THE NEW DISCIPLINE FOR 21st CENTURY LEADERS
Richard A. Chilcoat
Dramatic changes in the international system have forced us to reevaluate old strategies
and look for new reference points amid the still unsettled debris of the Old World order. At
issue for strategic leaders and strategists is the role of the United States in the world and our
capabilities to defend and promote our national interests in a new environment where threats
are both diffuse and uncertain, where conflict is inherent, yet unpredictable. These new
patterns of uncertainty combined with declining resources pose difficult challenges to
national security.
Meeting these challenges requires an integrated, systematic approach to the formulation
and execution of strategy. This article is an appeal to strategists to match the success in the
development of operational art and joint doctrine with an equally comprehensive approach to
1
strategic art. If operational art is an effective guide for the employment of force, strategic art
can be equally effective in guiding the formulation of national security strategy, national
military strategy, and theater strategy, thereby linking the use of military forces to the larger
political-military context in which wars occur. In other words, strategic art must establish the
relationships between military power and other instruments of power. It must also guide
combatant and theater commanders in fulfilling their strategic responsibilities.
Strategic leadership is the effective practice of the strategic art. Strategists can think
about and help devise strategies, but it is the strategic leader who practices the art and makes
it happen. A successful search for strategy and the mastery of strategic art by our senior
leaders, military and civilian, are vital to the nation. Identifying and mastering the
components of strategic art offer no panaceas, but elevating the importance and ensuring the
visibility of these steps in the national security debate can serve as constructive
counterpoints to such tendencies as political isolationism, militant economic protectionism,
military unpreparedness, and emotion-based interventions.
This essay is not intended to provide a strategy or even an ideal process for formulating or
mastering strategic art. Its purpose rather is to emphasize that the search itself is important,
permanent, and worth our best efforts and attention at a time when familiar landmarks have
vanished and no new strategic vision has attracted a national consensus. Said another way,
we have come a long way towards mastery of the tactical and operational arts—the time is
now to strive for mastery of the strategic art.
Simultaneous revolutions in military affairs, technology, and information, and a
reordering of the international system, have shattered traditional boundaries, merging the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war into a single, integrated universe in which
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action at the bottom often has instant and dramatic impact at all levels. Never in history have
so many strategic burdens confronted the entire chain of command, ranging from the
President in the White House all the way down to the individual rifleman at a security
checkpoint in Macedonia. We have, in Vice Admiral Jerry 0. Tuttle’s words, “entered the
‘visual era’—our rules of engagement are new, dominated by the risk that parents will see their
sons and daughters killed in real—time on TV—or that mothers and babies—churches and
mosques—temples and hospitals—will be blown away in full color before us in our living
2
rooms. . . . ”
These dramatic changes require an integrated approach to strategy and operations, an
approach that conceptually combines the levels of war—strategic, operational, and
tactical—with all the instruments of power in the national security strategy (see Figure 1).

Figure 1.
Before the national security strategy can become a coherent plan for action, strategic art must
first be invoked to coordinate all the instruments of power available to a nation or coalition to
attain clearly defined and agreed-upon objectives and end states. For this reason, we can no
longer afford isolated or uncoordinated approaches among the domains of strategy—military,
diplomatic, economic, or informational—which often, as Gregory Foster has observed,
“manifest themselves operationally as costly bureaucratic and institutional barriers to unity
3
of thought and action.” Churchill’s genius was rooted in his understanding of this reality.
Like a painter, he tells us, the strategist must have an “all-embracing view, which presents
the beginning and the end, the whole and each part, as one instantaneous impression
4
retentively and untiringly held in the mind.” Churchill was the classic example of both the
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strategist and the strategic leader. His leadership made the difference in translating words
into deeds, ideas and concepts into action. He was a master of the strategic art.
Unity of thought and action requires strategic leaders in uniform to understand
disciplines outside their own professional expertise, and civilian strategic leaders must
likewise comprehend the broader consequences of policy on the national security and national
military strategies. Trade, for example, if pursued for maximum economic benefits to the U.S.
economy, may include the transfer of technologies that put U.S. military superiority at risk.
Conversely, by erecting trade barriers we may cause conflict with other nations, again
putting our security at risk. These are difficult choices that can be mediated only by leaders
who are able to balance short-term against long-term benefits and regional against global
interests, and who are able to reconcile the collective effects of all components of strategy in
promoting and defending all U.S. interests. Mastering strategic art requires close,
cooperative, interagency relations and leaders with vision to see over and beyond the
bureaucratic barriers.
Political and military leaders must work closely together, interacting with one another on
desired end states, objectives, courses of action, capabilities, and risks, for there is no clear
threshold between peace and war marking the point where political and military leaders
hand off responsibility. Both must be masters of strategic art, and the subordination of
military to civilian leadership does not lessen the importance of military counsel and advice to
political authorities, or the responsibilities of both to communicate and coordinate at every
level of strategy and during all phases of conflict. This is the essence of strategic art.

DEVELOPING A WORKING DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC ART.
Good definitions should be brief, yet broad in scope and sufficiently specific to inform
action. Strategic art entails the orchestration of all the instruments of national power to yield
specific, well-defined end states. Desired end states and strategic outcomes derive from the
national interests and are variously defined in terms of physical security, economic well
being, and the promotion of values. Strategic art, broadly defined, is therefore: The skillful
formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and
means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests.
Several definitions of strategic art considered for inclusion here were overly restrictive,
limited in scope to military art. While it is indisputable that the nation’s military leadership
bears the responsibility to fight and win the nation’s wars, it is equally true that strategic art
includes the mastering of other instruments of power and understanding their contributions
and limitations within the national security strategy. Just as diplomacy absent supporting
military and economic power may be impotent, even dangerous, military strategy absent
political direction and a strong economic foundation may suffer the same disabilities.
The planning and execution of strategy require a paradigm understood by military and
civilian leaders alike. The strategy paradigm comprised of “ends, ways, and means”—which
has almost universal applicability—defines objectives, identifies courses of action to achieve
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them, and provides the resources to support each course of action. The relationships among
these elements of strategy allow for planning and the debating of alternative strategic
visions, calculations, and assessment of risk. This paradigm and its application to national
strategy and to military strategy are taught to senior military officers at every senior service
college.
Strategic leaders in uniform must simultaneously be able to comprehend and operate at
the levels of national security strategy, national military strategy, and theater strategy. At
the highest or grand strategy level, one of the principal tasks of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, his staff, and often the theater or regional commanders in chief (CINCs) is to assist the
Secretary of Defense in the formulation of national security strategy. This difficult task
requires a grasp of how all the elements of power comprising national strategy might be
applied either singly or in concert. Strategic leaders translate national security guidance into
a focused military expression through the formally articulated Defense Planning Guidance
and the National Military Strategy. It is at this level and in this process that differences
between strategic art and operational art are most pronounced.
Operational art does not establish the strategic context, but instead flows from the policy
decisions and strategy made at the national and theater levels. Operational art in the middle
overlaps with and bridges strategy and tactics and translates theater strategy into military
action by integrating the key activities of all levels of warfare (see Figure 2). It is more strictly
focused on the employment of military forces to attain the aims set by strategy through the
design and execution of campaigns and major operations.

Figure 2.
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Combatant commanders play a complex and multifaceted role as the integrators and
translators of strategy into the operational level. Of necessity they are practitioners of both
forms of art. Their responsibility is to assist in the formulation of national security strategy
and national military strategy as required, as well as to formulate a theater strategy to
implement national policy and guidance. Theater strategy integrates concepts and courses of
action to secure the aims of national or multinational strategy. It is the conceptual wellspring
from which operational art flows in application. The CINC stands precisely at the critical
junction where multiple levels of strategy are translated into operational designs for unified
action that link tactical operations to strategic objectives.
In practice, CINCs and their staffs often deal directly with nonmilitary agencies involved
in implementing the broader national security strategy. This requires the military
professional to deal with all the instruments of national power as presented in a bewildering
array of options, requirements, and constraints. These often represent competing interests in
an interagency system or in a coalition as ad hoc in makeup as it is in command
arrangements. In this complex political environment, military expertise and traditional
command and leadership skills must be supplemented by a keen understanding of underlying
political, military, and economic issues, peer leadership and consensus-building skills, and
the ability to secure the cooperation of organizations and personalities beyond one’s direct
influence and control.

MASTERING STRATEGIC ART.
According to the definitions of strategic art thus far developed, strategic leadership—in
the context of national security affairs—requires that senior leaders be able to skillfully
formulate, coordinate, and apply ends, ways, and means at hand to promote and defend the
national interests. This definitive relationship is shown at Figure 3.
Masters of the strategic art are those alone who can competently integrate and combine
the three roles performed by the complete strategist: the strategic leader, strategic
practitioner, strategic theorist. These roles, each with a distinctive set of skills, form the
defining competencies of the person who is the master of the strategic art. These roles and
6
skills, all quite complex, are depicted in Figure 4. It will be seen that the three skill groupings
overlap to some degree, but each is coherent and they are all mutually supportive. The
competencies depicted in Figure 4 are developed by the master of the strategic art during the
course of a lifetime of education, service, and experience:
●

●

The Strategic Leader provides vision and focus, capitalizes on command and peer leadership skills, and inspires others to think and act.
The Strategic Practitioner develops a deep understanding of all levels of war and strategy and their interrelationships, develops and executes strategic plans derived from interagency and joint guidance, employs force and other dimensions of military power,
and unifies military and nonmilitary activities through command and peer leadership
skills.
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Figure 3.

Figure 4. Roles and Skills of the Master of the Strategic Art.
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●

The Strategic Theorist studies the history of warfare, develops strategic concepts and
theories, integrates them with the elements of national power and with the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, and teaches or mentors the strategic
art. The distinction between a strategic theorist and a strategic leader is similar to the
one psychologist Howard Gardner draws between direct and indirect leaders. Direct
leaders influence others intentionally. Their major tools are messages, themes, concepts, or visions; their most important skill is effective communication. The audience of
direct leaders is broad, and may include the nation as a whole. Indirect leaders affect
7
others through their work—often theories or treatises.

The three roles are shown here separately for the purposes of analysis, but the master
strategist integrates and plays each role simultaneously as he executes his responsibilities.
The senior leader exercises strategic leadership, most completely, when he is competent in
each of the three roles. Often it is position or function that determines which of the three roles
are dominant at any given time. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the service chiefs, for
example, embody the role of the strategic leader, while a CINC, his staff, or a joint task force
commander are more focused on the functions of the strategic practitioner. Commandants of
the senior service colleges and high-level planners within the OCJCS and NSC place a high
premium upon their facility as strategic theorists.
Mastery of the strategic art is not the same as so-called “strategic genius.” True strategic
genius—a transcendent ability to read the enemy state’s center of gravity and then to devise
the most effective and efficient combination of means for attacking or threatening that center
of gravity—is probably too much to expect of any individual at the dawn of the 21st century,
because the total spectrum of elements of national power has grown so astonishingly broad
8
and complex. The activity of the individual strategic prodigy as manifested in centuries past
is today a corporate endeavor within governments. Realistically, the complex interagency
structure of national security requires military leaders to develop complementary and
overlapping expertise, as well as understanding that building organizations and developing
strategies and plans reflecting all three competencies of strategic art are as important as
striving for individual mastery. The trends that are likely to define the 21st century will
demand strategic leaders who can integrate and synchronize organizations and policies
simultaneously in all three areas.
Some skills are common to all three components of strategic art. For instance, all
strategists must be able to think holistically, meshing the different instruments of national
power and understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the various organizations and
agencies involved in national security. They must also be able to think conceptually because
strategy is distinguished from other activities by its expanded timeframe. Strategy deals with
the relationship of the present to the future, with balancing short-term and long-term
considerations. Conceptual thinking is the gateway to long-range planning. Finally, all
strategists must be able to think normatively. Value judgments are the heart of strategy.
Strategists must be able to decide not only what is attainable, but also what is preferable.
This is always a difficult process. Military officers must constantly make normative choices,
but at the tactical level these are simplified by formal guidance such as doctrine, SOPs, rules
of engagement, the Code of Conduct, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. At the
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strategic level, many normative choices entail trade-offs. To promote democracy or promote
stability? To feed starving Africans or rebuild American inner cities? And so on. This
normative complexity places great demands on strategists. To succeed, they must build and
constantly refine a coherent ethical framework. In the end, no strategist is stronger than his
9
ethical foundation.
Other groups of skills are particular to one or another of the three roles played by the
master strategist. Acting primarily as strategic theorists and teachers, for instance, the
masters of strategic art must have a full grasp of the political, military, economic, social,
ethical, and cultural spirit of their time—what the Germans call Zeitgeist. They must be able
to think in abstractions, to understand dilemmas, possibilities, and relationships that may
not be obvious to casual observers. And, most of all, they must be creative, able to see beyond
the limitations of the present, to sense new opportunities, and then to propose means to attain
them. They must, in other words, inspire others to think about the future.
Acting as the strategic leader, the element of individual psychology is important. The
master requires the ability to sense and compensate for his own weaknesses, to understand
the strengths and weaknesses of others, and to craft symbiotic relationships among
10
individuals to create an effective team. No strategist is equally skilled in all dimensions of
his craft but psychologically-aware leaders can overcome this. For example, George Marshall
had, in General Shalikashvili’s words, “a rare intuition, a nearly flawless inner sense for other
men’s strengths that allowed him to seek the spark of leadership in others, and when he saw
11
that spark, to place such men into key assignments and then to fully support their efforts.”
In a more modern vein, the strategic foundation of the Gulf War victory arose from the
blending of the diverse talents of George Bush, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, and Norman
Schwarzkopf. The ability to make a penetrating assessment of personal strengths and
weaknesses of all the main players is thus a requisite skill for strategic leaders. But that is not
all they need. Strategic leaders must have the same ability to inspire great efforts that leaders
need at every level. Patton, for instance, “had an innate knack for inspiring soldiers to fight
12
beyond all limits of their endurance. Where strategic theorists and teachers must be able to
inspire others to think, strategic leaders must be able to inspire others to think and act.
Strategic leaders must not only be able to transcend old conceptual limitations themselves,
but also encourage and empower others to do the same. Additionally, strategic leaders must
be skilled at the fine art of focusing, for this allows them to prioritize, to distinguish the vital
from the important, the important from the irrelevant, and the urgent from the routine.
Finally, in modern strategy, leaders must be as skilled in peer leadership as in directing
subordinates. This is a special talent never mastered by some officers who were outstanding
at the tactical level. In strategy, then, there is a time to dictate, order, and demand, but also a
time to persuade, cajole, and build consensus. Strategic leaders must understand the
difference and know the time for each.
Acting in the capacity as strategic practitioners, the masters must be particularly strong
in understanding cause-and-effect relationships and the orderly phasing of activities. They
must have an astute grasp of the operational and tactical levels, including the relationship of
military and nonmilitary activity in these venues. They must understand not only the
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application of force, but also other methods of using military power such as psychological
operations and nation assistance. And they must have impeccable communication skills.
Where strategic leaders and strategic theorists and teachers seek to inspire and thus build
their written and spoken communication for hortatory purposes, strategic practitioners
translate inspiration into practical plans and attainable goals. Clarity as well as inspiration
are the criteria by which they are measured. The master of the strategic art must be able to do
it all.
One method of measuring success and failure in strategic art is to look at history for
examples of both. A representative reading list would surely include great theorists
(Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz), leaders (Marshall, Eisenhower, Churchill), and
practitioners (Patton, Rommel, Ridgway). The master of strategic art should be a student of
history, studying the successful traits that these and other equally talented figures had in
common. We must not, however, ignore failures, including some that may seem at first
successful, but upon closer examination are not. Napoleon, for example, is often remembered
as a master of strategic art—Martin Van Creveld has called him the most competent human
being who ever lived. Examination of Napoleon’s reputation for military genius, however,
illuminates the boundaries between operational and strategic art. His genius lay primarily in
his innovations in operational art—his brilliant campaigns and leadership on the battlefield.
When judging Napoleon’s skills as a master of strategic art, we must keep in mind
Clausewitz’s warning that “the effects of genius show not so much in novel forms for action as
13
in the ultimate success of the whole.” By this standard, which has even greater resonance
today, Napoleon was a strategic failure whose legacy included the death of several million
Frenchmen, the occupation of his country by three armies, the restoration of the monarchy, a
14
century of British dominance, and his own exile. Similarly, German brilliance at the tactical
and operational levels on the battlefield in World War II did not prevent the virtual
devastation of Germany and occupation by the allies. In spite of demonstrated operational
genius, these are not records that aspiring masters of strategic art would seek to emulate.
Jomini’s works provide another useful example in distinguishing operational from
strategic art. Jomini’s legacy lies in his effort to bring clarity and predictability to war by
making operational art more scientific. His focus, however, ignores the larger political
context for which wars are conducted. He reduces the problem of war to the professional and
operational concerns of military commanders, thereby reinforcing the view that in war
military objectives and authority should not be subordinated to political objectives and
15
political authority. This view is the antithesis of both strategy and strategic art as we will
know and experience it in the 21st century. Two contemporary examples illustrate the
complexity of reconciling all elements of national security strategy with military strategy and
operations.
First, in the Gulf War, much of the hindsight criticism centers on the proposition that the
American-led offensive was halted too soon. More of the retreating Iraqi army should have
been destroyed, many commentators argue; others imply, or state outright, that we should
have pressed on to Baghdad, killed or captured Saddam, and established a new, presumably
democratic, government. Saddam’s continued presence in power, this argument goes, serves
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as a daily reminder that our policy failed, or, at the very least, that our victory was “hollow.” It
now appears that the offensive capability of Iraqi forces was not as completely destroyed as
appears to have been militarily desirable. From a political perspective, however, the
suspension of hostilities was timed about right, and every senior leader, military and civilian,
concurred in the decision. Prolongation—even for a few hours—of what was increasingly seen
by some, as a high-technology massacre of Muslims would not have been received well in
hostile (or even friendly) Middle East capitals.
Whether the destruction of the Iraqi military could have proceeded much further without
depriving Baghdad of the means of forcibly holding the country together after the cease-fire is
a question that can never be definitively answered. What does seem clear is that it is in the
interest of the United States to see Iraq survive as a regional power in the Gulf, particularly
as a potential counterbalance to resurgent Iran. As ruthless and despicable as Saddam’s
crushing of the Shiite and Kurdish rebellions was, future stability in the Gulf is better served
by an intact Iraq than by an Iraq splintered into Shiite, Sunnite, and Kurdish sectors.
American strategic leaders were confronted with forging and maintaining a fragile
political coalition, the challenge of projecting a formidable military capability great distances,
maintaining the political support of the American people, and leaving a credible regional
balance of power in the region where Iran, more than Iraq, may be the major threat in the
future. Balancing these elements of near and long-term strategy, the Bush administration
enunciated four objectives: (1) unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; (2)
restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government; (3) safety of U.S. citizens in the area; and (4)
reestablishment of stability and security in the Gulf. Four out of four is not bad strategic
16
artistry.
A second example is U.S. participation in multilateral peacekeeping and peace
17
enforcement operations, especially those inspired by ethnic conflict as in Bosnia. In these
conflicts, military leaders play a major role in the interagency decisionmaking process.
Ideally, this process assesses U.S. interests and objectives against the risks and costs of
intervention. The risks from military intervention in deeply rooted, and in some cases
intractable, ethnic conflicts (often driven by emotional rather than material interests) are
substantial. Economic and political incentives may neither satisfy nor deter the combatants.
The risk of escalation is high, especially when ethnic combatants have kinsmen or patron
states in the region. Escalation may also entail terrorism directed against the United States.
Military objectives and centers of gravity in such conflicts are difficult to identify and difficult
to attack, and may lie beyond imposed political constraints.
This last point lies at the heart of civil-military decisionmaking. Civilian leadership
identifies the broad political objectives and acceptable levels of cost and risk. Military
leadership is responsible for a military strategy to achieve political objectives. Reconciling the
two requires a clear delineation of political constraints and an equally clear assessment of
military objectives and centers of gravity that must be attacked to achieve both military and
political objectives. If centers of gravity, the most vital military targets, lie beyond the
political constraints imposed by the nation’s leadership, military intervention is unlikely to
succeed.
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If external political, economic, or military support is a center of gravity (Serbia’s support
of Bosnian Serbs, for example), then regional escalation of a conflict must be contemplated. If
land forces are the center of gravity, then the United States must tally the level of effort,
including American casualties, required to defeat or destroy those forces. If local support for
ethnic combatants is a center of gravity, then economic and other targets that are punitive to
noncombatants must be considered.
The difficult reconciliation process between political or economic constraints on war and
military objectives is vital to the formulation of effective military strategy if military force is
to be the principal means for conflict termination. Reconciliation is equally important
whether in war—situations in which military force is the principal means to achieve national
objectives—or in operations other than war—situations in which military power is available
but subordinate to political or economic power in conflict resolution. This process is strategic
art in practice; its complexity requires both interagency coordination and expertise beyond
one’s organizational responsibilities.

HOW WILL STRATEGIC ART CHANGE?
As with many human skills, strategy combines immutable elements that remain constant
across time with more fluid components that vary according to place and condition. The
18
constants are defined by strategic culture. For instance, 21st century American
strategists—like their predecessors—will still need to minimize the human costs of applying
power in pursuit of national interests, and to mobilize and sustain public support.
Synchronizing the instruments of national power will also be a constant. Future strategists
will continue to struggle with obstacles posed by the American strategic culture such as
impatience, a tendency to seek economic and technological solutions to strategic problems,
and difficulty understanding the perceptions, attitudes, and motives of others. And, most
important, future strategists will continue to reflect core American values such as respect for
the individual, reverence for basic civil and political rights, and the imperative to minimize
violence whenever possible.
But within this framework of constants, future American strategists will be forced to
cultivate some new skills or, at least, to place greater emphasis on some that were formerly
less central. For instance, as stressed above, horizontal or peer leadership will become
increasingly important. In the 21st century, strategy will almost always be interagency and
multinational. Military strategists must thus be able to exercise peer and cross-cultural
leadership as often as vertical or command leadership. The two require different skills. For
horizontal leadership, a command personality and ability to impose the leader’s will are less
relevant than the ability to negotiate, persuade, and build consensus. Horizontal leadership
will also place increased stress on the ability to communicate and understand cross-culturally
(including cross-institutional cultures). Phrased differently, future strategists must have a
sophisticated understanding of the psychology of cross-cultural leadership.
Given the rapidly accelerating rate of change that characterizes the modern era, 21st
century strategists also will be required to build new task-oriented organizations in relatively
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short periods. Innovativeness, conceptual thinking, a willingness to accept risk, the ability to
exploit rapid and persistent change, openness to continuing education, and general mental
flexibility will separate masters of strategic art from apprentices. Also needed is the ability to
quickly and accurately assess the strengths and weaknesses of others, and to build balanced,
complementary intra-team relationships. The complexity of 21st century strategy will
demand strategic leaders who can build the right leadership team for a specific task within a
rapidly evolving politicalmilitary environment.
Finally, facility in quick and accurate information assessment will become a central
strategic skill. If the 21st century is to be the “information age,” one of the foremost skills
strategists must have is the ability to select and extract vital information from the great mass
of useless information provided. Acquiring information will not be a problem. If anything,
future strategic leaders will be overwhelmed with information, and winnowing out what is
useful will be the challenge. Skill at this must be carefully and deliberately cultivated.
How, then, can 21st century strategists develop the complex skills their profession will
demand? Until fairly recently, the process of mastering strategy was informal and often ad
hoc. With the establishment of the service war colleges and the development of strategic
studies as an academic discipline in the 20th century, efforts have been made to formalize and
improve this process. These efforts must continue into the 21st century as the formal
mechanisms for cultivating strategic skill are reassessed and modified.
Three trends are particularly important. One is improved understanding of the adult
learning process. In the past, some candidate strategists were lucky enough to find a skilled
mentor. Dwight Eisenhower, for instance, gained much of his initial grasp of strategy at the
19
hand of Brigadier General Fox Conner. There were probably those with promise of strategic
skill who never found a mentor, and thus did not reach their full potential. Now with better
institutional understanding of adult learning, few, if any, truly talented strategists should
fall through the cracks. One challenge for the Army is honing its methods of identifying
strategic skill. Currently, admission to the war colleges is based mostly on tactical level
success, particularly in command. This may or may not be the best possible criterion, but it
certainly warrants further study and debate.
A second trend is increased utilization of technology. Information technology can help
strategists develop mentor and peer relationships; simulations technology can help
strategists test their decisionmaking skills; and, computer technology can help them acquire
and assess information. Anyone who aspires to master the strategic art must understand the
challenges and opportunities afforded by technology.
A third important trend, pointing toward the need to learn from other disciplines and
translate their accumulated wisdom into a form usable by strategists, is expanding
conceptual horizons. From the business community, for instance, strategists can learn
20
methods for assuring organizational flexibility and quality of product. From psychologists
and sociologists, strategists can develop sophisticated notions of how human societies
function, allowing them to craft the most effective strategies possible for coercing enemy
societies or repairing friendly ones. From cyberneticists, strategists can develop a better
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understanding of information systems, thus maximizing the effectiveness of their own while
eroding that of opponents. And from moral philosophers, strategists can come to a better
understanding of the ethical choices that form the foundation of their efforts. The key is a
continuous but critical “looking outward” to decide what wisdom from other disciplines is
relevant for strategy and what parts are inapplicable.
Strategic skills are developed over the course of a career through formal and informal
education and self-development, and additionally through professional experience. Senior
service colleges have traditionally made their main contribution by offering curricula
21
emphasizing the theoretical aspects of strategic art. But theoretical education is only part of
the process. If we accept the notion that strategic art is more something we do than something
we know, it is natural that we should exercise it in the classroom in expectation that we can
enhance students’ application of strategic art beyond the classroom and increase their value
as a resource to their individual service or agency and to the nation. This expectation for
strategic preparation is consistent with the extensive past efforts dedicated to tactical and
operational simulations, exercises, and wargames and our perception that praxis enhances
real-world performance. The unfortunate fact is, however, that strategic wargarming
emphasizing political, economic, and informational instruments of power has traditionally
not been exercised in the classroom nearly so much as its tactical and operational
counterparts.
The practice of the strategic art in the classroom has received less attention because, like
strategy itself, it is quite difficult. Politico-military relationships and their many related
factors are not nearly so neat or quantifiable, as are the operational and tactical issues so
familiar to military leaders; as a result, these issues fall outside the individual’s comfort zone
and often end up in the “too hard” category. Moreover, many officers have relatively little
exposure to the political and interagency processes at the highest levels of our own
government, let alone the complex web of relationships among nations and alliances,
although service, as a general officer almost always requires familiarity with the interagency
and intergovernmental processes. As a result, the services’ officer corps—and the Army’s
officer corps in particular—are far more comfortable and experienced with operational and
tactical wargames and simulations. Thus, a very real challenge in exercising strategic art in
the classroom is one of raising students’ sights and exposing them to these higher-level
processes before they actually have to deal with them in the real world.
The greatest challenge in providing practice in strategic art in the classroom is in creating
a reasonably representative politico-military environment in which the players must operate.
Beyond the lack of familiarity of many military officers with that environment, many other
impediments have existed in the past. Realistic scenario development has always involved
political sensitivities (signal sending) and risked giving offense to friends and allies, and
provocation to enemies. This has led to the generation of artificial scenarios and geographic
settings, often referred to as “synthetic theaters of war,” for use in simulations. Also, it has
often been difficult to obtain the participation of experienced key individuals from the
national and international political arenas to replicate their roles in relatively low-level
simulations. In such cases, simulations conducted by the military often resorted to the use of
military personnel who lacked the requisite expertise, with the result that significant
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distortion was introduced into the fabric of the simulations. Further, there is the tendency of
many military officers, even in strategic simulations involving the interagency process and
international and coalition-building issues, to focus nonetheless on lower-level issues more
appropriate to operational and tactical simulations with which they are more familiar.
To overcome such problems, the Army War College’s annual Strategic Crisis Exercise has
been designed expressly to confront students with practice at all levels and in all components
22
of strategic art. Among the many lessons learned is that the information age challenges us
to think beyond our traditional conception of the classroom—moving us towards the concept
of a “virtual classroom” in which we can bring high-level experts, policymakers, and
representatives of various player organizations into our exercises without their ever having
to leave their offices. This capability greatly enhances the realism and dynamism of strategic,
politico-military simulations.
The first Strategic Crisis Exercise confirmed our anticipation of the need for enhanced
representation of various commands and non-Defense agencies, better representation of
foreign nations—both friendly and hostile—and better portrayal of nongovernmental and
private entities such as the Red Cross and various relief and humanitarian organizations.
Also, it was evident that the student officers were more comfortable dealing with tactical and
operational issues than the complex mix of political, economic, and military issues. One
surprising development during the exercise was the underestimation of computer
requirements for automated simulations. In the information age, “if you are not able to go on
line at will, you virtually do not exist.”
The various lessons learned from exercising strategic art in the classroom coalesce in the
following conclusion: The combined revolutions in technology and global affairs have
shattered traditional boundaries between levels of strategy and levels of war, merging them
into a single integrated system that must be mastered by all strategic leaders, both military
and civilian. Military leaders will be relied upon for their ability to fight and win the nation’s
wars. But it is equally important that they see, plan, and act with the knowledge that military
art is but one component in a broad, dynamic strategy for national defense.

CONCLUSIONS.
The beginning of the Cold War marked the first time in American history that strategic
leaders were forced to deal with the essential paradox of grand strategy faced by the Roman
Empire and other great powers in the intervening centuries: Sivis pacem, para bellum—if you
want peace, prepare for war. Good strategy does not recognize the concept of permanent
victory. There are no such victories; there are only phase lines in a permanent struggle to
promote and defend our national interests. At each phase line threats are defeated or recede;
the international system reconfigures as old powers decline and new powers rise; and, at
home, resources are redistributed in support of new priorities. Only the nation’s interests
remain relatively constant, requiring new strategies and competencies for their promotion
and defense in new environments.
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The foregoing realities persist for the United States in the post—Cold War transition
period in which the National Security Strategy of global engagement and enlargement is
supported by a National Military Strategy focused on regional contingencies and operations
other than war. The key to the success of these strategies remains the creation of linkage
among national ends, ways, and means. And what constitutes “credible” in terms of national
security in the coming years will depend, as it always has in American history, on our ability
to reconcile the often conflicting demands of domestic and international politics. This means,
in turn, that civilian and military strategic leaders will face even greater challenges in this
transition period in building a consensus among the American people with regard to the
increasingly complex concept of national security.
Clausewitz was prescient on this issue. He did not discuss bureaucratic politics,
interagency process, or the separation of power in a constitutional democracy. He did,
nevertheless, clearly anticipate the necessity to achieve political consensus at home before
victory in war was possible. Patience, perseverance, and endurance in the face of protracted
conflict without prospects for clear and final victory are assuredly likelihoods for which the
strategist and the public alike must prepare.
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APPENDIX I
GUIDELINES FOR STRATEGY
I. General. Strategy is an art, and a highly creative one at that. It is also somewhat
scientific, in that it follows certain patterns which require a common understanding of
terminology, adherence to certain principles, and disciplined, albeit creative, thought
processes. In that spirit, offered herein are some guidelines, definitions, and rules of thumb.
The structure, definitions and processes described here are the basis for instruction in
Strategy Formulation for the students at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC). The term
“guidelines” best describes their intended use. They are not prescriptive in nature but
preceptual concepts to assist the strategic leader in constructively developing national
policies and strategies in an extremely complex international environment.
II. Strategy Formulation Guidelines. Understanding that these are guidelines and
not formulas, strategy will be developed in keeping with the particular features of the time,
place and personalities involved. Nevertheless, the USAWC guidelines offer an approach to
address the complexities of strategy formulation, and are intended for strategists attempting
to achieve the coherence, continuity, and consensus that policy makers seek in designing,
developing and executing national security and military strategies.

National Values

National Interests

Strategic Appraisal

National Policy

National Strategy

Military Strategy

Risk Assessment
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III. National Strategy (or National Security Strategy or “Grand Strategy”).
A. National Values. U.S. national values represent the legal, philosophical
and moral basis for continuation of the American system. U.S. values are the core of national
interests.
B. National Interest. Nations, like individuals, have interests—derived from
their innate values and perceived purposes—which motivate their actions. National interests
are a nation’s perceived needs and aspirations largely in relation to its external environment.
Hence, U.S. national interests determine our involvement in the rest of the world, provide the
focus of our actions to assure their protection, and thus, are the starting point for defining
national security objectives and then formulating national security policy and strategy.
1. As a rule of thumb, interests are stated as fundamental concerns of the
nation, and written as desirable conditions without verbs, action modifiers, or intended
actions. For example, U.S. national interests might be stated as:
materials).

a. Access to raw materials — (Not—protecting sources of raw

b. Unrestricted passage through international waters—
(Not—securing sealines of communications).
1

2. For simplicity and taking our cue from Nuechterlein and Blackwill, we
group national interests into four categories and three degrees of intensity.
a. Categories help us to organize. Keep in mind the breakdown is
normally artificial. Thus, while “Unrestricted access to Persian Gulf Oil” as a U.S. national
interest has a primary category of “Economic Well-Being” for the U.S. and its allies, it also ties
into the other three categories of national interest used by the USAWC. The four categories
are:
(1) Defense of the Homeland
(2) Economic Well-being
(3) Favorable World Order
(4) Promotion of Values
b. Intensity of interests helps us to determine priority of interests,
recognizing that without prioritization, there is the potential for unlimited derivative
objectives and the consequent mismatch of those objectives (ends) with resources (means),
which are always finite.
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(1) The current National Security Strategy document lists three
degrees of intensity: VITAL, IMPORTANT, HUMANITARIAN.
(2) The USAWC modifies and expands Blackwill’s core national
objectives to create core national interests which correspond generally to the four categories
listed in paragraph III.B.2.a. above:
(a) Defense of the Homeland. Physical Security refers to the
protection against attack on the territory and people of a nation-state in order to ensure
survival with fundamental values and political systems intact.
(b) Economic Prosperity.
(c) Promotion of Values.
(d) Favorable World Order. Note that Blackwill does not use this
category because “its universalism makes it exceedingly difficult to distinguish between more
and less important U.S. national security interests.” This, of course, is a problem that
policymakers in the post-Cold War era face on a daily basis.
(3) The three USAWC degrees of intensity are determined by answering
the question: What happens if the interest is not realized?
core national interests.

(a) Vital — if unfulfilled, will have immediate consequence for

(b) Important — if unfulfilled, will result in damage that will
eventually affect core national interests.
(c) Peripheral — if unfulfilled, will result in damage that is
unlikely to affect core national interests.
C. Strategic Appraisal.
1. The strategic appraisal begins with the sorting out of interests by
category and intensity using the general criteria above.
2. The next step is examining the domestic and international
environments to ascertain the challenges (forces, trends, opportunities and threats) that
affect national interests.
a. In particular, in assessing the relationship of an external threat
to a national security interest, the USAWC uses the following Blackwill criteria to relate the
effects on that interest with what the USAWC terms the core national interests (See above):
(1) Immediacy in terms of time.
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(2) Geographic proximity.
(3) Magnitude.
(4) “Infectious” dimensions.
(5) Connectivity — How many links in a chain of events from threat
(situation/event) to core national interest.
b. It is important that this step take place after the sorting out of
interests by category and intensity. The degree of intensity of an interest, in particular,
should be determined before a detailed analysis of threats to those interests. It is important
that interests not become a function of a particular threat. If a government begins with a
threat assessment before a conceptualization of interest intensity, it may react to a threat
with major commitments and resources devoid of any rational linkage to that intensity.
Rational cost-benefit analysis should not be allowed to affect the intensity of interest.
Although U.S. administrations sensibly make just such cost-benefit calculations, Blackwill
points out that:
these should be analytically independent from judgements about how important to the United
States a particular national security interest is. We may choose to defend a peripheral U.S. interest because it is not costly to do so; the interest nevertheless is still peripheral. Or we may
choose not to defend vigorously an important-hopefully not vital-U.S. national security interest
because we decide it is too expensive in a variety of ways to do so; the interest nevertheless is still
important, and we may well pay dearly for our unreadiness to engage.

3. The appraisal must be more than a listing of challenges. To be useful,
an appraisal must analyze and explain which and in what ways U.S. interests are affected.
The assessment should seek to identify opportunities and threats to U.S. interests. As a
consequence, the strategic appraisal will not only be influenced by current national policy,
but will help identify recommendations to change existing policies.
4. Following is an outline for developing a strategic appraisal.
Step 1: Determine U.S. Interests
— By category: defense of the homeland; economic well-being; favorable
world order; promotion of values.
— By intensity: vital; important; peripheral.
Step 2: Identify and Assess Challenges to U.S. Interests
— Defense Trends (Threats & Opportunities)
— Economic Trends (Threats & Opportunities)
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— World Order Trends (Threats & Opportunities)
— Promotion of Values Trends (Threats & Opportunities)
Step 3: Comparison to U.S. National Strategy. Discuss where your
assessment agrees or differs from the current U.S. national security strategy, and the reasons
you disagree.
Step 4: Policy Recommendations. Based on this assessment, present
policy recommendations for national diplomatic, economic, and military policies that must be
changed currently and in the future to protect against threats and to take advantage of
existing opportunities.
D. National Policy. To secure our national interests, the national political
leadership establishes policies to guide the formulation of a national strategy. National policy
is a broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the
national level in pursuit of national objectives.
E. National Strategy. (synonymous with national security strategy). The art
and science of developing and using all the elements of national power during peace and war
to secure national interests.
1. Various agencies of government contribute to the several components
of national strategy, with the President—assisted by the National Security Council (NSC)
and Staff—as the final integrator. Since the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the
President’s National Security Strategy document is the authoritative unclassified statement
of our national strategy.
2. You must be able to develop strategies employing all of the elements of
power. Remember, the formulation of national strategy, as it does at any level of strategy,
employs the strategic thought process based on the use of Ends, Ways, and Means:
a. National Objectives — ENDS.
b. National Strategic Concepts — WAYS.
c. National Resources — MEANS.
F. Military Strategy. Military strategy is meaningful only in the policy context
outlined above.
Military Strategy — The art and science of employing the armed forces of a
nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of
force.
Military Strategy = Objectives + Strategic Concepts + Resources
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Generic

Military

Answers

Ends

Objectives

What?

Ways

Concepts

How? (+Where & When)

Means

Resources

With What?

The next crucial step then, is translating national policy objectives and
guidance into clear, concise, and achievable military objectives.
1. Military Objectives. What is to be achieved by the military element of
power? As a rule of thumb, military objectives should:
be appropriate, explicit, finite, achievable, and, if necessitated
by policy guidance, limited in scope. (Test this by asking yourself if, as a CINC, you would
know exactly what you would be expected to accomplish by national leadership).
directly secure one (or more) stated interest(s). An effective first
step in articulating a military objective is to attach an appropriate verb to each previously
identified interest. For example:
Interest:

access to raw materials

Objective:

secure access to raw materials

Interest:

a region free of conflict

Objective:

deter intraregional conflict

Interest:

survival of Country X

Objective:

defend Country X

If no realizable military objective can be articulated to satisfy a given
interest, a policy choice to use the military element of power should be questioned.
2. Military Strategic Concepts. Strategic concepts are broad courses of
action or ways military power might be employed to achieve the aforestated objective. They
answer the question of “How.” Here is where the originality, imagination, and creativity of the
strategist come into play. As Clausewitz observed, there are many ways to achieve a given
end; presumably many can be right, but real genius lies in finding the best. As a rule of thumb:
Each military objective must have one (or more) concept(s)
detailing how means (resources) are to relate to ends (objectives).
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Stated strategic concepts represent the preferred options of the
possible courses of action considered.
Strategic concepts also detail when, where, phasing,
sequencing, roles, priorities, etc., as appropriate.
Example:
Interest: Access to Middle-East oil
Objective: Secure sea lines of communication to the Middle-East
Strategic Concept: U.S. naval forces and embarked land forces
will maintain a periodic presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Indian Ocean in
peacetime; be prepared to provide full-time presence in crisis; and be prepared to achieve
naval superiority in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean in wartime.
3. Military Resources. Finally, the strategy must have resources—i.e.,
military forces and means implied by the objectives and concepts identified. Military
resources are often stated as forces (divisions, wings, naval groups), but might include things
such as time, effort, organization, people, etc. As a rule of thumb:
concept articulated.

—Military resources must be identified for each objective and

—Supportability of forces should be addressed (in terms of
strategic lift, sustainability, host nation support, reinforcements, etc.).
—For Example:
One Carrier Battle Group (CBG) with an embarked Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) will deploy to X ocean on a quarterly basis . . .
A permanent Joint Task Force (JTF) will be established to . . . . Two
CONUS-based Divisions, one Special Forces Group and two Tactical Fighter Wings,
supported by . . . will be prepared to . . .
Identification of resource implications, while completing the
strategy, should be the first step in testing its internal logic. You should now think backward
through the process to ensure the forces envisioned are adequate to implement the concepts,
that the concepts achieve stated objectives, that the military objectives correctly satisfy the
policy objectives and protect the national interests identified, and so forth.
G. Risk Assessment. As almost no strategy has resources sufficient for
complete assurance of success, a final and essential test is to assess the risk of less than full
attainment of objectives. Living with risk is part of our business in the modern world, and
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being able to articulate its extent is the first step in reducing its impact. Where the risk is
determined to be unacceptable, the strategy must be revised. Basically there are three ways:
Reduce the objectives.
Change the concepts.
Increase the resources.
In other words, the strategist must reconcile the ends, ways and means to
minimize the risk inherent in a particular strategy.
IV. Conclusion. This thought process applies equally to national strategy, national
military strategy, and theater military strategy.
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